Bermudian Politics in Transition

Race, Voting, and Public Opinion

Frank E. Manning

Bermudian Politics in Transition explores the complex process that gave Bermuda's black Opposition a fifty per cent gain of parliamentary seats in 1976, split the ranks of Government, toppled the Premier, sparked a major race riot in 1977 and generated a mass momentum that endangers a white-controlled colonial order that has endured for more than three centuries. Based on survey research as well as intensive fieldwork, the book focuses on two areas: 1) trends in voting and party preference; 2) public opinion on the principal issues that have occupied Bermudian political attention since the inception of party politics in the 1960's.

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For Carolyn
and Lurleen

FOREWORD

Frank Manning has given us a book that has been long overdue in Bermuda: A detailed analysis of contemporary political thought and action.

Bermudian Politics in Transition will be compelling reading for anybody who is the least bit interested in Bermuda politics (and that seems to include everybody these days!), and who wants to learn more about what's what and why.

It will also be an indispensable tool for political strategists and pundits alike, unearthing some interesting, occasionally startling, but always enlightening insights into where Bermudians, the voters, stand on the issues of the day.

This book could literally prompt significant changes in party platforms before the next election.

It contains a veritable gold mine of information which goes a long way to explaining why the PLP picked up five more seats and increased its popular support in 1976, and conversely why the UBP lost those five seats and slipped in popular support.

Frank Manning's most fascinating find — and his surveys uncover plenty — has to be the pivotal role black women played in the PLP's stride forward.

His surveys also put paid to the popular notion that increased support only came from young blacks who were voting for the first time.

They also reveal long-suspected discontent among the white middle class with the direction in which the UBP appeared headed going into the '76 election: background to the movement within the party that toppled their leader, and Premier, Sir John Sharpe.

Bermudian Politics in Transition sets an exciting stage for the next election which could make or break the PLP.

As Frank Manning details, it was their shift to a more 'respectable' image in 1976 — toned-down socialistic rhetoric and emphasis on spiritual values and family life — which won them support from new places.

On the other hand, all is not lost for the UBP. Mr. Manning's book also clearly documents how they can shore up initial support and make inroads into growing support for the Opposition.

It may be, as Mr. Manning's surveys show, that voters believe their Government is only as good as its Opposition and they only wanted a more competitive Parliament.

And, after all, it is the voters of this country who will ultimately decide; and it's refreshing to see what they think for a change — which is what this book is all about.

Bermudian Politics in Transition is a welcome addition to any bookshelf of Bermuda history and the first in what I hope is a long line of its kind.

It also represents a great deal of hard work by an independent outsider whose objectivity makes this work that much more valuable.

John Barritt
Editor, Bermuda Sun

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PREFACE

Social research employs two approaches. The first, exemplified in the tradition of anthropology, is usually called qualitative. Human experience is studied intimately and in depth as a means of uncovering the innermost meanings of a culture. Investigation is done chiefly through the method of participant-observation — living with people, watching and listening to them, getting involved in their activities, sharing their concerns, becoming attuned to the rhythms of their lives. The results are more artistic than clinical, more humanistic than technical. The qualitative approach produces what Clifford Geertz (1973: 3-30) calls "thick description:" the interpretation of a culture by one who has seen it at close range, grasped its nuances, and thought out the logical relations and functional connections between its varied parts.

The second approach, more typical of political science and sociology, is known as quantitative. It aims to assess larger, more complex social units, trading depth for breadth and intimate encounter for broad exposure. Rather than personal, open-ended conversations, it employs questionnaires and formal interview schedules. One of the most systematic uses of these tools is survey research — the sampling of randomly selected members of a population to determine what characteristics prevail throughout the population as a whole. Properly done, a survey can yield data that are accurate enough to satisfy the most rigorous of scientific criteria.

My work in Bermuda, now spanning a decade, has been primarily qualitative. But in the aftermath of the critical election of 1976 I became convinced that to understand a political culture — my current objective — one must methodically assess the parameters of social thought within which politics has meaning, purpose, and value. To this end two surveys were conducted. The first, taken 25 days after Bermudians had gone to the polls, was an informal street sample aimed at identifying voting patterns from 1968 to 1976 by race, age, and sex. The second, taken two months later, was an extensive survey based on a stratified random cluster sample in selected residential areas. As the surveys are complementary and together

represent a self-contained and inherently interesting body of data, it was decided to make them available together as early as possible. This volume is the result.

Acknowledgements

The administration and analysis of the two surveys depended on many people, all of whom receive my deepest thanks. In Bermuda Chief Statistician Calvin Smith drew the random sample for the second survey, generously gave technical advice, and commented helpfully on an early draft. Gladstone Basset, 1970 Census Organizer, furnished maps and other materials for field work. Julia Durham, Tony Harper, Elaine Pascoe, and Elaine Tucker rendered skilled service as interviewers. Annette Richardson was an efficient secretarial assistant. Dorothy Newman, an American sociologist retired but fully active in Bermuda, gave a comprehensive critique of an early draft. Ford Baxter took an early interest in the project, and he, Donald French and Horst Augustinovic worked effectively to facilitate publication. Henry and Eula Douglas provided not only a house and an office, but a home in the fullest sense.

At Memorial University of Newfoundland my colleague Clinton Herrick was a valuable consultant during the year of processing, analyzing, and writing the material. Ruth Cornish efficiently managed computer operations. The University itself granted computer time and secretarial assistance. The Institute of Social and Economic Research covered part of my academic salary in 1976 and provided a grant for field research expenses.

My wife, Gail, was a constant helper. She did secretarial and interviewing work in the field, made a hand tabulation of the first survey, and drew all of the tables. My daughters, Carolyn and Lurleen, were remarkably patient as their father devoted long months to the labours of social research.



PART I

the political process

CHAPTER 1

BERMUDIAN POLITICS: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION

Bermuda's widely publicized riot in late 1977 capped an intermittently violent decade. There were earlier riots in 1968 and 1970, and a series of murders in 1972-73 that included the assassination of a British Governor and Police Commissioner as well as the slaying of several civilians. All incidents were fundamentally racial, dramatizing black rage against a white-dominated political economy and the persons who physically symbolize it.

From one viewpoint, the decade ended much as it began. Both the 1968 and 1977 riots were perpetrated by youthful street gangs from the notorious "back of town" section, Hamilton's diminutive counterpart to Kingston's Trenchtown or New York's Harlem. Both riots were associated with activities sponsored by the Progressive Labour Party (PLP), Bermuda's black political opposition. In 1968 the outbreak of violence was immediately preceeded by a volatile PLP campaign rally (Wooding 1969). In 1977 the upheaval was occasioned by the PLP's drive to stop the hanging of two blacks convicted of many of the earlier murders and legally represented during trial and through the appeal stages by the party's parliamentary leader, lawyer Lois Browne. The two riots also drew the same tired, stereotyped reactions: charges of tokenism from blacks, calls for tougher law and order from whites, and pleas for impartial inquiries from public figures walking the high road of neutrality.

Yet the political situation itself underwent notable changes between the riots. In 1968, the year of Bermuda's first election along party lines, the PLP was debilitated by a long period of internal dissension and by the frustrating spectre of its impotence against the predominately white and seemingly invincible United Bermuda Party (UBP). In 1977, three elections later, the PLP was within striking distance of a parliamentary majority and riding a tide of growing popular support. By contrast, the UBP had recently recorded its worst

electoral showing to date and experienced an internal reform movement that not only led to the humiliating resignation of Premier Sir John Sharpe, but also nakedly exposed the racial, ethnic, and class tensions beneath the facade of a 'united' party.

The broader social changes in the decade between the riots are equally apparent. In the late 1960's Bermuda was only beginning to emerge from a long history of segregation and institutionalized racism. White political authority was a fundamental social fact, as was expatriate domination of the educational system, the judiciary, and the police force. Ten years later blacks held a majority of parliamentary seats and had made unprecedented gains in the professions, government service, and even business. Interestingly, the judge who sentenced the convicted killers to death was not only black and Bermudian, but part of a family whose career achievements have been repeatedly acclaimed by the PLP.

The recurrence of similar events after a decade of notable change raises the question of whether the process of change has substantially affected the underlying structure of power relations. One is inclined here to compare Bermuda with the Commonwealth Caribbean, which went through the stages of "decolonization" — labour union organization, universal suffrage, party politics, representative government, and so on — a generation before Bermuda and which began to achieve two decades ago what has yet to occur and only recently become a viable prospect in Bermuda: national independence. Yet many would argue that even these changes have not appreciably altered the inner reality of Caribbean social life. Posing the rhetorical question, "Is Massa Day Dead?", the Vincentian commentator Orde Coombs replies: "Massa Day, it seems, never ends in the West Indies. It only grows blacker" (1974: xv). In other words, the old system of elite control persists. The only change is one of personnel. Black replaces white and native replaces foreigner, but a dominant class still dictates to a subordinate majority, relating to them with contempt, condescension, and cynical paternalism.

But one most guard against drawing a too-facile analogy. For one thing, "Massa Day" in Bermuda has always had more to do with race than (as in the Caribbean) with class. For another, what has happened in Bermuda is not simply the displacement of one group by a successor in the social hierarchy. Rather, there has been a diversification of the power structure through the absorption of new groups and the evolution of strategic alliances across what were formerly rigid barriers. The careful observer realizes that Bermuda has a different history than the Caribbean, and, potentially, a different future.

This book deals with the political character of the decade that began and ended with riots, focusing on how Bermudians have responded both at the ballot box and in the formation of ideological positions. We begin by looking at a system in transition.

The Assault on the Aristocracy

Traditionally — and the Bermuda Parliament dates to 1620, making it older than any in the British Commonwealth overseas — Bermuda was ruled by an aristocracy of white families descended from the first seventeenth century English settlers. Seafarers until the 1870's, agricultural exporters from then until the 1920's, and more recently an interlocking establishment of merchants, bankers, and corporate lawyers, the aristocracy has been a ruling class in an almost medieval sense. Parliament was theirs to run with the same cavalier smugness and unassailable authority that they ran the island's exclusive social clubs. Indeed, it is wistfully if privately acknowledged that major political decisions were typically reached over drinks and business deals in the Royal Bermuda Yacht Club. A clearer example of the concentration of political power, economic control, and social prestige in the same hands is not found in the West Indies, where local elites under the colonial system were far more beholden to British imperial directives (Lewis 1968: 323).

The barriers of race and class stratified the Bermudian social order, but not in the overlapping way illustrated by the colour-class hierarchies of the British and French Caribbean. Instead, class lines differentiated

the aristocracy from the diverse assemblage of other whites: their "poor cousins" who failed to acquire or maintain a controlling economic position, English and Irish labourers brought in for military construction in the nineteenth century, Turks Islanders who immigrated in the early twentieth century, Azorean Portuguese imported for the past hundred years as gardeners and farmhands, "soldier people" who settled in Bermuda after a tour of duty with the British garrison or naval squadron, civil servants, teachers, policemen, doctors, nurses, and most recently, corporate technocrats who service the international finance sector. On the other hand, an American type race bar segregated all whites from the black majority, whose own class system has been predicated on ethnic origin, cultural behaviour, and socioeconomic rank rather than pigmentation.

The rule of the aristocracy — generally known in Bermuda as either Front Street (their commercial address) or the Forty Thieves (their acquisitive style) — has been maintained through the instruments of economic patronage: jobs, loans, credit, recallable mortgages, charitable donations. Supporters of Front Street found it a paternal, even benevolent oligarchy. Opponents usually lost all that they had.

Not surprisingly, the first challenge to Front Street was delayed, cautious, token, and ultimately limited by what the aristocracy was willing to concede. It came from the Political Associations, parish organizations first formed in the late nineteenth century by blacks who held land and therefore the right to vote. Their aims were modest: to gain minority representation on the parish vestries and to win one of the four parish seats in the House of Assembly. These objectives were gradually met in heavily black parishes, but only through the selection of candidates deemed acceptable to Front Street; otherwise, white property-owning syndicates would be formed before elections to defeat them. The group of successful tradesmen, small shopkeepers, and rising professionals introduced to politics through the Associations were thus fully aware of their client role as well as the fragility of their economic and political positions.

The Associations continued after World War II, but black leadership was gradually assumed by a new ethnic

element: West Indians. A mixture of professionals who immigrated in the previous three decades and the children of labourers imported at the turn of the century, West Indians quickly developed a reputation for being more aggressive and enterprising than black Bermudians. Their cultural background in societies where class overshadowed race undoubtedly fostered these drives, while the new experience of segregation in Bermuda instilled a sense of militancy and frustration not characteristic of those who had been enculturated into a race system. Besides rising to prominence as candidates of the Associations, West Indians spearheaded the labour movement and the instigation of public pressure for democratic reforms in voting, education, and hiring practices.

Fundamental social changes were not realized, however, until the black movement took to the streets, again with the impetus coming from West Indian-Bermudians. The first thrust was an ad-hoc movement spawned in 1959 to desegregate movie theatres. A coordinated boycott and mass picketing effort closed the theatres until they agreed to accept an open seating policy. The entire demonstration lasted only two weeks, accomplishing what had been inconclusively discussed in Parliament for two years. The hotels quickly followed the precedent of the theatres, agreeing to accept reservations for dining, dancing, and entertainment from local residents without discrimination. Within a decade all commercial, government, and eventually private facilities were legally desegregated.

Another important thrust came from the labour union, started during World War II but essentially dormant in the following decade. Union dockworkers struck in 1959, drawing strong anti-union countermeasures from Government but also inspiring a resurgence of union militancy. The union's membership grew steadily from 1962 onwards, positioning it three years later for a general strike that escalated into a near riot as union picketers clashed with police and armed forces. Notably, the strike centered on a recognition dispute with the Bermuda Electric Light Company, the directors of which are Bermuda's most powerful aristocrats.

A third movement was the drive to extend the franchise, another reform stalled for years by the bureaucracy of parliamentary committees. A new initiative came in 1960 through a public group that took its case to the people through an island-wide series of forums. As pressure mounted Parliament was forced to act, and in 1962 formulated compromise legislation. The property qualification was dropped, but those who owned land were compensated with an extra or "plus" vote. In addition, the minimum age for voting was raised from 21 to 25 years.

From the ranks of the universal suffrage movement there emerged in 1963 Bermuda's first political party, the PLP (Progressive Labour Party). Its advantage over the independents, who included the aristocracy as well as a few blacks who chose to run again under Political Association sponsorship, was immediately apparent. The party coordinated and supported all campaign activity — rallies, fund raising, publicity, canvassing — and presented a single platform to the voters. Though in existence only three months prior to the 1963 General Election, and without a designated leader, the PLP mobilized massive "plumping" (casting one vote only) support. Of its nine candidates, six were elected to the House of Assembly.

With the plus vote scheduled to be phased out in that session of Parliament, and the voting age returned to 21, it seemed certain that three centuries of white aristocratic rule were at an end and that Bermuda would follow the course toward black government and decolonization pursued in the Commonwealth Caribbean since World War II. But what appeared inevitable failed to happen. In the next election in 1968 — Bermuda's first under full and equal adult suffrage — the PLP gained only a third of the popular vote and a quarter of the parliamentary seats, making Bermuda the single predominately black country in the Antilles to return a white government in its first election under democratic suffrage (Allen 1973: 122). Four years later, in the election of 1972, the phenomenon was repeated with an identical distribution of seats. Notably, eight of the ten PLP seats won in both elections were returned from predominantly West Indian districts. Bermudian districts as high as seven-tenths black rejected the PLP.

Dissension and radicalism readily step forward as important reasons for the PLP's humiliating defeats. A serious split developed early in the party's history between professionals and representatives of the union. Although in the Caribbean it has generally been the professional class who have built parties nominally tied to labour, the union gained a stronger presence in the PLP through its covert financial support of the party and its influence on the central committee. In the mid-1960's five of the six members of the parliamentary caucus either left or were expelled from the party, three to form a short-lived splinter party and two to return with scars that never really healed. Other professionals — physicians, dentists, lawyers, teachers — also bolted from the party or remained apolitical, many of them recently returned from university and generally expected by blacks to play a major role in political reform.

The drift toward left wing radicalism developed later in the decade, primarily through the influence of an intellectual fringe who formulated a loose ideology joining American concepts of Black Power with the revolutionary socialism of some African and Caribbean countries. Reified and militant, this stance further alienated conservative professionals. It also disturbed the core of working class supporters, whose political goals are immediate and mundane and whose dream of advancement centers more on capitalist competition than socialist equality (Manning 1973: 87-147). The party's most enthusiastic constituency became black street gangs and paramilitary youth groups, the element who have accounted for Bermuda's riots and killings.

The PLP's class antagonism and solipsistic radicalism were not, however, the products of a political vacuum. To grasp the party's collapse we must return to the aristocracy and the complex conditions which afforded them resilience and flexibility in the face of a black threat.

The House that Jack Built

> "Don't underestimate Front Street. They're some of the smartest white people in the British Commonwealth".
>
> — a black Bermudian

Traditionally stable and prosperous, the Bermudian economy experienced remarkable growth after World War II and particularly from 1960 onwards. The seasonal and elitist tourist trade that had been started in the 1920's evolved into mass tourism and became the dominant economic sector. Its growth accelerated in the 1960's, volume doubling in the first half of the decade and nearly doubling again by the end. Bermuda now entertains three-fifths of a million visitors each year, about ten times the resident population.

The second economic sector to experience boom growth has been international finance. A tax haven, Bermuda in the late 1940's began to offer shelter to foreign companies seeking a base for corporate business. In the 1960's the international companies became an important component of the economy, providing both a substantial source of public revenue and a stimulus for jobs, services, and new profit-making opportunities. Expansion escalated in the 1970's, resulting near the end of the decade in a registration approaching four thousand corporate entities.

The aristocracy have been the chief beneficiaries of Bermuda's phenomenal economic growth. Their Front Street stores are a major attraction both to tourists and to an increasingly affluent and consumer-oriented native population. They own Bermuda's major importing firms, public utilities, and the principal agencies and service businesses which cater to the tourist trade. They retain control of the two largest banks, and through the banks get most of the lucrative legal work generated by the international companies.

Yet while the aristocracy have profited immensely since World War II, the scale and rate of growth has been far too great for any monopoly to contain. Mass tourism required the renovation of old hotels and eventually the construction of new luxury hotels, demands beyond the reach of local capital. Hotel ownership, primarily Bermudian before World War II, passed to foreign interests, first British businesses seeking to invest money abroad after the post-war election of labour governments in England, and later American multinational hotel chains. Today nine of the ten "large" hotels (minimum 250 beds),

as well as most of the major small hotels, are foreign-owned.

The foreign ownership of the two major industries has brought an influx of management executives and corporate technicians. In the 1960's Bermuda experienced its largest decennial population growth in history, three-fifths of it resulting from immigration (Newman 1972: 2). The white population grew at twice the rate of the black (Census 1970: 34), especially in the age groups that constitute the most vigorous and upwardly mobile segment of the work force.

Besides the influx of expatriate expertise there has been considerable economic advancement among groups

Sir Henry "Jack" Tucker, UBP architect and parliamentary leader from 1964 to 1971, votes in Bermuda's first election under full and equal adult suffrage in 1968. (Sun Pic)

traditionally excluded from business. Portuguese, whites of working class and foreign ancestry, and a small but growing number of blacks have risen to prominence in such relatively new but flourishing and crucial fields as real estate, investment, and insurance. In addition, these same groups have seized opportunities created by the expansion of retail commerce, banking, corporate law, and other areas formerly monopolized by Front Street.

While socially fragmented by traditional class, racial, and ethnic antipathies, Bermuda's old and new money interests readily agreed on two points: the merits of the free enterprise system and the intolerable threat presented by the PLP's black militancy and revolutionary socialism. Their necessary course of action was equally clear: to form a political movement that could unite white Bermuda and lure enough black support to stop the PLP.

The result was the United Bermuda Party (UBP), founded in 1964 by 24 of the 30 independents in the House of Assembly — many of whom, ironically, had campaigned the year before on personal platforms opposed to the party system. The architect was Sir Henry "Jack" Tucker, whose influence during seven years as leader and subsequent years as elder statesman is suggested in the party's unofficial name: "the House that Jack Built". Bermuda's most powerful banker and an aristocrat of celebrated ancestry, Tucker's ability derived from his understanding of the patronage system and its adaptability to changing conditions. He realized that the cohesion of the party required the wide distribution of not only cabinet posts and other political appointments, but also club memberships, company directorships, and investment opportunities. He had the authority and economic leverage to procure this largesse from Front Street, and the political sagacity to dispense it effectively.

Legislatively the UBP co-opted the PLP's democratic reform proposals, leading the drive for desegregation, free secondary education, and full and equal adult suffrage. On more controversial matters it modified the PLP's positions, but nonetheless gradually implemented Government-financed social services and made a formal commitment to the Bermudianization of the labour force. The strategy achieved both its obvious aim of winning the marginal black vote as well as the more subtle but crucial

objective of forcing the PLP into a leftist position that was both untenable at the polls and a dramatization of the threat that made the UBP coalition an economic necessity. It was ultimately the PLP that furnished the foundation for the house of Jack.

Dissension and Retribution

In December 1971 Sir Henry Tucker retired from active politics. On his orders the UBP made two moves that its critics predicted would never happen. The first was the selection of Sir Edward Richards, an Afro-Guyanese lawyer and Bermuda's first black knight, as the new Premier. The second was the nomination of John Swan, Bermuda's most successful black businessman, as the candidate for Sir Henry's seat in Paget East, a district more than nine-tenths white and the UBP's safest constituency. Both moves could be challenged as tokenism, of course, but even cynics had to admit that they were tokens of a magnitude not previously dispensed. The PLP was again preempted.

In the aftermath of those events and its second humiliating electoral defeat in 1972, the PLP was left exhausted and despairing. A few party veterans quietly disengaged from politics to devote renewed attention to occupational careers. Others who remained active reevaluated their views, generally coming to the conclusion that racial militancy and revolutionary socialism were, after all, unsuited to Bermuda. At the same time a group of culturally bourgeoisie professionals, mainly teachers, took enough interest in the party to seek seats on the policy-making central committee, while small businessmen became active on the branch level and groomed themselves as future candidates. Through the growing influence of media and advertising people who introduced sophisticated public relations techniques, a new image was gradually created. The PLP became respectable.

The diminishment of a militant black threat undercut the brokerage value of UBP blacks to their white colleagues, especially in view of the gesture of elevating Richards to the party leadership. The reaction of the UBP blacks to the dissipation of their bargaining position came with the formation of the Black Caucus in late 1974. Its

detailed report renewed familiar black demands for better educational and job training programmes, called for government financial assistance for aspiring black businessmen, and urged a moratorium on the granting of status (citizenship), a position long taken by the PLP. More interesting, though, was the ventriloquist strategy of presentation. Throughout the report references were made to the militant unrest of the black public and their alleged contempt for the UBP. The solution, urged the report, was for UBP blacks to be seen receiving greater recognition and for more blacks to be brought into the party and assured of "meaningful participation" in the councils of power. Failure to heed the warning, and in particular to integrate blacks into the upper echelons of the economy, would result in socialist upheaval of the type seen in Jamaica (Black Caucus n.d.).

Predictably, the Black Caucus was viewed by many UBP whites as a form of political extortion. They had supported UBP blacks in two campaigns, submerging but not forgetting the realization that a party financed by white money, elected primarily through white votes, and representative of a white political tradition, had been forced to tailor its platform to woo black votes and to stifle the political ambitions of whites in order to run enough black candidates to have a semblance of integration. Now blacks not only belied the image of racial unity, but demanded further concessions as well.

The most vocal reaction within the UBP came from Portuguese, expatriates, and whites of working class origins, groups who are the structural competitors of blacks but suffer the political liability of being white. As a rival ethnic identity was unavailable (although a few comics suggested that a "Gee Caucus" might be appropriate), the group instead framed their position around rightist concerns: the growing power of the labour union, the rising cost of social services, the increase of crime, the breakdown of discipline in the schools, and the summary theme of a drift toward socialism. A small segment of the parliamentary caucus began to challenge the party and even to vote against it in the House of Assembly, while at the same time demanding greater representation for themselves on Cabinet.

As they attempted unsuccessfully in 1972, the white dissidents sought again in 1976 to increase their strength

by going after Front Street incumbents in pre-election primaries. Three primary challenges were made, all of them a conservative critique against the centrist position of the party mainstream as well as a class struggle between new and old money, between those who identified with a background of hardship and hard work and those whom they saw as the unworthy heirs of power and privilege. Two of the primaries unseated incumbents, swelling the ranks and the confidence of the dissident whites.

UBP incumbent Harry Viera, right, and PLP opponent Llewellyn Fox wait at the polling station in Southampton West. Bermuda's "Portuguese King", Viera was the chief strategist in the UBP primaries and in the reformist movement that toppled Premier Sharpe.

It was, then, a bitterly divided UBP which went into the 1976 General Election, facing an opposition that had muted its controversial reputation among blacks and taken a faint step toward neutralizing whites. The PLP won four marginal seats held by the UBP since 1968, and took a fifth — somewhat less marginal — in a bye-election four months later. Thirteen years after its formation the PLP had finally come within striking distance of victory, although it still needed five more seats to deadlock the House of Assembly.

With its position eroded, the UBP's factionalism hardened. The Black Caucus report, stalled for a year and

substantially diluted in a Cabinet committee, had not been incorporated into campaign policy. Moreover, UBP blacks saw their PLP counterparts moving into lucrative client roles as the international companies, Bermuda's newest and best-endowed patrons, began to hedge their bets on the island's political future. Whites outside the aristocracy continued to press rightist positions, to vent the view that the party hierarchy was isolating itself from the legitimate needs and grievances of whites, and to insist that without widespread reform the UBP stood in danger of losing the next election.

For several reasons the disaffection of both dissident wings focused on Jack (later Sir John) Sharpe, who had succeeded Richards as Premier five months before the 1976 election. A white of working class and "soldier people" origins, Sharpe was nonetheless disliked by this stratum of whites for his liberalism and his tendency to side with Front Street. And while having an easy informality with blacks on the ground level, the business and professional blacks in Cabinet considered him paternalistic and authoritarian. Like Richards, moreover, he lacked a strong economic position and therefore the authority to gain the concessions that blacks demanded.

Setting aside their ideological differences and racial antipathies, the two dissident groups united early in 1977 to bring about several resignations from the Cabinet and other key party posts. The move forced Sharpe to turn to the aristocracy to rebuild his Cabinet, thereby accentuating the Front Street image. In the following months Sharpe survived two non-confidence motions in the parliamentary caucus, but failed to improve his beleagured position. In August, 1977, he resigned the Premiership.

The ensuing struggle for succession came down to a clash between the "reformist" (black and white dissidents) and "establishment" (Front Street) wings of the party. Blacks, the most powerful group in the reformist bloc, got their choice as the reformist candidate: C. V (Jim) Woolridge, a black of West Indian ancestry. The establishment put up David Gibbons, a white businessman whose family empire controls Bermuda's largest conglomerate. The winner was Gibbons, but the vote of

the parliamentary caucus was close and the mandate was clear: to integrate the black and white reformists into a new, socially balanced coalition. His first Cabinet was a dramatic step in this direction, as he fired two Front Street aristocrats from the former Cabinet to make room for additional blacks and Portuguese.

In a sense, the political transition since World War II has followed a logic of retribution. The aristocracy brought in West Indians as cheap labour, indentured Portuguese to perform Bermuda's most menial work and to function as a buffer group between the races, accelerated white expatriate immigration as a countermeasure to universal suffrage, and excluded working class whites from privilege while insisting that they keep separate from blacks. Yet all of these groups turned against the aristocracy when it no longer had the exclusive economic sanctions to hold them in check. Even Gibbons illustrates the retributive pattern. His Bermudian ancestry goes back only to the nineteenth century, and his father and uncle, founders of the family business empire, started from nothing and were at one time crassly excluded from the sanctuaries of social prestige. What Gibbons represents is the first successful challenge by an outsider against the economic hegemony of the aristocracy — the pattern that produced the diverse coalition that first became the UBP and later reformed it.

Besides the pattern of partisan reversal and social retribution, the transitional process reveals the strategic advantages of holding a moderate position — a position that sustains the political economy of free enterprise capitalism. The UBP's co-option of the center elicits class dissension and left wing radicalism from the PLP. The PLP's cultivation of bourgeois respectability elicits racial dissension and right wing backlash from the UBP. The UBP's reconstruction of a socially mixed but essentially conservative coalition prompts the PLP to renew its ties with Bermuda's real "minority" group — the poor and alienated from the back of town.

Thus the relative strengths of the combatants change, but the underlying structure of power persists. As long as the PLP poses a radical challenge to that structure, the solidarity and success of the UBP are assured. To fragment and weaken the UBP, the PLP

must be seen as compatible with Bermuda's dominant interests. The riots that punctuate the political process are ritualistic recognitions that the process at its deepest level does more to preserve the social order than to remodel it.

We turn now to voting and public opinion, and what they reveal about the culture that Bermuda's political system has bred.

CHAPTER 2

THE RACE VOTE

That Bermudian politics is based on race is not, of course, a new piece of information. Yet fifteen years after the appearance of political parties, there is still virtually no informed understanding of the patterns and processes that constitute Bermuda's peculiar version of racial politics. For example, in determining the proportion of blacks who vote for the UBP — the critical question in deciding the outcome of all elections since universal suffrage — district strategists simply assume that all whites vote UBP. They then subtract the number of white votes — known from the reports of polling station representatives — from the total number of UBP votes, taking the remainder as the measure of black UBP support. There have been no means of breaking down the black vote by age, sex, class or other variables, and no reliable method of forecasting trends.

The survey reported in this chapter, hereafter referred to as the "post-election survey", was intended as a rough initial step to elicit three vital types of data: 1) the composition of the 1976 vote, by race, age, and sex; 2) the demographic and political basis of the PLP's impressive gain in popular vote between 1972 and 1976; and 3) the difference, if any, between which party the voters supported and which party they hoped would win the Government. Conducted 25 days after the election, the survey interviewed 293 persons — slightly more than one per cent of the registered voters and about one and a half per cent of those who actually voted in 1976. Though the sample was not chosen on a scientific random basis, the survey had a built-in factor for checking its accuracy — the question about how respondents voted in 1976. With adjustments made for sampling biases, the survey results fell within two percentage points of the actual popular vote.[1]

1. A detailed discussion of the post-election survey, including a comparison of its results to the popular vote, is found in Appendix 1.

TABLE 2 - 1
VOTING PATTERNS, BY RACE

Race	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
Black	100	12	80	8	205
White	100	97	1	2	88

The Making of the Government 1976

The politics of race are indisputably illustrated by Table 2-1. Four-fifths of blacks give voting support to the PLP, while nearly all whites support the UBP. Neither party can claim a bi-racial following in any reasonable sense, although the UBP is certainly closer to that ideal than the PLP.

Table 2-2 examines the black vote by age and sex. PLP support stands highest at 91 per cent in the 21-29 age group, and thereafter declines through each successive cohort to a low of 71 per cent among those over 60. Correspondingly, UBP support rises consistently from 4 per cent of the youngest cohort to 21 percent of the oldest. While neither pattern is surprising, the level of PLP support among older blacks is considerably greater than is commonly assumed. Among respondents over 50, PLP supporters outnumbered UBP supporters by more than 3 to 1.

A more striking finding is the differential between the sexes. Overall, men and women evidence similar voting records, men giving slightly more support to the PLP and slightly less to the UBP. But with age controlled, there are notable differences in every cohort and an average cohort difference of 16 percentage points. The male pattern is an exaggeration of the black sample as a whole. In the youngest cohort, 95 per cent support the PLP and 5 per cent the UBP. The ratio becomes more evenly balanced in each successive older group, standing at 57 per cent PLP, 29 per cent UBP, and 14 per cent split ticket in the oldest cohort. Among women, however, PLP support declines through the middle years only. Thereafter the pattern reverses, making the two oldest cohorts similar to the two

TABLE 2 - 2
VOTING PATTERNS OF BLACKS, BY AGE AND SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & Over	100	21	71	8	24
50 — 59	100	20	72	8	24
40 — 49	99	16	73	10	49
30 — 39	100	9	81	10	53
21 — 29	100	4	91	5	54
All Ages	100	12	80	8	205

B. MALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & Over	100	29	57	14	14
50 — 59	100	25	67	8	12
40 — 49	100	9	83	8	24
30 — 39	100	0	88	12	25
21 — 29	100	5	95	0	20
All Ages	100	11	81	8	95

C. FEMALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & Over	100	10	90	0	10
50 — 59	100	15	77	8	13
40 — 49	100	24	64	12	25
30 — 39	100	18	75	7	28
21 — 29	100	3	88	9	34
All Ages	100	14	78	8	110

youngest. Thus it is young blacks of both sexes and older black women who provide the hard core of PLP support. The weakest black support for the PLP comes from middle-aged women and older men.[2]

Table 2-3 offers a similar breakdown of whites. While the near unanimity of UBP support and the relatively small number of cases renders findings subject to more error than in the black case, it is notable that the only deviation from full UBP voting support occurs among males, particularly in the 21-29 cohort. It remains to be seen whether this signals an incipient trend of white attrition from the UBP.

Another suggestive observation is that the races differ from each other in opposite ways with respect to voting behavior by sex. Among blacks, men give stronger support to the PLP than women. Among whites, women give stronger support to the UBP than men.

The Shifting Electorate

Of the popular vote the UBP polled 56.6 per cent in 1968, 61.8 per cent in 1972, and 55.5 per cent in 1976.

2. While this striking pattern could have been altered by the shift of a few cases, it is replicated in another survey with a different sample population. See Chapter 3.

Walter Roberts, PLP Member of Parliament, speaks to outdoor gathering in Somerset. At left is sportsman and party stalwart Randy Horton.

TABLE 2 - 3
VOTING PATTERNS OF WHITES, BY AGE AND SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & Over	100	100	0	0	13
50 — 59	100	96	0	4	25
40 — 49	100	100	0	0	11
30 — 39	100	100	0	0	25
21 — 29	100	86	7	7	14
All Ages	100	97	1	2	88

B. MALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & Over	100	100	0	0	9
50 — 59	100	92	0	8	13
40 — 49	100	100	0	0	6
30 — 39	100	100	0	0	14
21 — 29	100	60	20	20	5
All Ages	100	94	2	4	47

C. FEMALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & Over	100	100	0	0	4
50 — 59	100	100	0	0	12
40 — 49	100	100	0	0	5
30 — 39	100	100	0	0	11
21 — 29	100	100	0	0	9
All Ages	100	100	0	0	41

Correspondingly, the PLP's share of the popular vote was 34.4 per cent in 1968, 38.7 per cent in 1972, and 44.4 per cent in 1976.

The differences between 1968 and 1972 are confused by the Bermuda Democratic Party (BDP), which ran in 1968 along with 9 independents. Although no BDP or independent candidate gained a seat, they collectively polled 9 per cent of the popular vote. These votes were split fairly evenly between the major parties in 1972, increasing their popular support but leaving their relative strengths and their distribution of parliamentary seats unchanged.

The crucial comparison, then, is between 1972 and 1976, elections contested only by the two major parties.[3] The four parliamentary seats[4] and six percentage points of the popular vote that switched from the UBP to the PLP constitute the outstanding change in Bermuda's brief history of party politics.

Party spokesmen and political pundits have generally attributed the PLP's popular vote gain to the more than eighteen hundred new registered voters.[5] The popular view is illustrated by the *Royal Gazette's* election analysis:

> The figures do not indicate there was any noticeable "swing" away from the UBP to the PLP. But rather that there was an increase in the number of people who registered to vote, and that by far the greatest number of these new registrations were PLP supporters.
>
> In short, the UBP in voting strength practically held what it had, while the PLP went into new ground to increase the size of its support...
>
> The PLP increased its overall total by 3,124, whereas the UBP vote dropped by 546...
>
> So, at most, the PLP could only lay claim to having "taken" 546 away from the UBP as compared

3. A lone independent candidate in 1976 gained less than one-tenth of 1 percent of the popular vote.
4. The PLP gained a fifth seat in the bye-election held four months after the General Election, giving it 15 seats in the House of Assembly. The UBP holds 25 seats.
5. While there are slight discrepancies in the reported figures, there were about 3,600 voter registrations between 1972 and 1976. About half of these were changes of name or address, and the other half were new voters. There are no official records of the age and race breakdown of the new voters.

with 1972. That in itself would not be sufficient in a total poll of 36,971 as recorded yesterday. What really did hurt the UBP was the way the new voters obviously sided with the PLP. (*Royal Gazette*, May 19, 1976:6)

The *Mid Ocean News* made a similar observation in its election wrap-up:

> Over 2,000 more voters turned out in this year's poll, and this must be giving UBP officials some food for thought. For many of them must have voted for the PLP in order for its percentage of the total poll to swell as it did. (*Mid Ocean News*, May 22, 1976:5).

Aside from arithmetical errors beyond our present concern, these accounts rest on the premise that Bermudians do not switch their voting allegiance. An increase in PLP support must, therefore, result from new voters alone. A cognate assumption is that the great majority of these new voters are under 25 — that is, persons who have reached voting age since the last election rather than older persons who failed to vote before — and black. The extent to which the parties share this conventional wisdom is suggested by the PLP's persistent proposal to lower the voting age to 18 and the UBP's adamant rejection of it.

The post-election survey, however, strongly challenges the supposition that the PLP's increased strength comes primarily from young blacks voting for the first time. While this group heavily favoured the PLP, their level of support was only about the same as that of all blacks in their 20's. Their presence as voters constituted but one of the causes which contributed to the PLP's vote gain. Other important causes were the conversion of blacks who previously voted for the UBP or split tickets, the heavy support of blacks who previously failed to vote, and incipient white erosion from the UBP, notably among the young. Let us examine the data.

Table 2-4 is a measure of the PLP's voter increase between 1972 and 1976. With split tickets counted as one vote for each party, the PLP can be seen to gain 5½ percentage points of the black popular vote and 2 percentage points of the white popular vote. Rounded out and adjusted to the racial balance of the electorate, the survey registers a five per cent popular vote gain for the PLP — about three-quarters of a per cent less than the actual gain

TABLE 2 - 4
VOTING PATTERNS IN 1972 AND 1976, BY RACE

Party Vote	Black		White	
	1972	1976	1972	1976
Total	100	100	100	100
UBP	19	12	100	97
PLP	76	80	0	1
Split Ticket	5	8	0	2
Number of Cases	163	205	65	88

recorded at the polls and thus seemingly an accurate gross measurement.

For the sources of the PLP's gains, let us look first at blacks, the pivotal group. Table 2-5, a comparison of the black respondents who voted in both 1972 and 1976, reveals that there has been an impressive shift on the part of previous voters. The UBP has lost six percentage points of the black vote, two-thirds of it going to the PLP and the remainder to split tickets. Thus the PLP has reaped a 5 per cent net gain among previous black voters, about the same as its gain in the larger sample that includes new voters as well.

The similarity between new and previous black voters is illustrated in Table 2-6. The two groups are virtually identical with respect to support for the PLP. The only difference is that the new voters give less support to the UBP and more to split tickets — a pattern that slightly favours the PLP. Otherwise, the new voters merely reinforce the already high levels of PLP support among those who previously voted. They add numerically to the PLP's votes — a critical electoral function — but do not have a

TABLE 2 - 5
VOTING SHIFT OF BLACKS WHO VOTED IN 1972 AND 1976

Election Year	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
1972	100	19	76	5	163
1976	100	13	80	7	163

TABLE 2 - 6
VOTING PATTERNS OF BLACKS, BY PREVIOUS VOTING STATUS

Previous Voting Status	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
Voted in previous election	100	13	80	7	163
Did not vote in prevous election	100	7	79	14	42
1) Not old enough	100	0	89	11	18
2)Old enough, but ineligible	100	0	50	50	2
3) Eligible, but did not vote	100	14	72	14	22

PLP chairman Charles Bean, center, celebrates with three-time winner Austin Thomas, left, and party leader Lois Browne, right, after the gain of four seats in the 1976 election. (Sun Pic)

TABLE 2 - 7
RELATIVE SIGNIFICANCE OF NEW BLACK PLP SUPPORT, BY PREVIOUS STATUS OF VOTERS

Previous Voting Status	Percent	Number of Cases
Voted for UBP or split ticket	23	10
Not old enough to vote	37	16
Old enough, but ineligible to vote	2	1
Eligible, but failed to vote	37	16
TOTAL	99	43

significantly greater allegiance to the PLP than the former voters.

There are, of course, notable differences between the two major groups of new voters — those who were previously too young to vote, and those who were previously eligible but failed to exercise their franchise. As expected, PLP support is higher in the younger group. But that group's support is only the same as that of blacks in their upper 20's who also voted in 1972. Thus the new black voters reinforce the pattern of their cohort already established in the previous election.

The other large group of new black voters, those who previously failed to vote, gave somewhat less support to the PLP and more to split tickets than the black average. Still, their support represents an important addition to the PLP's vote count, especially since they constitute more than 10 per cent of the black survey respondents.

The relative contribution of all blacks who voted for the PLP for the first time, is shown in Table 2-7. The under-25's account for 37 per cent of the party's gain — a proportion that falls far below the popular interpretation of the election results. Moreover, it is highly possible that even this figure is exaggerated, given our strong impression that this group is considerably more apathetic with regard to voting that the black population as a whole. Our pollsters, for example, reported that about half of the persons they approached in their early 20's had not voted and were thus disqualified from the survey. In other age groups, by comparison, only about one in four persons had to be disqualified.

TABLE 2 - 8
VOTING SHIFT OF WHITES WHO VOTED IN 1972 AND 1976

Election Year	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
1972	100	100	0	0	65
1976	100	98	0	2	65

Respondents converted to the PLP from UBP or split ticket voting account for nearly one-fourth of the party's vote gain, while those who were previously eligible but failed to vote account for 37 per cent. Both groups, in a sense, are converts, the former from other voting allegiances and the latter from apathy. Together they constitute three-fifths of the PLP's new black voters.

Turning to whites, Table 2-8 indicates that there has been a slight drift from the UBP to split tickets among those who previously voted. While the relatively small number of respondents makes projection subject to a wider margin of error than in the black case, there is at least the suggestion that the white population, politically speaking, is no longer a seamless whole. This suggestion is carried further in Table 2-9, comparing whites who voted previously with those who voted for the first time in 1976. Among the new voters, 8 per cent supported the PLP or split tickets. Ironically, the implication — albeit one

TABLE 2 - 9
VOTING PATTERNS OF WHITES, BY PREVIOUS VOTING STATUS

Previous Voting Status	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
Voted in previous election	100	98	0	2	65
Did not vote in previous election	99	91	4	4	23
1) Not old enough	99	71	14	14	7
2) Old enough, but ineligible	100	100	0	0	12
3) Eligible, but did not vote	100	100	0	0	4

that requires further testing — is that young whites differ politically from others of their race to a greater extent than young blacks differ from other blacks. Supportive evidence for this possibility is presented in the following chapter.

In sum, the growth of PLP support comes from many sources — blacks under 25, blacks in other age groups who previously did not vote, blacks converted from UBP or split ticket voting, a marginal white element who have drifted from the UBP, and young whites voting for the first time. Data for blacks are firm and those for whites appear to be suggestive of what could be a dramatic change in Bermudian politics: the breakup of the solid white vote.

At the same time, the PLP's gains are exceeded by the UBP's losses — an indication that the 1976 election was more of a defeat for the UBP than a victory for the PLP. Among those in both races who changed their voting allegiance, the major shift was the decline in UBP support. In the black case, one-third of this decline went to split tickets; in the white case, all of it went to split tickets. If nothing else, these findings buttress the UBP's internal critics who contend that their party has made costly political mistakes.

The shift to the PLP among blacks who voted for the UBP or split tickets in the previous election invites further analysis, as it represents the strongest evidence of a real political transition. Table 2-10, a comparison of the voting record of those blacks who voted in both 1972 and 1976, shows UBP support declining by 6 percentage points, two-

TABLE 2 - 10
VOTING SHIFT OF BLACKS, BY AGE

	Percent								
	1972				1976				No. of Cases
Age	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & over	100	30	70	0	100	22	74	4	23
50 — 59	100	25	58	17	100	21	71	8	24
40 — 49	100	19	77	4	100	17	75	8	48
30 — 39	100	15	83	2	100	9	85	6	46
21 — 29	100	5	86	9	100	0	95	5	22
All Ages	100	19	76	5	100	13	80	7	163

thirds of it going to the PLP and the remainder to split tickets. The decline is seen in every cohort, but is greatest — 8 percentage points — in the oldest cohort. Correspondingly, PLP support increases in all but the 40-49 age group, where it falls by 2 percentage points. The greatest increase, an impressive 13 percentage points, is seen in the 50-59 cohort. These data clearly show that the major erosion from the UBP and the major swing to the PLP occurred among older black Bermudians.

Table 2-11 reveals that the voter shift also varies somewhat by sex. While both sexes register a four per cent gain in PLP support, the decline in UBP support is twice as great among men as among women. The difference, of course, is that split ticket voting also rises

TABLE 2 - 11
VOTING SHIFT OF BLACKS, BY AGE AND SEX

A. MALE

Age	Percent								No. of Case
	1972				1976				
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & over	100	38	62	0	101	31	62	8	13
50 — 59	99	33	58	8	100	25	67	8	12
40 — 49	100	13	83	4	100	9	87	4	23
30 — 39	100	13	83	4	100	0	87	13	23
21 — 29	100	0	100	0	100	0	100	0	7
All Ages	100	19	77	4	100	11	81	8	78

B. FEMALE

Age	Percent								No. of Cases
	1972				1976				
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
60 & over	100	20	80	0	100	10	90	0	10
50 — 59	100	25	58	17	100	17	75	8	12
40 — 49	100	24	72	4	100	24	64	12	25
30 — 39	100	17	83	0	100	17	83	0	23
21 — 29	100	7	80	13	100	0	93	7	15
All Ages	100	19	75	6	100	15	79	6	85

among men, but holds constant among women. Thus the female pattern is one of conversion to the PLP, while the male pattern is a mixture of conversion to the PLP and attrition from the UBP.

Greater sex differences emerge when comparisons are made within individual cohorts. Among women, there is an appreciable growth of PLP support in the 21-29, 50-59, and over 60 cohorts, gained from the ranks of those who formerly supported the UBP or split tickets.[6] Thus the heavy growth of PLP support among older blacks stems primarily from women. Among men, nonetheless, there is an impressive growth of PLP support in the 50-59 age group.

The significance of black women in contributing to the growth of PLP support is indicated further by their preponderance in the group which voted in 1976 but failed to exercise their franchise, though eligible, in 1972. Of these persons about two-thirds are women, nearly three-quarters of whom supported the PLP. In short, the PLP's drive to politicize older, previously apathetic blacks reached about twice as many women as men.

Voting as Sport

Three days after the 1976 election, a regular fixture in a black workmen's club observed that he voted for the PLP although he really wanted to see the UBP win. He compared the governmental process to a boxing match, noting: You're only as good as your opposition. If I hit you and you can't hit me back, then it's no contest."

An illustration of the agonistic metaphor that is common in black Bermudian social thought (Manning 1973: 87-145), this remark suggests that good politics, like good sport, is based on keen, close competition. One suspects that the view has induced many blacks to support the PLP, not to put it in power but to put it in a better position for political competition.

After the election, PLP strategists confided that they were helped considerably by the *Mid Ocean News,* which reported on the basis of a pre-election poll that the UBP

6. Although the shift of a few cases could have changed this pattern, it is confirmed with respect to most age cohorts by a second independent survey. See especially Table 3-8 in Chapter 3.

would return to power, that the mood of the country was unchanged, and that the distribution of parliamentary seats would be about the same as in the previous election (*Mid Ocean News*, May 15, 1976:1, 2, 4). The PLP's view was that the prediction not only lulled whites to sleep, but assured blacks that they could vote for the PLP without changing the Government. Interestingly, the Bermuda Industrial Union, organizational backbone of the PLP, predicted some weeks before the election that the party would suffer defeat (*Worker's Voice*, April 23, 1976).

These items suggest something distinctive about Bermudian politics. In other countries, candidates and parties confidently predict victory. There is also evidence that indications about who will win an election — whether from opinion polls or the publication of early returns — tends to create a "bandwagon" psychology among the electorate, inclining them to support the likely winner. But in Bermuda it is the opposite, at least in terms of the PLP's fortunes. Predictions of defeat seem to be the best way to rally a number of voters who might otherwise not support the party.

We were curious to test this hypothesis, and yet wary of embarrassing respondents by asking whether they really wanted to see the party they supported win the election. Instead, we referred to the next election, asking which party they would vote for and which party they

TABLE 2 - 12
VOTING INTENTION AND DESIRED WINNER IN THE NEXT ELECTION, BY RACE

Race	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Un-decided	
BLACK					
Voting Intention	100	4	60	36	205
Desired Winner	100	5	50	45	205
WHITE					
Voting Intention	100	61	0	39	88
Desired Winner	100	72	1	27	88

wanted to see form the Government. The results, shown in Table 2-12, reveal that while 60 per cent of blacks are reasonably sure of voting again for the PLP, only 50 per cent want to see the PLP form the next government. Hence one in six blacks who will vote for the PLP is undecided about whether he wants to see that party win the election.[7] This type of pattern is not found among blacks who favor the UBP, and it is exactly reversed among whites, whose intention to vote UBP again is 11 percentage points lower than their desire to see the UBP retain control of Government. Thus the sporting view of voting is confined to black PLP supporters, as originally suspected. But its future role is problematic as the PLP gains strength and moves within striking distance of a parliamentary majority. Will the desire to compete eventually instill a desire to win? Or will the prospect of winning stop the game?

7. Approximately one-seventh of the undecided voters in each race said their decision would depend on the candidates.

CHAPTER 3

PARTY PREFERENCE

Like evidence in a court case, research data are strengthened by independent corroboration. Our second survey, a stratified random sample conducted in selected residential areas and hereafter known as the "residential survey," was conceived in part as a means of independently testing the post-election survey, particularly the three striking findings discussed in the previous chapter:

1. The tendency of an electorally significant proportion of blacks to vote for the PLP while hoping it will not win the Government.

2. The indication that the PLP's growth of popularity results not only from newly-registered young blacks but also, and more importantly, from the conversion of blacks of all ages who formerly supported the UBP or split tickets, from the politicization of blacks of all ages who formerly failed to vote, and from a trend of white alienation from the UBP.

3. A pattern of sexual difference in voting behaviour, especially among blacks but also among whites, that varies independently of age.

We deemed party agreement an appropriate analogue of voting support, and therefore asked respondents which party they currently agreed with more, and which party they agreed with more in 1972 (Items 26 and 27). An analysis of their answers not only confirms the major findings about voting patterns but also points to underlying reasons for their occurrence.

TABLE 3 - 1
CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT, BY RACE

Race	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Black	100	29	52	19	216
White	100	85	4	11	71

TABLE 3 - 2 (Same as Table 2-1)
CURRENT VOTING SUPPORT, BY RACE

Race	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Split Ticket	
Black	100	12	80	8	205
White	100	97	1	2	88

Party Agreement

Table 3-1 shows the percentage response by race to the question about current party agreement. A slight majority of blacks choose the PLP and nearly three tenths the UBP, with the remainder unsure. Among whites a resounding 85 per cent agree with the UBP, 4 per cent (surprising, perhaps) select the PLP, and 11 per cent are unsure.

Using the post-election survey as a basis of comparison (Table 3-2),[1] we can see that voting support exceeds party agreement for both races. But the gap is much greater among blacks (28 percentage points) than it is among whites (12 percentage points). Even with the "not sure" category of blacks added to those who profess agreement with the PLP, only 71 per cent of blacks favour the PLP — 9 percentage points less than the black PLP vote. By comparison, black agreement with the UBP stands at 29 percent, more than twice the level of black voting support for that party. Among whites, on the other hand, the "not sure" category and the UBP agreement category together come within one percentage point of the white UBP voting support. The obvious inference is that an appreciable percentage of blacks vote for the PLP even though they actually agree more with the UBP — an observation that seems to confirm the earlier finding that some blacks vote for the PLP simply to put it in a better competitive position.

The implications of this seeming paradox are staggering (Table 3-3). With the white sample "blown up" to its proper size (about 36 per cent of the electorate), the

1. The residential survey was taken within two months of the post-election survey, and there were no major developments during that period that would have affected the political climate. Hence voting behaviour and party agreement can be seen as separate (though of course related) types of data, rather than as a single measurement which changed over time.

TABLE 3 - 3
HYPOTHETICAL VOTING SUPPORT BY RACE, BASED ON CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT WITH ADJUSTMENT OF WHITE SAMPLE TO 36 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES

Race	UBP		PLP		Not Sure	
	Percent	Number of Cases	Percent	Number of Cases	Percent	Number of Cases
Black	29	63	52	113	19	40
White	85	104	4	5	11	13
Total	49	167	35	118	16	53
Total (Excluding Not Sure)	59	167	41	118		
1976 Popular Vote	55.5		44.4			

UBP would gain 49 per cent of the popular vote and the PLP 35 per cent, with the remainder unsure, if all respondents voted according to their party agreement. Eliminating the uncertain respondents from this equation, the PLP would get 59 per cent of the vote and the UBP 41 per cent. Thus in the 1976 election, the PLP "gained" and the UBP correspondingly "lost" more than three percentage points of the popular vote, as a result of the black proclivity to vote for the PLP while actually agreeing with the UBP. While this difference is small, it is highly suggestive. In the 1976 election, nine of Bermuda's 40 parliamentary seats were won by less than three percentage points over the nearest competitor of the opposite party. A shift of a few hundred votes in key marginal constituencies could have drastically changed the election results, either putting the PLP in power or handing it a crushing defeat.

Furthermore, the projection in Table 3-3 is deliberately conservative. Although whites are roughly 36 percent of the eligible electorate, they are an estimated 41 per cent of the actual electorate — a discrepancy resulting from the heavier proportion of whites who register and exercise their franchise than blacks. Table 3-4 projects the popular vote on the basis of this larger estimate of white voting strength. Were all persons to vote according to

party agreement, the UBP would gain 52 per cent of the popular vote and the PLP 32 per cent, with the remainder of respondents undecided. Eliminating the undecided segment, the UBP would realize 62 per cent of the vote as compared to the PLP's 38 per cent — enough for a clear landslide and the type of parliamentary majority that the UBP enjoyed from 1968 to 1976. Thus the tendency of blacks to make voting decisions counter to their ideological agreement, has a substantial bearing on Bermuda's political fortunes.

The 52 per cent of blacks who profess agreement with the PLP approximates the 50 per cent of blacks on the post-election survey who stated that they would like to see the PLP win the next election. On the white side, the 85 per-cent who agree with the UBP exceeds the 72 per cent who wish to see them form the next government. While the smallness of the white sample makes it subject to a greater margin of error than the black, the discrepancy may also reflect white disenchantment with the UBP, given the party's electoral setbacks and post-election dissension.

Age and Sex

The relationship of age and sex to current party agreement parallels the findings on voting behaviour from

TABLE 3 - 4
HYPOTHETICAL VOTING SUPPORT BY RACE, BASED ON CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT WITH ADJUSTMENT OF WHITE SAMPLE TO 41 PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF CASES

Race	UBP		PLP		Not Sure	
	Percent	Number of Cases	Percent	Number of Cases	Percent	Number of Cases
Black	29	63	52	113	19	40
White	85	127	4	6	11	17
Total	52	190	32	119	16	58
Total (Excluding Not Sure)	62	190	38	119		
1976 Popular vote	55.5		44.4			

TABLE 3 - 5
CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF BLACKS, BY AGE AND SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & Over	99	52	38	9	21
50 — 59	101	42	42	17	36
40 — 49	100	29	51	20	55
30 — 39	100	19	59	22	64
21 — 29	101	23	60	18	40
All Ages	100	29	52	19	216

B. MALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & Over	100	64	27	9	11
50 — 59	101	38	44	19	16
40 — 49	100	22	56	22	27
30 — 39	101	28	59	14	29
21 — 29	100	29	57	14	14
All Ages	101	32	52	17	97

C. FEMALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & Over	100	40	50	10	10
50 — 59	100	45	40	15	20
40 — 49	100	36	46	18	28
30 — 39	100	11	60	29	35
21 — 29	100	19	62	19	26
All Ages	100	27	53	20	119

the post-election survey. Table 3-5 shows that black ideological agreement stands highest at 60 per cent in the 21-29 cohort, and thereafter declines through each successive ten-year age group to a low of 38 per cent among those over 60 years. Black agreement with the UBP follows a reverse pattern, except that it is slightly lower in the 30-39 cohort than in the 21-29 cohort. In all cohorts, agreement with the PLP ranges from 20-35 percentage points lower than the PLP voting support reported in the post-election survey, while agreement with the UBP is 10 to 30 percentage points higher than the corresponding cohort voting support.

Otherwise, one of the surprising findings here is the relatively consistent level of uncertainty — about one-fifth of the respondents — in all age groups except the oldest, where it drops to only 9 per cent. It is often assumed, for example, that young blacks are unequivocally behind the PLP. Yet in each of the two youngest cohorts the uncertain respondents together with those who favour the UBP are 41 per cent of the cohort total.

The data reveal virtually no overall difference between the sexes with respect to PLP agreement, women naming the party in 53 per cent of all cases and men in 52 per cent. A greater gap separates the sexes on the matter of UBP agreement, the choice of 27 per cent of women but 32 per cent of men.

Differences between the sexes do, however, emerge within age groups, revealing a pattern very similar to the voting data recorded in the post-election (of Table 2-2). Male PLP agreement falls with age, especially in the groups over 50. Female PLP agreement reaches its low point in the 40-49 and 50-59 cohorts, but then rises again. The result is a marked difference between the sexes in the upper age groups.

Turning to whites (Table 3-6), the chief significance of age is seen in the relatively low UBP agreement in the 21-29 and 30-39 cohorts, contrasted with the much higher UBP agreement among those over 40. Most of the non-UBP agreement in the younger group falls in the uncertain category, although there is also sympathy here for the PLP. What is apparent is that white faith in the UBP, once solid and impervious, is now questioned by those in their 20's and 30's.

TABLE 3 - 6
CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF WHITES, BY AGE AND SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & Over	100	85	5	10	20
50 — 59	100	100	0	0	10
40 — 49	99	92	0	7	13
30 — 39	100	73	7	20	15
21 — 29	100	77	8	15	13
All Ages	100	85	4	11	71

B. MALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & Over	100	90	0	10	10
50 — 59	100	100	0	0	6
40 — 49	100	100	0	0	7
30 — 39	100	100	0	0	5
21 — 29	100	83	17	0	6
All Ages	100	94	3	3	34

C. FEMALE

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & Over	100	80	10	10	10
50 — 59	100	100	0	0	4
40 — 49	100	83	0	17	6
30 — 39	100	60	10	30	10
21 — 29	100	71	0	29	7
All Ages	100	76	5	19	37

Virtually all white men profess agreement with the UBP, as compared with only three quarters of white women. The dissenting women, however, are mostly unsure rather than in sympathy with the PLP. But insofar as the post-election survey is an accurate measurement, these uncertain women vote UBP; the only white voting support for the PLP registered on that survey came from men (see Table 2-3).

Thus while there is disagreement between the sexes in both races, it is expressed differently and with different results. White women express far greater uncertainty than white men, but vote the same way — for the UBP. But among blacks men and women often come down on opposite political sides, with respect both to party preferences and voting.

Conversion and Attrition

The residential survey confirms the most striking political finding of the post-election survey: that the PLP's gains have been accomplished through a general shift of voter support rather than by the impact of new black voters alone. Party agreement has undergone a parallel shift, as shown in Table 3-7. Whereas in 1972 more than a third of blacks and more than nine-tenths of whites agreed with the UBP, now less than three-tenths of blacks and 85 per cent of whites profess that position. The PLP's corresponding gains are less impressive, as about half of the UBP's former faithful are now uncertain.

TABLE 3 - 7
PARTY AGREEMENT SHIFT FROM 1972 TO 1976, BY RACE

	Black		White	
Party Vote	1972	1976	1972	1976
Total	101	100	100	100
UBP	34	29	92	85
PLP	49	52	1	4
Not sure	18	19	7	11
Number of Cases	216	216	71	71

TABLE 3 - 8
PARTY AGREEMENT SHIFT OF BLACKS FROM 1972 TO 1976, BY AGE AND SEX

A. MALE

Age	Percent								Number of Cases	
	1972				1976					
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	1972	1976
60 & over	100	60	30	10	100	64	27	9	10	11
50 — 59	100	31	56	13	101	38	44	19	16	16
40 — 49	100	33	56	11	100	22	56	22	27	27
30 — 39	100	24	59	17	101	28	59	14	29	29
21 — 29	100	43	43	14	100	29	57	14	14	14
All Ages	100	34	52	14	101	32	52	17	96	97

B. FEMALE

Age	Percent								Number of Cases	
	1972				1976					
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	1972	1976
60 & over	100	50	40	10	100	40	50	10	10	10
50 — 59	100	52	38	10	100	45	40	15	21	20
40 — 49	101	39	39	23	100	36	46	18	26	28
30 — 39	100	22	50	28	100	11	60	29	36	35
21 — 29	100	22	56	22	100	19	62	19	27	26
All Ages	100	33	46	21	100	27	53	20	120	119

The demographic sources of the party agreement shift among blacks are seen in Table 3-8. The most striking pattern here, and one that again corroborates the voting data recorded on the post-election survey, is that women are the critical group behind the PLP's rising popularity. Whereas male PLP agreement remains constant at 52 per cent, female PLP agreement rises by 7 percentage points, from 46 to 53 per cent. The female shift, moreover, occurs in every age group, although most impressively in the 30-39, 40-49, and over 60 groups. By contrast, male agreement with the PLP rises only in the 21-29 cohort. It holds constant in the next two cohorts, and actually decreases in the two oldest cohorts. In sum, it is black women of all ages and young black men who have shifted to the PLP.

The decline of black UBP agreement follows an essentially similar pattern. Among women, the decline is seen in every age group, by percentages ranging from 3 to 11 points. The overall female decline is 6 percentage points. Among black men, declining UBP agreement is seen only in the youngest and middle cohorts, while there is actually a slight rise of UBP agreement in the other three cohorts. Overall, male UBP agreement declines by a marginal two percentage points.

The other notable difference between black men and women pertains to levels of uncertainty. Whereas men have become more uncertain on the question of party agreement, women have become slightly less uncertain. Coupled with the other data in Table 3-8, this finding indicates that the male pattern represents attrition from the UBP, while the female pattern represents conversion to the PLP. Again, black men and women are moving in different directions politically.

On the white side, by contrast, men and women are moving in the same political direction — a direction of growing attrition from the UBP, growing uncertainty, and slight but growing agreement with the PLP (Table 3-9). As noted in the discussion of Table 3-6, the major difference between the sexes lies in the greater political uncertainty of women — a difference that is most marked in the two youngest cohorts. Otherwise, the chief finding

Black men enjoy the ambience of a workmen's club festival. Men 'compete' to boost the PLP's voting strength, but women have been ideologically converted.

TABLE 3 - 9
PARTY AGREEMENT SHIFT OF WHITES FROM 1972 TO 1976, BY AGE AND SEX

A. MALE

Age	Percent								No. of Cases
	1972				1976				
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & over	100	100	0	0	100	90	0	10	10
50 — 59	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	6
40 — 49	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	7
30 — 39	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	5
21 — 29	100	100	0	0	100	83	17	0	6
All Ages	100	100	0	0	100	94	3	3	34

B. FEMALE

Age	Percent								No. of Cases
	1972				1976				
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
60 & over	100	90	0	10	100	80	10	10	10
50 — 59	100	100	0	0	100	100	0	0	4
40 — 49	100	100	0	0	100	83	0	17	6
30 — 39	100	70	10	20	100	60	10	30	10
21 — 29	100	71	0	29	100	71	0	29	7
All Ages	101	84	3	14	100	76	5	19	37

represented by Table 3-9 is simply that white attrition from the UBP is a demographically broad phenomenon, ranging widely between the sexes and in all ages but the 50-59 group.

Perspectives

Party agreement, like actual voting, is highly correlated with race. Voting support for each party is roughly equal to the sum of those who agree with it and those who are undecided. The obvious assumption is that communal influences within each racial group are sufficient to sway all of the undecided voters. In the case of blacks, such influences appear strong enough to sway even some of those who claim to agree more with the UBP — a

phenomenon that is understandable in view of the pervasive presence and political pregnancy of black racial/cultural identity (cf. Manning 1974).

But it should be borne in mind that the delivery of undecided and pro-UBP black voters to the PLP occurred in an election that the PLP did not have a serious chance of winning. It is plausible, as suggested in the previous chapter, that the PLP vote was swelled by people who simply wanted to see the party gain extra seats and thus a more 'competitive' position in Parliament. This contention is supported by the finding that it is only black men — the group most exposed to the culture of sport and competition (Manning 1973) — who increased their voting support for the PLP without becoming ideologically converted to it. Among black women, however, the conversion rate to the PLP is even greater than the rate of increased PLP voting support.

Whites have also contributed to the PLP's improved position, although the major white pattern is one of drift from the UBP toward uncertainty. Here again women differ from men, not in the inverse way seen among blacks but in the sense of being more likely to express uncertainty. The translation of white uncertainty into PLP agreement remains marginal, but it is notable that similar marginal support was recorded in the post-election survey. Thus one feels reasonably confident in concluding that there is some preference for the PLP among Bermudian whites, and that this preference is slowly growing.

Perhaps the most striking finding to emerge from the two surveys pertains to the autonomy of black women and their agreement shift in all age groups to the PLP. The first and simplest explanation to suggest itself is that the PLP is, after all, headed by a woman. But Lois Browne previously led the party from 1968 to 1972, and has been a powerful influence and prominent symbol in it since her first election to Parliament in 1963. Female solidarity does not therefore explain the current transition of black women from the UBP to the PLP.

A more plausible reason emerges when one considers the PLP's recent emphasis on religious and moral issues and its enlistment of the support of many black pastors — a development that represents an abrupt change from past

practice. For the first decade of its history as a party, the PLP was highly critical of black religion, viewing it in Marxist terms as an opiate for the pain of social oppression and therefore an obstacle to political mobilization. Black pastors and laymen were often attacked as "Uncle Toms" from PLP platforms. Several party leaders avowed atheism, while others claimed that their socialist ideals were incompatible with existing forms of Christianity.

But after two frustrating defeats at the polls, the party decided not only to mute its controversy with the churches but to move in the opposite direction by aligning itself with religious elements. The new strategy was unveiled in the 1976 election campaign when a single issue — the integrity of family life — was made the focal point and integrating

PLP leader Lois Browne talks to a party gathering. (Sun Pic)

theme of the platform. Political rhetoric was drawn from the Biblical archetype of God leading his chosen people against an enemy that held them in bondage. Rallies were opened and closed with prayers, punctuated with hymn singing, and supported through monetary "offerings" explicitly likened to church collections. Candidates waxed at length about their religious sensibilities, and attended one or more churches, usually as a group, every Sunday. A gospel singer was recruited as a candidate. The final election-eve rally was programmed as a revival service, with ministers and church choirs cast in the starring roles and politicians put in the background.

The political significance of this religious symbolism becomes apparent when one considers the fundamental dichotomy in black Bermudian society between the churches, representing asceticism and salvation (in the evangelical Protestant sense) and the workmen's clubs, representing hedonism and sin (Manning 1973). The dichotomy has a clear sexual referent, since the churches are constituted primarily by women and the clubs by men. An appeal to religious sentiment thus resonates chiefly with women. But as religion is the overall black cultural ideal, the appeal does not alienate men. Religion is thus an effective political instrument, gaining the support of women without appreciably losing the support of men.

The church-club dichotomy has been examined in the West Indies as part of a more general dialectic between social classes. In Wilson's (1973) scheme, for example, church religion is an aspect of "respectability," a bourgeoisie value system associated chiefly with women and the family. Contrasted with it is "reputation," a lower class value system centered primarily in the male peer group. The two systems remain in tension, although respectability is the conscious ideal, especially among those with middle and upper class pretensions.

The PLP has recently cultivated a more respectable image in this bourgeoisie sense. In the 1976 campaign it down-played its association with organized labour and radical politics, avoided talk of socialism, and successfully recruited a number of businessmen and professionals as parliamentary candidates. The party also courted a more congenial relationship with the British monarchy, the ultimate political symbol of respectability in a colonial

polity. Whereas PLP parliamentarians previously boycotted visits by the Royal Family, they greeted the Queen and her consort on a 1976 visit with curtsies and unctuous smiles.

The favourable response to these and similar political strategems employed by the PLP suggests that our enquiry must consider not only the natural categories of race, age, and sex, but also the man-made or cultural categories associated with the concept of social class. It is abundantly and unmistakeably clear that Bermuda exemplifies the politics of race. Does it also reveal the politics of class?

CHAPTER 4

THE POLITICS OF CLASS

Crosscutting the categories of race, age and sex are other categories that come under the general heading of social class: occupation, education, income, residence, and the like. Recent census data reveal the considerable extent to which class designations are unevenly distributed, not only between black and white but also between male and female, young and old. A brief review of this material will uncover some gross features of the Bermudian class structure and provide a rationale for the measurement of class developed in our residential survey.

The Social Profile

Occupationally, more than 60 per cent of working whites are found in white-collar jobs, as compared to less than 30 per cent of blacks. In the upper echelon of white-collar jobs the disparity is even greater. The likelihood of a white being in a professional-technical or administrative-managerial position is about three and a half times as great as it is for a black (Census 1970: 177-8).

The occupational distribution is also related to sex. For instance, 44 per cent of working black women are found in white-collar jobs, as compared to only 19 per cent of working black men. Among whites, 84 per cent of working women hold white-collar jobs, as compared to 49 per cent of working men. In both races the higher proportion of women in white-collar jobs reflects their concentration in clerical positions. But there are also significant differences by race. Whereas about half of working white women hold clerical positions, only a quarter of working black women are in the clerical sector (Census 1970: 177-8).

Age also has a bearing on jobs. In the 25-34 cohort, for example, the percentage of persons in both professional-technical and clerical positions is about twice as great as it is in the group over 55 years. These differences are exaggerated among women, whose participation in all white-collar jobs except sales is about three times as great

in the 25-34 cohort as it is in the over-55 cohort (Census 1970: 172).

Age also has racial implications. The median age of blacks is 22, while that of whites is 30 — a difference reflecting whites' lower birth rates, higher immigration rates, and greater life expectancy. In the under-25 age group, blacks outnumber whites two to one. In the remainder of the population, blacks are barely half (Scott 1977).

Education, another key indicator of class, is unevenly distributed between the sexes. Women surpass men, percentagewise, in the earning of school-leaving certificates, G.C.E. "O" and "A" level credits, and post-secondary diplomas — a fact that may surprise North Americans but that accords with the numerical dominance of women over men in Bermuda's white-collar jobs. Men surpass women educationally only with respect to having a higher percentage of university degrees (Census 1970: 99-101).

The educational disparity has a racial dimension as well. Among all whites old enough to leave school in 1960, 57 per cent remained until at least age 16 and 42 per cent until at least age 17. In the counterpart black population, 37 per cent remained until age 16 and 19 per cent until age 17 (Census 1960: 35).

Sex differences with respect to levels of education are more pronounced among blacks than among whites. Black men enjoy only three-quarters of the statistical chance that black women have of remaining in school until age 16, whereas white men have five-sixths as much chance as white women. Similarly, the likelihood of black men staying in school until age 17 is about three- fifths of what it is for black women, whereas the likelihood of white men staying in school until that age is three-quarters of what it is for white women. (Census 1960: 35).

Although the organizational differences between the 1960 and 1970 censuses do not allow educational attainment comparisons, it is clear that young Bermudians are better educated than their elders. In 1972 about half of the educational enrollment was in secondary and post-secondary institutions (Newman 1972: 18). In 1974 the existing post-secondary programmes were consolidated

into the Bermuda College, which now offers the academic equivalent of the first year of university.

Income corresponds fairly closely with other indicators of class, and thus reflects a pattern of uneven distribution similar to that of occupation and education. In 1970, annual incomes in excess of $10,000 were reported in all categories of white-collar jobs. The percentages claiming this level of income were as follows: professional-technical, 16 per cent; administrative-managerial, 73 per cent; clerical, 6 per cent; sales, 11 per cent. By contrast, annual incomes over $10,000 had an almost negligible occurrence in the blue-collar ranks. They were reported by only 3 per cent of labourers (including skilled tradesmen), 1 per cent of service workers, and no agricultural workers (*Census of Establishments,* Vol. I, 1971: 208).

These few statistics evoke a new set of questions. Are the political differences between whites and blacks really the result of race, or are they more a reflection of their different positions in the class structure? Put more simply, do whites support the UBP because it is white or because it represents capital? Do blacks favour the PLP because it is black or because it is labour?

The age and sex data invite similar questions. Are the differences between blacks and whites tied to the fact that blacks are generally younger? Within the same race, is the political variation between men and women a matter of sex alone, or is it also a reflection of women being better educated and having jobs that are more prestigious and often better paid? Are differences between younger and older voters simply a matter of age, or is it also significant that the younger group have spent longer in school and acquired higher status occupations?

Such questions make it imperative to consider the class characteristics of the survey respondents — the task to which we now turn.

Education, Occupation, and Home Ownership

As a means of identifying respondents by class, we experimented with three variables: education, occupation, and home ownership. We will look first at the

TABLE 4 - 1
EDUCATION AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT, BY RACE

A. BLACK

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
University Degree	101	13	63	25	8
Post-secondary Academic or Professional Training	101	24	65	12	34
One or more GCE Credits	101	36	29	36	14
Complete Secondary with Certificate	100	30	56	14	86
Elementary or Incomplete Secondary	100	29	48	23	65
All Educational Levels	100	29	53	18	207

B. WHITE

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
University Degree	100	70	10	20	10
Post-secondary Academic or Professional Training	101	88	0	13	8
One or more GCE Credits	100	93	7	0	14
Complete Secondary with Certificate	100	87	0	13	23
Elementary or Incomplete Secondary	100	80	7	13	15
All Educational Levels	100	84	4	11	70

relationship of each variable to current party preference, the question that best summarizes political thought.

Table 4-1 indicates that, for blacks, ideological support for the PLP generally rises with education. The exception is the middle category (GCE credits), although the relatively small number of persons here makes this statistic subject to a fairly wide margin of error. Otherwise, PLP agreement rises from less than half among those with elementary education to nearly two-thirds among those with post-secondary education. UBP agreement, inversely, falls with education, although the pattern is less consistent. If nothing else, these figures confirm the old white fear that education makes blacks discontented with their lot.

On the white side, ideological dissatisfaction with the UBP is greatest at both ends of the scale — those with elementary education and those with university degrees. Even here, however, whites agree with the UBP to a greater extent than any educational segment of blacks agrees with the PLP. Non-UBP agreement among whites is primarily uncertain rather than pro-PLP, a finding consistent with earlier analyses of the white population.

To simplify this classification and to eliminate the categories with relatively small numbers of cases, we made a single category of the secondary certificate and GCE credit levels, and another single category of the two levels of post-secondary education. The result is three categories corresponding to the primary, secondary and post-secondary phases of education, a classification used also in some parts of the Bermuda Census. We also introduced sex controls, in view of the demonstrated significance of sex in both voting patterns and political ideology.

Table 4-2 shows black PLP agreement rising consistently with education, from 48 to 52 to 64 per cent. The more striking finding, however, is the extent to which education accentuates differences between the sexes at the post-secondary level. Among black men with post-secondary education only 47 per cent agree with the PLP — the lowest level of agreement in the three categories. But among women in the same educational bracket, PLP agreement stands at 74 per cent — the highest of the three

TABLE 4 - 2
EDUCATION AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF BLACKS, BY SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Post-secondary	99	21	64	14	42
Secondary	100	31	52	17	100
Primary	100	29	48	23	65
All Educational Levels	100	29	53	18	207

B. MALE

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Post-secondary	100	33	47	20	15
Secondary	99	33	53	13	45
Primary	100	29	50	21	34
All Educational Levels	100	32	51	17	94

C. FEMALE

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Post-secondary	100	15	74	11	27
Secondary	100	29	51	20	55
Primary	100	29	45	26	31
All Educational Levels	101	26	55	20	113

categories and more than one and a half times as great as the male figure. Correspondingly, UBP agreement among post-secondary educated black men is more than twice as great as in the counterpart female group.

Comparable data for whites are revealed in Table 4-3. Those with secondary education have both the highest level of UBP agreement and the lowest levels of PLP agreement and uncertainty. As with blacks, the general pattern is primarily a reflection of the female pattern. But unlike the black case, white men and women are not on opposite sides of the ideological divide. Rather, white women who do not agree with the UBP fall mainly in the ranks of uncertainty.

Moving to occupation (Table 4-4), we constructed job categories according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations, used also on the Bermuda Census. With blacks, the highest rates of PLP agreement are found among blue-collar workers: tradesmen and general labourers (60 per cent) and service workers (58 per cent). (Agriculture, of course, is also part of this category, but there were only two respondents in agricultural work.) PLP agreement dips to a low of 50 per cent in the lower echelons of the white-collar work force — clerical and sales work — but then rises again in the upper echelons of the white-collar work force — administrative and managerial (53 per cent) and professional and technical (55 per cent).

The strong PLP support in the blue-collar ranks is not, of course, surprising. These are the bulk of the Bermuda Industrial Union's organized workers, a traditional base of strength for the PLP. What may be surprising is the relatively strong PLP support in the upper echelon of white-collar workers — a group that might be predicted to side with the UBP because of common economic interests.

Economic determinism is dealt a further blow by the pattern of white UBP support, which exactly parallels black PLP support. White agreement with the UBP is highest in the blue-collar and upper white-collar positions, and considerably less in the lower white-collar positions. Thus occupational controls intensify rather than diminish the politics of race. An exception is the lower white-collar work force, although their data represents not an

TABLE 4 - 3
EDUCATION AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF WHITES, BY SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Post-secondary	100	78	6	16	18
Secondary	100	89	3	8	37
Primary	100	80	6	14	15
All Educational Levels	100	84	4	11	70

B. MALE

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Post-secondary	100	100	0	0	8
Secondary	100	93	7	0	15
Primary	100	90	0	10	10
All Educational Levels	100	94	3	3	33

C. FEMALE

Education	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Post-secondary	100	60	10	30	10
Secondary	100	86	0	14	22
Primary	100	60	20	20	5
All Educational Levels	100	76	5	19	37

TABLE 4 - 4
OCCUPATION AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT, BY RACE

A. BLACK

Occupation	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Professional & Technical	100	35	55	10	20
Administrative & Managerial	100	26	53	21	19
Clerical	100	25	50	25	28
Sales	100	31	50	19	16
Service	100	31	58	11	36
Agriculture	100	50	0	50	2
Trades & General Labour	100	24	60	16	55
Not working	99	36	33	30	33
All Occupations	100	29	52	19	209

B. WHITE

Occupation	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Professional & Technical	100	86	0	14	7
Administrative & Managerial	101	88	0	13	16
Clerical	100	67	0	33	12
Sales	—	—	—	—	0
Service	100	100	0	0	1
Agriculture	100	100	0	0	4
Trades & General Labour	101	88	13	0	8
Not working	100	87	9	4	23
All Occupations	100	85	4	11	71

ideological convergence of the races but simply the highest levels of uncertainty in both races.

There was also a sizable number of non-working respondents, a group including housewives, retired persons, and the unemployed. The white non-working group, about a third of the white sample, differs little from the overall white population except in registering 9 per cent agreement with the PLP. But the black non-working group, roughly one-sixth of the black sample, shows a surprisingly low level of PLP agreement — 33 per cent. Their idiosyncrasy results not from relatively strong UBP agreement, but from their 30 per cent uncertainty. For blacks, then, it would seem that participation in the labour force is a politicizing experience. Whites, whose politicization has a longer history and a more extensive social basis, do not seem as dependent on this experience for forming political opinions.

The political similarity in both races between the various categories of blue-collar workers, lower-echelon white-collar workers, and upper-echelon white-collar workers, warrants a collapsed reclassification of occupations under these three headings. Introducing sex controls again, we note (Table 4-5) that black men and women evidence diametrically opposite patterns. Among men, ideological agreement with the PLP falls from three-fifths of the blue-collar respondents to less than two-fifths of the white-collar respondents, while UBP agreement shows a comparable rise. Among women, PLP agreement increases from 55 per cent of the blue-collar workers and 53 per cent of the lower white-collar workers to an impressive 77 per cent of the upper white-collar workers. Correspondingly, UBP agreement diminishes from 29 to only 12 per cent. Thus, in the upper white-collar ranks black women are twice as likely as black men to give ideological support to the PLP, while the men are four times as likely as the women to support the UBP.

The political differences between black men and women are more dramatic here than elsewhere because the female sample has been reduced by more than a quarter by the elimination of non-working respondents — a group who, as we have seen, are outstanding in their low level of PLP agreement. Thus, working black women overall register 58 per cent agreement with the PLP — five

TABLE 4 - 5
OCCUPATION AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF BLACKS, BY SEX

A. BOTH SEXES

Occupation	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper White Collar	100	31	54	15	39
Lower White Collar	100	27	50	23	44
Blue Collar	100	27	58	15	93
All Occupations	100	28	55	17	170

B. MALE

Occupation	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper White Collar	100	46	36	18	22
Lower White Collar	101	38	38	25	8
Blue Collar	101	26	60	15	62
All Occupations	100	32	52	16	92

C. FEMALE

Occupation	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper White Collar	101	12	77	12	17
Lower White Collar	100	25	53	22	36
Blue Collar	100	29	55	16	31
All Occupations	100	24	58	18	84

percentage points higher than the figure for the total number of women who answered the question (Table 3-5). This points to a striking irony: while the PLP has long condemned the socioeconomic conditions which lead so many black women to work, this situation has actually enhanced the party's support.

Moving to whites (Table 4-6), we see that UBP agreement is very high in the blue-collar and upper white-collar strata, but drops to about two-thirds in the lower white-collar positions. The table also reveals that the white sample has been reduced by a third, owing primarily to the fact that more than half of the white women are not working. While this renders a sex breakdown virtually meaningless, there is nothing in other sex breakdowns of the white population to suggest male-female differences as politically significant as those of blacks.

The relationship of home ownership to political ideology is shown in Table 4-7. Blacks with homes agree with the PLP over the UBP by a ratio of less than 3 to 2, while for those who do not own homes the ratio is more than 2 to 1. Among whites the difference lies between UBP agreement and uncertainty, as in other breakdowns. About nine-tenths of the white homeowners agree with the UBP, as compared to three-quarters of the non-homeowners. These figures support the common assumption that home ownership is a major conservative influence.

TABLE 4 - 6
OCCUPATION AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF WHITES

Occupation	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper White Collar	100	87	0	13	23
Lower White Collar	100	67	0	33	12
Blue Collar	100	92	8	0	13
All Occupations	100	83	2	15	48

TABLE 4 - 7
HOME OWNERSHIP AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT, BY RACE

A. BLACK

Home Ownership	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Own home	100	34	49	17	112
Do not own home	100	24	55	21	99

B. WHITE

Home Ownership	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Own home	99	89	4	6	47
Do not own home	100	74	4	22	23

The Construction of Social Class

Since the notion of class is itself a composite of social characteristics, it is proper to develop an overall measurement of class for analytical purposes. The problem is what characteristics to consider and how to weigh them. Despite its intrinsic interest, we decided for two reasons to omit home ownership from consideration. First, the question discriminates against unmarried persons, particularly in the younger age brackets, who are unlikely to be homeowners. Second, the question tends automatically to put a married woman in the same category as her husband, as confirmed by the fact that our survey — a stratified random sampling of households — showed the same percentages of men and women owning homes.

We were thus left with two variables — education and occupation — as indices of social class. As indicated by Tables 4-1 through 4-6, these variables yield different results when correlated with party agreement. Leaving aside the sex differences, black ideological support for the PLP rises with education, particularly among those who

have advanced to the post-secondary level. But it falls with occupation, being lower in both strata of white-collar jobs than in the blue-collar jobs. An equally perplexing disjunction exists among whites, who evidence the strongest UBP agreement in the middle stratum of the educational scale but the weakest UBP agreement in the middle stratum of the occupational scale.

The reason for these inconsistencies is that education and occupation are themselves imperfectly correlated. In terms of education, the largest group in both races — nearly half of blacks and slightly more than half of whites — falls into the middle stratum: completed secondary education. On the occupational scale, however, the races are inversions of each other. Among blacks the largest group — more than half of the sample — are blue-collar workers, while both groups of white-collar workers are about the same size. Among whites the largest group — nearly half of the sample — are the upper-echelon white-collar workers, while lower-echelon white-collar workers and blue-collar workers are about the same size. Thus, blacks are over-educated for the jobs they do, while whites are relatively under-educated. Our survey matches the entire population in this pattern, which was discussed by Newman with reference to 1977 census data:

> Education clearly wins rewards. On the other hand...many acquire the more prestigious and higher-paying jobs without the school credentials — half of the administrators and managers and almost 30 per cent of the professional and technical workers...
>
> The conclusion that suggests itself is that social as well as economic criteria are built into employment and recruitment (1972: 16).

Owing to the general suppression of race on the 1970 census, Newman's observations are based on a breakdown by parish rather than race. Our survey, however, reveals the extent to which the discrepancy between education and occupation pertains primarily to blacks. The overall correlation coefficient (gamma) between the three categories of education and the three categories of occupation is .69. For blacks alone it is .74, whereas for whites alone it is only .45.

But while the relationship between education and occupation is, as Newman put it, "fuzzy", the fact remains

that these variables are combined in each individual and together contribute to his/her social status. Traditionally, occupation was by far the more important among whites. Inheritance and pedigree counted more than education, a condition that encouraged the substantial white emigration of the 1950's and early 1960's when those outside the gentry realized that their occupational mobility on the island was blocked. Black mobility was also restricted, except in the professions where the highest educational qualifications were necessary. Accordingly, education became the most general criterion of black social distinctions.

Circumstances have, however, changed considerably since the mid-1960's. The relaxation of ascriptive barriers in white society and diminishing racial segregation in the job market make it reasonable to use a common measure of class if it is based both on education and occupation. The rationale adopted was that education, insofar as it is independent of occupation, is principally a prestige symbol. Occupation, too, symbolizes prestige, but also produces income, the material basis of many other indices of social class. We therefore determined to weigh occupation twice as heavily as education in constructing an overall scale of social class for both races.

Table 4-8 is the result. The educational levels were ranked at 1, 2, and 3 points, while the occupational levels were ranked at 2, 4, and 6 points. Respondents who scored

TABLE 4 - 8
BREAKDOWN AND RANKING OF ALL RESPONDENTS, BY EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

	2 Blue Collar	4 Lower White Collar	6 Upper White Collar	Points	Classes	Number of Cases	Percent
1 Primary	Lower Class N=50	Middle Class N= 8	Middle Class N= 7	8 - 9	Upper	56	25
2 Secondary	Lower Class N=54	Middle Class N=32	Upper Class N=24	5 - 7	Middle	66	29
3 Post-secondary	Middle Class N= 2	Middle Class N=17	Upper Class N=32	3 - 4	Lower	104	46
					Total	226	100

3 or 4 points — those in blue-collar jobs with any amount of education below the post-secondary level — were ranked lower class. Those with 5 to 7 points — those with blue-collar jobs but post-secondary education (only two cases), all persons in lower white-collar positions, and those in upper white-collar positions with less than completed secondary education, were ranked middle class. Finally, respondents who scored 8 or 9 points — those in upper white-collar positions with not less than completed secondary education — were ranked upper class. The resulting social profile is the expected pyramid, with the lower class constituting slightly less than half of the survey population, the middle class about three-tenths, and the upper class a quarter.

Tables 4-9 and 4-10 present the same breakdown for each race separately. On the black side, the lower class is larger than the average for both races, the middle class about the same, and the upper class smaller, although in no case is the difference great. The black social profile reveals the considerable extent to which Bermuda has developed a real class system, rather than the more caste-like system that existed under segregation. Nearly half of the black population are now middle or upper class.

On the white side, by comparison, three-quarters of the population are middle or upper class, primarily upper. Thus the white social profile is an inversion of the black, the upper class being the largest and the lower class the

TABLE 4 - 9
BREAKDOWN AND RANKING OF BLACK RESPONDENTS, BY EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

	2 Blue Collar	4 Lower White Collar	6 Upper White Collar	Points	Classes	Number of Cases	Percent
1 Primary	Lower Class N=46	Middle Class N= 7	Middle Class N= 3	8 - 9	Upper	36	20
2 Secondary	Lower Class N=46	Middle Class N=25	Upper Class N=14	5 - 7	Middle	50	28
3 Post-secondary	Middle Class N= 2	Middle Class N=13	Upper Class N=22	3 - 4	Lower	92	52
					Total	178	100

TABLE 4 - 10
BREAKDOWN AND RANKING OF WHITE RESPONDENTS, BY EDUCATION AND OCCUPATION

	2 Blue Collar	4 Lower White Collar	6 Upper White Collar	Points	Classes	Number of Cases	Percent
1 Primary	Lower Class N= 4	Middle Class N= 1	Middle Class N= 4	8 - 9	Upper	20	42
2 Secondary	Lower Class N= 8	Middle Class N= 7	Upper Class N=10	5 - 7	Middle	16	33
3 Post-secondary	Middle Class N= 0	Middle Class N= 4	Upper Class N=10	3 - 4	Lower	12	25
					Total	48	100

smallest group. Only in having similarly proportioned middle classes are the two races really alike. To put this comparison in vernacular terms, blacks are clearly "well off" but whites are much "better off." This situation itself is possibly Bermuda's most unique social characteristic among Western nations, and especially the islands of the Caribbean and Atlantic.

Social Class and Ideology

With a measurement of social class determined, we can return to the questions raised earlier. Are the differences between black and white, male and female, young and old a function of the class structure, or are these differences significant in themselves? Conversely, is class independently influential politically, or is it more a function of the demographic structure?

Table 4-11 reveals, first of all, that race is important in its own right and clearly dominant over class. Both white UBP agreement and black PLP agreement are strongest in the upper and lower classes, making these classes more polarized than the races as a whole. Nor does the middle-class data indicate a political rapprochement of the races; rather, it is simply that the greatest uncertainty in both races is found in the middle class. Thus, despite the UBP's identification with business and the PLP's with labour, it is ultimately the white-black division that determines both the vote and the ideology behind it.

TABLE 4 - 11
CLASS AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT, BY RACE

A. BLACK

Class	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper	100	35	56	9	34
Middle	100	23	50	27	48
Lower	100	27	58	15	89
All Classes	101	28	56	17	171

B. WHITE

Class	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper	101	90	0	11	19
Middle	100	69	0	31	16
Lower	100	92	8	0	12
All Classes	100	83	2	15	47

Yet social class is an important differentiating factor within the races if not between them. The levels of party agreement are similar to those when occupation alone was considered, a predictable result in view of the weight given to occupation in measuring class. On the white side ideological support for the UBP is forthcoming from nine-tenths of the lower and upper classes, but from only two-thirds of the middle class. Notably, though, the middle class has not found the PLP to their liking, but instead expresses uncertainty.

On the black side the most striking finding is the rise of support for both parties in the upper class, particularly in comparison to the middle class. The jump in UBP support sustains the view that ideology is an expression of economic interest, while the growth of PLP support seemingly contradicts it. Clearly, black class politics requires a closer look.

Table 4-12 reveals that the class contradiction is essentially a sexual opposition. Among men PLP support falls from three-fifths in the lower class to a third in the middle and upper classes, while UBP support correspondingly rises from a fourth to a half. The female pattern, however, is opposite. PLP support rises from slightly more than half in the lower and middle classes to an astounding 86 per cent in the upper class, while UBP support falls from 3l to 14 per cent. Overall, three-fifths of the women are in ideological agreement with the PLP, as compared to barely more than half of the men. Here, then, is the most dramatic version yet of black male-female political differences, and compelling proof that an analysis of the black class structure requires a two-part model.

While the importance of sex increases with the imposition of class controls (and vice versa), the importance of age diminishes. Moving from blacks under 40 to those over 40, Table 4-13 shows that UBP support rises by 18 percentage points and PLP support falls by 14 percentage

TABLE 4 - 12
CLASS AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF BLACKS, BY SEX

A. MALE

Class	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper	100	50	35	15	20
Middle	99	33	33	33	9
Lower	100	25	60	15	60
All Classes	101	32	52	17	89

B. FEMALE

Class	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper	100	14	86	0	14
Middle	101	21	54	26	39
Lower	100	31	55	14	29
All Classes	100	23	60	17	82

TABLE 4 - 13
CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF BLACKS UNDER 40 YEARS AND OVER 40 YEARS

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Over 40	101	38	46	17	112
Under 40	100	20	60	20	104

TABLE 4 - 14
CLASS AND CURRENT PARTY AGREEMENT OF BLACKS UNDER 40 YEARS AND OVER 40 YEARS

A. LOWER CLASS

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Over 40	100	28	59	13	54
Under 40	100	26	57	17	35

B. MIDDLE CLASS

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Over 40	99	33	33	33	15
Under 40	100	18	58	24	33

C. UPPER CLASS

Age	Percent				Number of Cases
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Over 40	99	53	33	13	15
Under 40	100	21	74	5	19

points — a significant variation in view of the large number of cases in each sample. But with class controlled (Table 4-14), the differences disappear entirely in the lower class, the largest segment of the black population and the one where men and women are most alike politically. Age differences are found in the middle and upper classes, but are primarily the result of sex patterns already discussed. In the middle class two-thirds of the older respondents are women in the 40-49 cohort, while in the upper class nearly three-quarters of the older respondents are men — both groups being relatively weak PLP supporters anyway.

On the other hand, in the under-40 population where the number of cases is greater and the sex ratio more evenly balanced, there are impressive differences by class. UBP support drops from the lower to the middle class and PLP support rises considerably from the middle to the upper class. Class is, then, independently important.

In sum, the outstanding political variables among blacks are sex and class, each accentuating the other's significance. The role of age differs by sex and is diminished with class held constant. Age functions most impressively with no other controls imposed — a phenomenon that accounts for the common assumption that age is the key factor in black political culture.

Moving to whites, the relatively small class sample renders further breakdown statistically unsound. Comparing Tables 4-11 and 3-6, however, it is notable that the white middle class surpass any white age or sex group with respect to low UBP agreement and correspondingly high uncertainty. Thus, social class looms a significant political factor in white society.

Class and Party Shift

Let us now consider the extent to which social class has been a factor in the political transition between 1972 and 1976. Looking first at blacks, Table 4-15 reveals that agreement with the PLP actually declined by four percentage points among all men in the class analysis. The decline, coupled with a modest growth of UBP support, is seen in the lower and upper classes, the largest male

groups. Women, however, more than offset these losses, making a shift of seven percentage points to the PLP and a full ten percentage points away from the UBP. All classes figured in this trend, but the upper class most impressively through its shift of 26 percentage points from the UBP to the PLP. As a return glance to Table 3-8 will indicate, no demographic segment of the black population has contributed as greatly to the PLP's rise, and the UBP's decline, as upper-class black women. Interestingly, the PLP has lost seven percentage points of ideological support among upper-class black men. Thus, aside from race itself, sex differences in the black upper class represent Bermuda's major political polarity.

This finding calls to question some common assumptions about black society. Hodgson (1974: 143-163) has recently contended that black Bermuda was essentially

TABLE 4 - 15
PARTY AGREEMENT SHIFT OF BLACKS FROM 1972 TO 1976, BY CLASS AND SEX

A. MALE

Class	Percent								Number of Cases	
	1972				1976					
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	1972	1976
Upper	100	47	42	11	100	50	35	15	19	20
Middle	99	44	33	22	99	33	33	33	9	9
Lower	99	23	63	13	100	25	60	15	60	60
All Classes	101	31	56	14	101	32	52	17	88	89

B. FEMALE

Class	Percent								Number of Cases	
	1972				1976					
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	1972	1976
Upper	100	40	60	0	100	14	86	0	15	14
Middle	100	28	51	21	101	21	54	26	39	39
Lower	101	35	52	14	100	31	55	14	29	29
All Classes	101	33	53	15	100	23	60	17	83	82

"classless" before the push for racial integration in the early 1960's. Since then, high status has been symbolized by contact with whites, particularly invitations to white clubs and to the white UBP's "political cocktail parties". Apart from whatever general critique might be made of this argument, the political point is that it is sex-specific. It can be applied to men, but is strongly refuted by the data in the case of women.

A more fundamental question pertains to the celebrated "war of the sexes" in black society. Sexual polarization is generally considered strongest in the lower class, where men center their lives in the male peer group and women are left to look after the household — the scenario of the classic "matrifocal" syndrome. Sexual opposition is thought to diminish in the middle and upper classes, where nuclear families headed by the husband/father are the norm. With respect to political ideology, however, the Bermudian situation is exactly the reverse. In the lower class there is relatively little difference between the sexes. It is in the middle class, and more acutely in the upper class, that strong sexual opposition surfaces.

A reason for this anomaly may lie in some distinctive features of the black Bermudian family discussed by Paul (1977). Families based on non-legal conjugal relationships, he contends, are structurally matrifocal. They are headed by women, since adult men are generally absent from the household. Families based on legal marriage, however, tend to be functionally matrifocal. The husband/father is nominally the "head," but the wife/mother is the "neck" — the one who supports, sustains, and turns the head. It is she who is the emotional center of the home, who makes, or at least concurs in, major decisions, and who is chiefly responsible for socializing the children. This situation is radically different from the West Indies, where only structural matrifocality is generally seen. When men are present in the Caribbean household, they tend to be assertive, authoritarian and virtually omnipotent (cf. Hodge 1974: 111-120).

Given these distinctions as well as the obviously strong relationship of non-legal unions to the lower class and legal marriage to the middle and upper classes, it would appear

that functional matrifocality is more divisive than its structural counterpart. If the two are one flesh, they are clearly not one mind when it comes to political thought.

Economic and sexual reasons may also account for the greater identification of middle- and upper-class black women than men with a party that symbolizes black solidarity. Economically, black women have competed against whites in the white-collar job market far longer than their male counterparts, who until recently went almost exclusively into labour and service positions shunned by whites. Sexually, while the black woman is constrained by a lingering taboo against personal relations, especially intimacy, with white men, she sees black men freely enjoying the company of white women. Hence, black women must contend with white women for black men, who in turn can take their pick. Like economic competition, this sexual competition is undoubtedly far keener in the middle and upper classes than in the lower class.

In most countries political differences between the sexes in the middle and upper classes would work to the advantage of the party favoured by men, since men greatly outnumber women in the occupational ranks that constitute these classes. Again, however, Bermuda is somewhat unique. About three-fifths of all women over age 14 are gainfully employed (Census 1970: 125), a ratio that climbs to an estimated three-fourths when black women alone are considered. More importantly, black Bermudian women have achieved a measure of occupational mobility unequalled in North America and unimagined in the Caribbean. In the survey their numerical representation in the upper class is about three-quarters as great as that of men, a reflection of their prominence in business, politics, and the professions (cf. Manning 1973: 163-166). In the middle class, they outnumber men four to one. Thus, the ideological support of black women in the higher levels of the social scale is an element of crucial importance.

Turning to whites, Table 4-16 confirms the significance attributed earlier to the middle class. Erosion began here at least as early as 1972, and has continued at a faster rate than in the lower class. Whatever their voting record, the

TABLE 4 - 16
PARTY AGREEMENT SHIFT OF WHITES FROM 1972 TO 1976, BY CLASS

Class	Percent								No. of Cases
	1972				1976				
	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	Total	UBP	PLP	Not Sure	
Upper	101	90	0	11	101	90	0	11	19
Middle	100	81	0	19	100	69	0	31	16
Lower	100	100	0	0	100	92	8	0	12
All Classes	100	89	0	11	100	83	2	15	47

white middle class clearly has marked ideological disagreement with the UBP.

Alienation with the UBP points to two episodes most symptomatic of the party's internal turmoil: the 1976 pre-election primaries and the 1977 "reformist" movement. In the primaries the white gentry were challenged by a mixture of foreign-born, first generation Bermudian, and "poor cousin" whites, urged on by Portuguese. In the



British-born schoolteacher Colin Benbow, left, greets a voter at the polls. Benbow upset William Cox, an aristocrat and son of the former House Speaker, in a UBP primary in heavily white Devonshire South. At right is running mate John Barritt.

reformist upheaval these same groups aligned with blacks to topple the regime of Premier Sharpe and to force new and broader concessions on the Gibbons' government.

Interestingly, the ideological colouration of the dissenting elements has been conservative, even reactionary. Under attack has been the supposed trend toward socialism and a welfare state, the alleged suppression of individualism under party politics, and, ironically, some of the liberal reforms introduced by the UBP establishment to broaden its base of support. Solutions have keyed on law and order, tough anti-strike legislation, and balanced budgets.

The rightist orientation of the UBP's internal critics may explain why the white middle class — the group represented by the critics — drifts from the UBP but identifies itself primarily as uncertain rather than in agreement with the PLP. We should, therefore, expect to find a concentration of rightist sentiment in the white middle class. Let us consider this hypothesis as we move to examine public opinion on Bermuda's major social issues.

PART II

issues and sentiments

CHAPTER 5

THE ASSESSMENT OF OPINION

While it is votes that win elections, it is sentiments, values, interest and identities that ultimately determine voting decisions. We therefore move from the level of electoral behaviour to that of social thought, to explore some of the major issues that face Bermuda now and that loom critical in the years ahead. The result is an ideological profile, a picture of how Bermudians view the realities on which their politics are premised.

A brief technical gloss is needed to introduce this profile, the subject of Chapters 6 through 10.

The residential survey addressed 25 issues by phrasing them as controversial statements, for example, "Bermuda should aim for national independence." Following the statement were five response options: agree strongly (+2); agree somewhat (+1); not sure (0); disagree somewhat (-1); disagree strongly (-2). The numeral value assigned to each alternative enabled us to compute a mean score, that is, an "average" response. The mean score summarizes the group's opinion, indicating whether and to what extent the issue draws a positive or negative response.

Three types of information are given for each questionnaire item. The first, in part A of the Table, is a simple breakdown by race. Whites and blacks are compared with reference to the percentage of respondents who chose each category and their mean score. In a political culture predicated on race, this is, of course, the most fundamental breakdown. On 22 of the 25 questionnaire items there were statistically significant differences between whites and blacks at the .9 level; that is, there is at least a 90 per cent probability that the racial difference on the survey reflects a real difference in Bermudian society. No other variable — party, class, sex, or age — accounted for such large and widespread differences of opinion.

The second breakdown, in part B of the Table, is by class and sex for blacks and class alone for whites — the factors that proved most significant with respect to party

preference (cf. Tables 4-11 through 4-14). The mean score alone is furnished, partly to reduce the size and complexity of the Tables and partly because where relatively small numbers of cases are involved, this figure yields a more accurate reflection of opinion than the percentage distribution of individual response categories.

The third breakdown, found in part C of the Table, is by race and party. There are four groups of respondents: UBP whites; UBP blacks; PLP blacks; and PLP black converts. In the first three groups the criterion of selection is to have agreed with the appropriate party both in 1976 and 1972. In the final group the criterion is to have been PLP in 1976, but either UBP or undecided in 1972. The two types of agreement and disagreement are collapsed into single categories and the mean scores are also given.

The comparison of UBP whites, UBP blacks, and PLP blacks enables us to see whether race or party plays the dominant role in shaping social thought. The data for the fourth group, PLP black converts, enable us to monitor which issues were most significant in winning new supporters to the PLP.

PLP sound truck tours neighbourhoods in Sandys, a parish where the party gained an additional seat in 1976.

To make the Tables as readable as possible, numbers of cases (respondents) are omitted. It was deemed unnecessary to state these figures each time, as variations from one item to another are never enough to make an appreciable difference in either percentage distributions or mean scores. For most questions the number of cases in each group is as follows:

A. Race

Black	225
White	72

B. Class, Race, and Sex

	Black Both Sexes	Male	Female	White Both Sexes
Upper	35	20	15	20
Middle	48	9	39	16
Lower	89	60	29	12

C. Party and Race

UBP Whites	60
UBP Blacks	59
PLP Blacks	96
PLP Black Converts	13

The issues are arranged under five headings: economic, political, religious, racial, and disciplinary. Many issues, of course, overlap two or more categories, but the choice was made on the basis of an issue's primary reference. Within each group issues are discussed in descending order of opinion difference between the races; that is, the issue which evoked the largest difference in mean score between blacks and whites is considered first, while the issue that evoked the smallest difference is considered last.

Indications of statistical significance are omitted from text and tables, but are given separately in Appendix C. In the overview of each chapter, however, reference is made to "major" (higher than .5 mean points) differences

between two groups under comparison. As a rule, differences of this magnitude usually fall comfortably within the bounds of statistical significance.

Throughout the text a consistent verbal style is used in speaking of levels of agreement and disagreement. Whether positive or negative, mean scores between 0 and .39 are described as "marginal"; those between .4 and .79 as "moderate"; those between .8 and 1.29 as "strong"; those over 1.3 as "radical". These are arbitrary distinctions, of course, but their logic becomes apparent when considering the levels of agreement and disagreement associated with each verbal category.

Let us now move to Bermudian opinion.

CHAPTER 6

THE ECONOMY

Bermuda's distinctive and enviably successful economy has traditionally been understood as Capitalism Triumphant. The notion rests on the remarkable persistence of a laissez faire, free enterprise business system, the businesslike management of Government, and a strong aversion to state-run social services. Government ownership is limited to such entities as public transportation and the post office, but even these are calculated to break even or make a slight profit. Government itself operated in the red only during a period of rapid expansion in the early 1970's; in other modern years it has had a balanced or, more commonly, a surplus budget. Outstanding public expenses are often recovered through ingenious business schemes. For example, when Government converted from pounds to dollars in 1970, it more than offset the considerable cost by selling souvenir coin sets and first-day postage stamps.

Government-financed social services are a recent and still restricted phenomenon. There was no free primary education until 1949 and no free secondary education until 1965; even today schools are expected to raise their own funds for special projects. Until the 1960's, welfare benefits were exclusively in the hands of individual patrons, private charities, and voluntary beneficial societies — a tradition that has changed, but not yet systematically. Pension benefits, public housing, and subsidized medical services have been instituted on a limited scale in the present decade, but there is still no unemployment insurance.

Traditionally, of course, Government and business were in the same hands — those of the Forty Thieves, Bermuda's entrenched white aristocracy. The democratization of politics under the party system and the growth and modernization of the economy have diminished the aristocracy's prominence, but the union of Government and business persists. Sir Henry Tucker, who led the United Bermuda Party (UBP) from its inception in 1964 until his retirement from active politics in 1971, holds directorships on about a dozen large local companies as

well as some seventy-five international companies registered in Bermuda (*Bermuda Sun*, April 17, 1976, p. 6). This ideal is emulated and to some extent realized by other politicians, including blacks in both parties.

The capitalist faith is ritually sustained by the celebrated visits of foreign business elite. A recent and typical example occurred in 1976 when the Young President's Organization, reportedly the world's most exclusive club for under-40 executives and including eight Bermudians in its membership, chose Bermuda for its annual convention. The event was given exhaustive media coverage, and the delegates, proclaiming their motto "Free Men, Free Enterprise," were treated as demigods by Bermudian officialdom. Later in the year it was announced that Harry Schultz, inspiration for Arthur Hailey's novel *The Money Changers*, was to set up his main base in Bermuda — a decision taken after he had worked on the island for two months. An extensive news interview with Schultz quoted some of his economic philosophy:

> Communism is failure to understand human nature and economic law....
>
> Socialism is a philosophy of envy. Every society has room for every kind of person. But equality is not part of nature. You have to create equal opportunity, then let each individual create his own potential....
>
> One day I'll write a bible of capitalism....
>
> I don't believe government should poke its nose into private affairs....Government taxation should not rise above two per cent....
>
> If they (taxpayers) don't have a child, why should they pay for the schools? If they don't have a car, why should they pay for the upkeep of roads?

Schultz went on to say that he wanted to found an independent state on a South Pacific island, observing, "When I start my own country, I will use methods similar to Bermuda's" (*Bermuda Sun*, July 17, 1976, p.5).

The UBP's economic logic justifies Schultz' fondness for Bermuda. As one of its prominent businessmen-politicians explained privately, "You're either a capitalist

or a socialist. There's no other choices. You're either in the boat or you're not." Needless to say, he viewed the socialist alternative as the epitome of financial and moral ruin.

The UBP's strident opposition to socialism stems from political strategy as well as economic philosophy. When black leaders planned a political party in the early 1960's, they considered calling it the Bermuda Socialist Party. The movement instead took the name Progressive Labour Party (PLP), but its principal figures remained avowed socialists for more than a decade and openly sought the tutelage of socialist revolutionaries in the Third World. The association with socialism alienated many conservative blacks, driving them into the UBP and leaving the PLP a small but purified radical left. Politically, this handed the UBP a simple and highly effective strategy: turn the PLP's socialist vocabulary against it by exploiting the contrast between affluence in Bermuda and poverty under socialist regimes in the Caribbean and other under-developed areas. The success of this strategy is illustrated by the 1968 and 1972 elections when the UBP captured three quarters of the parliamentary seats.

The strategy was deployed again in 1976, although the initiative was taken by the Royal Gazette, a pro-UBP daily newspaper. For several days in early May, the paper highlighted Jamaica's civil disturbances, running wire stories and syndicated news features that linked the uprisings to Prime Minister Manley's new socialist programme. Then on May 13th, five days before the Bermuda election, an editorial labelled the PLP's economic plan "stark naked socialism". It went on to discuss the problems created in our countries by socialist controls on free enterprise, and concluded by asking "Did anyone ever see a controlled people happy and laughing? Or with pockets stuffed with dollar note?" (May 13,p.4). The UBP adopted the newspaper's vocabulary the following day when it attacked the PLP's economic plan in a lengthy press release citing Jamaica's "dangerous socialist experimentation" and cleaning it as a model of what the PLP wanted for Bermuda (May 14, p. 1).

Unlike former years, however, the ploy failed to elicit strong reaction from the PLP and thereby create a focal campaign issue. Read from a neutral standpoint, the

PLP's economic plan was bland and nebulous, an expression of the centrist and non-controversial image which the party diligently cultivated throughout the campaign. This new image, moreover, is based on substance as well as strategy. Since the early 1970's, the party has moved in a definite bourgeois direction, quietly but clearly diminishing its alignment with labour and its espousal of socialism. Of the 35 PLP candidates ran in 1976, only three represented a union base. Party spokesmen now tend to skirt the socialism issue by noting that the UBP has itself adopted socialism by taking over some of the welfare programmes once run by private groups — a charge that is often voiced by the UBP's internal critics and that, therefore, fuels their attack.

The economic statements on the questionnaire, all drawn from issues that have been focal points of Bermudian political argument, pertain to the socialist-capitalist controversy. Yet the items explicitly referring to socialism or social services elicited less difference between the races and parties than items about other matters that are commonly discussed in Bermuda with reference to socialist or capitalist principles. This suggests that while the classic argument about socialism and capitalism has by now become blurred by the PLP's centrist direction and the UBP's internal upheaval, the ideological positions articulated by the argument continue to differentiate social thought. Let us move to the issues and explore how they are viewed by the public.

Foreign Ownership

Although the Bermudian economy has always depended on external contingencies, business itself has been in local hands — traditionally those of the white aristocracy but more recently those of upwardly mobile blacks, Portuguese, and whites of lower and middle class origins as well. The situation contrasts radically with most Commonwealth Caribbean countries, where banking, real estate, insurance, retail commerce, and other key sectors of the economy are dominated by multinational corporations or newly-immigrated ethnic minority groups.

Bermuda's control over its economy is safeguarded by the law that businesses operating on the island — excluding the international companies whose activities

are restricted to corporate transactions — must be at least 60 per cent Bermudian owned. The law has, however, a notable exception: the hotels. Before World War II, most Bermudian hotels were, in fact, locally owned. But after the war the capital needed to renovate the older hotels and to build new ones was sought abroad. Today nine of Bermuda's ten "large" hotels (minimum 250 beds) are under foreign ownership, while controlling interest in the tenth is held by non-natives resident in Bermuda. Collectively, these large hotels accommodate two-thirds of Bermuda's tourists (Ministry of Tourism figures, 1976).

The implications of foreign hotel ownership have been recently manifest to the public in two ways. The first was the unprecedented acquisition of public beach property for the use of guests by the two newest luxury hotels. The second has been the failure of smaller, Bermudian-owned hotels to compete on the modern tourist market, a failure dramatized in some cases by their being converted to dormitories for the expatriate staff recruited by large, foreign-owned hotels. Many homeowners who built apartments for tourists in their houses have also failed to make a viable business, and thus been left to rent the premises to residents at much lower rates.

In previous election campaigns, the PLP urged nationalization of the hotels, but drastically muted such talk in 1976. Indeed, it now claims that the impetus for nationalization should come from the general public. The foreign ownership issue was, however, raised by the Bermuda Industrial Union, which threatened a major hotel strike two months before the election. Although the issues at stake were wages, pension benefits, and layoff procedures, the rationale put forth by the union as a means of gaining public support was Bermuda's lack of control over its major industry. The hotel workers were cast as exploited native labour, making huge profits for foreign investors who had no concern about Bermudian society.

Mass support was not, however, forthcoming, and the dispute submitted instead to arbitration. Table 6-1 shows why. The anti-foreign ownership position is anathema to whites and barely palatable to blacks. A full 60 per cent of whites disagree strongly and another 28 per cent disagree somewhat, that foreign ownership constitutes a threat. Blacks marginally agree with the proposition, although

TABLE 6 - 1
"THE AMOUNT OF FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN BERMUDA IS A THREAT TO THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL WELL-BEING OF THE ISLAND." (ITEM 14)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	99	26	21	12	30	10	.22
White	100	1	7	4	28	60	-1.38

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.21	.20	.21	-1.46
Upper	.20	.10	.33	-1.60
Middle	.18	.11	.20	-1.69
Lower	.22	.25	.17	- .92

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	8	5	87	-1.37
UBP Blacks	100	29	12	59	- .37
PLP Blacks	101	64	12	25	.77
PLP Black Converts	99	46	7	46	.08

the 12 per cent who are unsure could tip the balance either way. Notably, the largest single group of blacks — 30 per cent — are those who disagree somewhat.

Class makes little overall difference except among lower class whites, who are considerably less sure than

middle and upper class whites that foreign ownership is not a threat. A more striking finding is the difference between black men and women by class. With men, opposition to foreign ownership decreases as class rises; with women, it increases. Insofar as these patterns parallel the data on partisan support (cf. Table 4-12), it would appear that foreign ownership is a critical issue in determining the political alignment of blacks.

The findings thus corroborate the ideological schism between the sexes in the black class structure. Black men respond predictably, with the middle and upper classes taking a position that is more conservative and more consistent with their socioeconomic interests. Black women, however, invert the standard model, moving leftward in the middle and upper classes and thus becoming more polarized from whites.

The issue divides blacks and whites in the UBP about as much as it divides blacks alone on party lines. Nearly nine-tenths of UBP whites disagree with the contention that foreign ownership is threatening, but only three-fifths of their black colleagues share that viewpoint. Almost two-thirds of PLP blacks see foreign ownership as a threat, an expected finding in view of their party's traditional position and the labour union's campaign. The PLP's black converts stand midway between blacks in the two parties, symbolizing their transitional status but also suggesting that foreign ownership was not one of the issues that won the PLP new followers.

Unemployment Insurance

For most of the past two generations Bermuda has had a surplus of jobs, resulting in both the overemployment of the local population and the large scale importation of expatriate labour. As recently as 1972, the island claimed the world's lowest unemployment rate — one per cent — and highest labour force participation rate among both sexes (Newman 1972: 9). Being unemployed in such conditions has been sorely stigmatized at all levels of society. Research done in 1969-70 revealed a widespread "anti-welfare" attitude among the members of black workmen's clubs, reflected in the clubs' refusal to include

any form of unemployment insurance in their beneficial programmes. (Manning 1973: 122).

But with the recession of the middle 1970's and a corresponding moratorium on hotel building, unemployment became a social reality for the first time in the memory of many Bermudians. A 1976 survey revealed 1,200 unemployed, about four per cent of the labour force (Statistical Office figures, 1976). Hardest hit were construction workers, virtually all black and one of the largest sectors of the labour force in recent decades.

PLP leaders are privately divided on unemployment insurance. Generally, the union and other liberal elements of the party favour it, while the business and professional wing are opposed. Desirous of projecting a moderate image, the party took no official stand in the 1976 platform, but did stress the critical need to "deal with unemployment." Still, the PLP is popularly associated with unemployment insurance through its traditional identification with social welfare issues.

The UBP, on the other hand, view unemployment insurance as the epitome of the dreaded welfare state and thus unequivocally oppose it. A recent statement by David Gibbons, then Finance Minister in the Sharpe Cabinet, spells out the party position:

> I don't think unemployment insurance is necessary in Bermuda. In fact, I think it would be very wrong to bring it in.
>
> There are always going to be people who are not working, and there's always a hundred or two people who are sort of semi-vagrants and who really aren't that keen about working anyway.
>
> If somebody just decided — and this is the great problem with unemployment insurance — they don't want to work for a few weeks and they know they can get it, there's a tremendous temptation to just simply not work for a few weeks. And anybody can always find a way of stopping work and qualifying.
>
> I think Bermuda is too small a place for it, and it's frankly not necessary; and, economically, it would be a grave error to change from our present system....(*Bermuda Sun*, July 8, 1977, p. 8).

He also indicated, however, that there should be improved and standardized forms of relief for people in genuine need, citing specifically women with children who have lost or been deserted by their husbands.

After his election as Premier, Gibbons told a conference of chartered accountants that unemployment insurance was not in the offing: "We have not been impressed by the effects on attitudes to work and on the economy of countries where unemployment relief is too freely given (*Royal Gazette*, September 12, 1977, p.1,2).

Table 6-2 shows the races evenly polarized on the proposition that Bermuda should institute unemployment insurance. Blacks are in favour by three to one, while whites are opposed by more than two to one. While no other item on the questionnaire evoked a more even and emphatic split of opinion along racial lines, many blacks who favoured unemployment insurance shared the UBP's view about those who simply refuse to work. One woman, for example, told the interviewer that her husband had been sick and unable to work and that she, therefore, had no source of support but the generosity of relatives. Yet she pointed accusingly to jobless men who simply hang around the streets, seemingly "without a care in the world."

Black support for unemployment insurance decreases consistently with class, a pattern seen in both sexes. Note that the black female response is consistent with class interests on this social welfare issue, while it was an inversion of class interests on foreign ownership, a nationalistic and somewhat more abstract ideological issue.

The white response roughly parallels the black, as the middle and upper classes register greater opposition to unemployment insurance than the lower class. The strongest negative position is taken by the white middle class, an indication of this group's considerable anti-welfare sentiment and the generally conservative position predicted on the basis of its drift from the UBP to uncertainty (cf. Table 4-16).

Unemployment insurance is favoured by less than a fifth of UBP whites, by two-thirds of UBP blacks, and by three-quarters of PLP blacks — a clear division of opinion along racial rather than party lines. The strongest pro-

TABLE 6 - 2
"BERMUDA SHOULD HAVE SOME FORM OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE TO PROVIDE BENEFITS FOR THOSE WHO ARE OUT OF WORK." (ITEM 19)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	41	31	4	13	11	.78
White	101	6	24	6	21	44	- .75

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.75	.78	.72	- .71
Upper	.50	.48	.53	- .75
Middle	.78	1.00	.73	- .81
Lower	.84	.86	.80	- .50

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	18	7	75	-1.07
UBP Blacks	100	66	3	31	.49
PLP Blacks	100	74	3	23	.86
PLP Black Converts	100	92	0	8	1.42

unemployment insurance position, however, is taken by the PLP's black converts, 92 per cent of whom voice agreement. Ironically, this suggests that even though PLP has not officially endorsed unemployment insurance, their traditional association with this type of issue may have attracted some new black followers.

Labour Relations

Unionism came late to Bermuda relative to the Caribbean. The first labour organization was started in 1944 when the Bermuda Government — at that time a monolithic merchant oligarchy — forced the newly-established U.S. bases to cut the wages of local civilian workers so that they would not exceed the rates paid by Bermudian employers. Yet the Bermuda Industrial Union (BIU), the outgrowth of the workers' protest, lacked real strength until the mid-1960's when it staged its first major successful strike, united a divided labour movement, and pushed its membership into the thousands.

The BIU today symbolizes several levels of social meaning. First, an overwhelming majority of its rank and file members are black, and many of the white minority are European contract workers in the hotels. Although white Bermudians in some clerical and sales positions are among the lowest paid employees in Bermuda, the union has made no concerted effort to organize them; nor, in fairness, have white workers sought out union membership. As in other Bermudian institutions, race prevails over economic considerations.

Second, the union has become increasingly militant over the past decade. In the single year 1974, for example,

Ottiwell Simmons, President of the Bermuda Industrial Union and PLP winner in Pembroke East, greets an ardent supporter at the polls.

the BIU staged seven official strikes, six of which arose over recognition and personnel disputes. The following year it called a general strike coincident with an official visit by Queen Elizabeth and Prince Philip. In both 1976 and 1977 the union tied up public transportation by striking the bus service.

Third, the BIU represents an even stronger and better organized challenge than the PLP to the white-controlled power structure. Besides its negotiating activities, the BIU runs a credit union, co-op food store, and gas station. And unlike Caribbean labour movements which typically are fragmented into rival segments, the BIU is a single entity representing all unionized blue collar workers in Bermuda. The only other unions are the professional groups representing the teachers, civil servants, and entertainers.

The proposition put to survey respondents was the familiar argument that Government should exercise more control over the union, especially with respect to preventing strikes (Table 6-3). Blacks are almost evenly divided on the issue, 46 per cent agreeing and 49 per cent disagreeing. Consistent with their mixed opinion, many blacks told interviewers they would like to see greater cooperation and understanding between Government and labour, rather than either Government control or union militancy. The white response, contrastingly, is unequivocal. About two-thirds of whites agree strongly that the union must be more firmly controlled, while another 22 per cent agree somewhat.

By class, blacks are marginally opposed to greater control over the union in the lower class and marginally in favour of it in the middle and upper classes. While this pattern is predictable, what is perhaps surprising is both the closeness of responses by class and the fact that even in the lower class — the union constituency — 38 per cent agree that Government should wield greater power over the union. Black men are generally more favourable to union interests than black women, although in the lower class the women take the stronger pro-union position. Support for greater control over the union is highest among middle class women, followed by upper class men.

TABLE 6 - 3
"GOVERNMENT SHOULD EXERCISE MORE CONTROL OVER THE LABOUR UNION, ESPECIALLY WITH REGARD TO PREVENTING STRIKES." (ITEM 9)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	101	25	21	6	32	17	.05
White	100	64	22	6	1	7	1.35

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.01	- .09	.07	1.38
Upper	.14	.25	0	1.40
Middle	.20	- .44	.34	1.13
Lower	- .19	- .15	- .28	1.67

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	99	93	3	3	1.58
UBP Blacks	100	69	5	26	.74
PLP Blacks	99	28	4	67	- .48
PLP Black Converts	100	46	8	46	0

On the white side the strongest anti-union opinion is found in the lower class, the group whose wages are often lower than those of black union members. Thus there is greater difference of opinion between the lower classes of the two races than between the races as a whole — a stinging commentary on the prevalence of racial antagonism over the union's nominal concern for all

workers. All three white classes, however, leave no doubt about their opposition to strikes and powerful unionism.

The union issue divides blacks along partisan lines to a greater extent than any other economic issue, foreign ownership included. Two-thirds of PLP blacks do not agree with greater control over the union, while two-thirds of UBP blacks agree — a measure of polarization matching that between the races. UBP whites agree almost unanimously that Government should exercise a more powerful hand over the union.

Scholarships

The slowness of Bermuda to support and encourage education has been partly overcome by the rapid strides of the past decade. Educational expenditures in recent years have accounted for about a fifth of the total Government budget. The minimum school leaving age was raised from 13 to 14 in 1965, to 15 in 1967, and to 16 in 1969, ensuring all children at least that many years of free education (*Bermuda Report* 1970: 34). Post-secondary facilities on the island — academic, technical, commercial, and hotel training — were consolidated into the Bermuda College in 1974. Tuition is charged, but financial aid is also available.

University or professional study abroad is achieved by a still relatively small percentage of the population (Newman 1972: 17). Predictably, race is a factor. Breaking down years of schooling by race, the 1960 Census showed significant disparities between blacks and whites (35). The next census, which gave a breakdown by residence only, showed that the highest educational levels were in Smith's and Paget — Bermuda's only two predominantly white parishes — while the lowest levels were in the City of Hamilton and Sandys Parish — the most heavily black sections of Bermuda (Census 1970: 100, 68).

The relatively low level of post-secondary qualifications among blacks is one basic reason why a white expatriate elite play an important and increasingly influential role in Bermudian business and professional life. To quote from Newman's analysis:

> The level of schooling acquired by the resident Bermudian population up to 1970 was not commensurate with the Colony's expanding commercial

and technological needs, as witnessed by substantial increases in professional, technical, and managerial occupations.

> A large part of the solution (to Bermudianization of the labour force) within the Bermudian population alone is possible during the 70's if most of those enrolled in secondary schools now and in the future are encouraged to take and pass the necessary examinations, and if a sizeable proportion of them elect to enter a university and are financially able to do so (1972: 18).

The question of financial ability is paramount, of course, especially in view of the sharp rise in American tuition rates and the recent decision of many public universities in Canada to charge higher fees to non-native students. Bermuda offers scholarships, bursaries, and other grants for higher education abroad, but competition is keen. Whites have generally enjoyed an edge, moreover, partly because four of Bermuda's five academic secondary schools were exclusively white before desegregation in the 1960's; three are still predominantly white. The PLP claims that scholarships are invariably given to youth from middle and upper class families who can afford to send their children to university without financial aid. Alternately, it calls for Government scholarships for all students who gain admission to universities abroad.

Table 6-4 shows that two-thirds of blacks favour the proposition that post-secondary scholarships should be awarded on the basis of financial need rather than academic merit, while nearly three-fifths of whites are opposed. Strong feelings are more prevalent among blacks, however, making their positive mean score nearly three times as high as the negative mean score of whites.

Black support is strongest in the lower and middle classes and then tapers off in the upper class — a pattern consistent with socioeconomic interests. But the more striking data pertain to the broad difference between black men and women, especially in the lower and middle classes where women favour the proposal about twice as strongly as men. This finding can be read as a confirmation of the thesis that in black society, mothers play a greater role than fathers in planning for the higher education of their children and, in this context, throws

TABLE 6 - 4
"SCHOLARSHIPS AND BURSARIES FOR STUDY ABROAD SHOULD BE GIVEN TO THOSE STUDENTS WHO HAVE THE GREATEST FINANCIAL NEED, RATHER THAN TO THOSE WHO GET THE HIGHEST GRADES." (ITEM 23)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	45	22	7	14	12	.73
White	100	19	14	10	32	25	- .26

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.77	.59	.95	- .29
Upper	.57	.55	.60	- .70
Middle	.86	.44	.95	0
Lower	.79	.63	1.14	0

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	27	10	63	- .48
UBP Blacks	100	61	3	36	.53
PLP Blacks	100	78	5	17	1.03
PLP Black Converts	100	46	23	31	.39

light on the difference faced by lower and middle class women in meeting the demand. In the upper class the sexual difference narrows, although women still show greater support than men for the awarding of scholarships on the criterion of financial need.

The white lower and middle classes are neutral on the scholarship proposition, while in the white upper class there is fairly considerable opposition. This pattern conforms to expectations, as it is the white upper class who have the most to lose by scholarship aid being based on need rather than merit. The issue thus puts upper class whites against blacks as a group, leaving lower and middle class whites between the two.

Blacks are divided along party lines only about half as much as the races are divided in the UBP. Note the emergence of a pattern. When racial opinion is deeply divided and blacks voice a clear opinion as in this issue and the unemployment insurance issue, UBP blacks are ideologically closer to PLP blacks than to their own partisan colleagues. But when black opinion is closer to neutral, as in the foreign ownership and labour union issues, there is a broader gap between blacks along partisan lines than between the races in the UBP. Put succinctly, race prevails over party when blacks feel strongly about an issue — as they clearly do about the need for unemployment insurance and the wider distribution of scholarship benefits.

Tax Reform

Bermudian taxation is, and has always been, indirect. Customs duties traditionally yielded the bulk of the public purse, as virtually all necessities and consumer goods are imported. Supplementary revenue came from licensing fees, legal fines, stamp duties, and departure taxes. With the growth of Government under the representative system, however, new tax bases have been necessary. The Land Tax, introduced in the late 1960's and increased in 1974, assesses homeowners on the annual rental value of their houses. The Employment Tax of 1973 charges employers five per cent of their workers' wages. The Hospital Levy, introduced two months before the 1976 election, charges both employers and employees three-quarters of one per cent of their wages. Another recent source of revenue has been the Betting Tax, swelled by the growing popularity of off-track betting parlours.

The PLP has long assailed the taxation system on the grounds that it is not based on the means to pay and therefore regressive. Their argument is applied as

follows: customs duties fall most heavily on working class blacks, who have the largest families and therefore the highest food and clothing bills; the Land Tax is paid by the average homeowner, but the landlord with several houses may be exempt if all of them are assessed below a specified minimum; the Employment Tax charges the small local businessman five per cent of his wage bill, but takes only two per cent from the hotel owner and contains a number of other privileged categories and exemptions; the Hospital Levy taxes wages but not profits, dividends, and other sources that provide the chief income of the wealthy; the Betting Tax sanctions gambling, a pastime which has working class blacks as its chief devotees.

Alternately, the PLP has proposed a progressive income tax similar to that of most Western democracies. The party softened this position in 1976, stating it favoured a tax based on income but not necessarily an income tax *per se*. The platform plank attacked the present system and promised reform:

> Tax reform will be a major objective of the PLP government. Bermuda's present regressive system of taxes must be restructured. Import duties, licensing fees, occupancy taxes, betting taxes, and the Hospital Levy will no longer form the main base of Government revenue.

The UBP counters that an income tax would be too costly to collect in a small country, echoing the position of Canadian consultant W. A. Macdonald, who examined the tax structure and recommended the Employment Tax instead of an income tax. To quote from his report, "Bermuda has never relied on a form of taxation which required the maintenance of records or self-assessment by taxpayers. A move from this position to a full income tax would be comparable to moving from the horse and buggy to the jet age in a single leap" (Macdonald 1973: 18). The party adds that the disclosures required by an income tax would undermine the island's present position as a shelter for international businesses which want to escape taxation and to keep their assets in confidence.

Table 6-5 shows that both races support the proposition that the tax burden should be heaviest on those who are most able to pay. About nine-tenths of blacks and nearly

TABLE 6 - 5
"BERMUDA'S TAX STRUCTURE SHOULD BE CHANGED IN ORDER TO PUT THE GREATEST BURDEN ON THOSE WHO ARE MOST ABLE TO PAY." (ITEM 11)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	99	76	13	4	4	2	1.57
White	100	53	19	7	8	13	.92

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.63	1.61	1.65	.73
Upper	1.60	1.55	1.67	.25
Middle	1.62	1.22	1.71	1.06
Lower	1.65	1.69	1.57	1.08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	73	7	20	.95
UBP Blacks	100	88	3	9	1.37
PLP Blacks	100	94	3	3	1.79
PLP Black Converts	100	77	15	8	1.46

three-quarters of whites agree, a heavy majority of both choosing the "strongly" option. For both races the mean score is higher than on any other economic statement calling for liberal change. All black classes are radically committed to tax reform, although support decreases slightly as one ascends the social hierarchy. In the lower class men take a stronger position, while in the middle and upper classes women take a stronger position — a pattern

consistent with the party alignment by sex and class reported in Table 4-12. White support for tax reform is strong in the lower and middle classes, but drops to marginal in the upper class. The lower and middle classes of both races are relatively close to a common opinion, indicating that tax reform is something of a populist issue.

Seventy-three per cent of UBP whites agree that the tax structure should be reformed, as compared to 88 per cent of UBP blacks and 94 per cent of PLP blacks. On mean scores, however, the UBP blacks are midway between the other two groups. Black PLP converts register a lower agreement percentage than other blacks, but a relatively high mean score since all who supported tax reform "agreed strongly."

In sum, the findings indicate that tax reform can be the PLP's economic trump card. It has the unequivocal support of blacks across party, sex, and class lines, representing the only economic issue on which blacks can realistically and vociferously unite. It also has the strong support of lower and middle class whites, together with the majority of the white population. The UBP must relate to the strong populist sentiment for democratic tax reform, even at the risk of alienating its most powerful constituency, the white elite.

Social Services

The central principle of Bermudian social organization, at least since the emancipation of slaves in 1834, has been the patronage system. In complete control of the economy and political machinery, the white merchant aristocracy have endeared the majority black population to them through the distribution of jobs, loans, credit, charitable donations, and social prestige. Culturally, the system has promoted the popular concept of Bermuda as a single extended family, gratefully loyal to the oligarchy for their benevolent and paternal leadership.

Partisan politics and the black reaction against social subordination have successfully challenged the cultural premises of the patronage system without altering the underlying distribution of power. Patronage has been transferred from private hands to an expanded governmental and civil service hierarchy, making clientship

depend less on personal rapport with individual white benefactors than on cooperation with Government and support by the Government party.

While superficial from a structural viewpoint, these changes have given rise to two conservative complaints. First, the white aristocracy view with dismay the diminishment of the private charities which made the distribution of largesse a highly personalized, time honoured custom. The predominately white, voluntary welfare societies have generally been reduced to a shadow of their former stature. Replaced entirely have been the parish vestries, limited-franchise elected bodies which functioned as a training ground for the sons and scions of the gentry to cut their political teeth as "overseers of the poor" and in other patronage roles under vestry jurisdiction.

Second, there is the charge that Government is overspending on social services. Expenditures on medical, public health, and welfare programmes increased from 14 to 21 per cent of the Government budget in the first half of the 1970's, as health and social services became the most costly area of Government activity. The reaction against this process usually takes the form of an anti-socialist backlash against the growing welfare state.

While the statement that Government is overspending on social services evoked a relatively small difference between the races, it is notable that their mean scores are opposite (Table 6-6). Whites marginally support the proposition, although the tenth of respondents who are unsure could have tipped the balance either way. Blacks marginally reject it, but nearly a third agree. In short, the races are divided but the difference is small.

But the overall difference between the races is exceeded by both the racial differences in all classes and the class difference among whites. On the black side opposition to the charge of Government overspending is stronger in the middle and upper classes than in the lower class, a pattern that may reflect the black bourgeoisie antipathy to what is identified as a reactionary white cliche. Conversely, white support for the overspending claim rises with class. The white lower class disagree, with a stronger voice than heard from any class group of blacks. The white middle and upper classes are in

TABLE 6 - 6
"GOVERNMENT IS SPENDING TOO MUCH MONEY ON SERVICES AND BENEFITS THAT INDIVIDUALS SHOULD PROVIDE FOR THEMSELVES." (ITEM 4)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	99	16	15	12	40	16	- .24
White	101	24	24	10	29	14	.14

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	- .20	- .16	- .24	.19
Upper	- .25	- .24	- .27	.45
Middle	- .40	.67	- .63	.38
Lower	- .07	- .26	.36	- .50

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	52	10	38	.27
UBP Blacks	100	36	15	49	- .07
PLP Blacks	100	27	8	65	- .40
PLP Black Converts	101	39	23	39	- .15

agreement, an expected finding in view of their economic position and their displacement as patrons by Government.

Black male-female differences are impressive in the lower and middle classes. Although these differences do not develop any consistent pattern and ultimately cancel out each other, they exemplify what is by now a familiar

observation: that black social thought is sex differentiated.

UBP whites voice majority agreement — 52 per cent — with the contention that Government is spending too much on social services, while 65 per cent of PLP blacks refute that same contention. UBP blacks stand about midway between the two groups, tending to disagree but also registering a relatively high level of uncertainty. Black PLP converts are similarly divided.

The Socialist Trend

Traditionally, the capitalist-socialist controversy symbolized to Bermudians a fundamental division of social reality. On the one side were the UBP and its external role models, the corporate business elite of North America and Europe. On the other side were the PLP and its external role models, the new political elite of the Caribbean and Africa. The racial aspects of the division lent it relevance and urgency within the most familiar idiom of Bermudian social thought.

The recent confusion of these boundaries by the PLP has resulted partly from its public relations effort to create a bourgeois image and partly from influences introduced by new elements in the party. A physician elected to Parliament for the first time in 1976 told a news reporter: "I think we are all, in varying degrees, capitalists at heart." He went on to say that he was bothered by the "socialist stance of some (PLP) members," but did not feel that stance any longer represented the dominant outlook of the party itself. (*Bermuda Sun*, June 12, 1976, p. 4).

PLP leader Lois Browne has effectively reversed the controversy by claiming that it is really the UBP which is now socialistic. Asked recently about her party's commitment to socialism, for example, she replied, "I don't think people ask that question now, because of all the socialist things the UBP have enacted." (*Bermuda Sun*, April 7, 1977, p. 4). She cited old age pensions, hospital insurance, and free public education, programmes proposed by the PLP in the 1960's and at that time labelled socialist by the UBP.

UBP incumbents deForest Trimingham and John Swan talk with a voter in Paget East, Bermuda's most heavily white constituency and a bastion of anti-socialist sentiment.

The ironic charge of socialism against the UBP has found its way into the rhetoric of the party's white dissidents. An illustration of competing anti-socialist positions is furnished by one of the UBP's 1976 primary campaign meetings in a heavily white district. The incumbents spoke in broad ideological terms and with reference to the Caribbean. One, for example, told the audience: "Socialism is a parasite on capitalism....We must defeat socialism. I've been watching Cuba and Jamaica and it's frightening. We must wipe this out." The other incumbent identified "Marxist socialism" as Bermuda's "major enemy," citing the alleged destruction of Jamaica under Manley as the evidence of where socialism would lead. The challenger, however, pointed closer to home by attacking the UBP's present policies as examples of socialism. He condemned subsidized day care centers and the high cost of public education, and described the Hospital Levy as "a tax to support the indigent — but the indigent will always be with us."

Of interest is that neither side pointed to the PLP as the villian of socialism. The incumbents raised the familiar Caribbean scare, a tactic whose political mileage

TABLE 6 - 7
"BERMUDA IS DRIFTING TOO FAR IN THE DIRECTION OF SOCIALISM." (ITEM 25)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	15	13	28	32	12	- .11
White	100	17	25	15	33	10	.06

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	- .23	- .34	- .11	.13
Upper	- .28	- .43	- .07	.60
Middle	- .37	- .89	- .25	- .13
Lower	- .13	- .23	.07	- .33

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	45	12	43	.08
UBP Blacks	100	26	26	48	- .16
PLP Blacks	100	28	27	45	- .16
PLP Blacks Converts	100	42	25	33	.17

has been rather exhausted. The challenger slammed the UBP for socialism, a charge that brought thunderous applause and strengthened his demand for widespread reform in the party.

The rhetorical transformation of socialist identities seems to have neutralized the races. Table 6-7 reveals little racial difference on the proposition that "Bermuda is drifting too far in the direction of socialism." Indeed, the races give almost identical responses in all categories except "agree somewhat" and "not sure", where the

greater percentage of whites opt for agreement and the greater percentage of blacks for uncertainty. Consequently, whites register a marginally positive mean score and blacks a marginally negative one. The level of uncertainty for both races is greater than for any other economic item.

As in the previous statement about Government overspending on social services, the class response of each race is basically an inversion of the other. Moving upwards in the class structure, whites become more convinced that Bermuda is becoming too socialistic while blacks become more convinced that it isn't. Accordingly, the upper classes of the two races are rather polarized.

Comparing the responses of black men and women, the general statement that Bermuda is becoming too socialistic differs from the previous statement that specifically mentioned overspending on services and benefits. While black men are more inclined to refute the rather abstract socialism statement, women take a stronger negative position on the more concrete matter of social services. Both statements, however, evoke a positive response from lower class black women, suggesting their conservatism on this type of issue in contrast to their liberalism on the question of scholarships, unemployment insurance, and other economic issues.

The socialism contention elicits virtually no difference between blacks across party lines. The mean scores of UBP and PLP blacks are identical, and their agreement-disagreement levels vary by no more than three percentage points. Ironically, the PLP's black converts take a position similar to UBP whites in agreeing that the socialist trend has gone too far — a finding that should furnish some political humour for both parties!

Overview

The ideological position of UBP blacks is particularly significant, as they are the key swing element in the Bermuda electorate. If the UBP can retain their allegiance and perhaps increase their number (as happened in the late 1960's when there was a substantial black drift from the PLP to the UBP), it will remain strong. But should the reverse trend of black conversion to the PLP

continue at its present rate (cf. Table 3-7), the PLP will need only two more elections to secure a popular majority. Should the trend accelerate the PLP could win the next election.

On the issues of foreign ownership, labour union control, and taxation policy — matters having to do with the general management of the economy — UBP blacks stand as close or closer to their white politicial colleagues than to the blacks in the PLP. But on the key social welfare issues — unemployment insurance and scholarships — the UBP blacks are considerably closer to the PLP blacks than to the whites in their own party.

The UBP is therefore on safe ground when it stresses the issues that distinguish its black followers from other blacks and that also have a wide appeal to whites. It can continue to defend the foreign ownership of large hotels as an economic necessity and maintain a strong position in dealing with the union, particularly in preventing strikes. But should the party move to broaden its black support by making new concessions on social welfare issues such as unemployment insurance and scholarships, it would further alienate the white dissidents who represent what are essentially middle class interests. While the party's black and white reformists were united in the move to topple Premier Sharpe, their respective constituencies are ideologically far apart. The UBP's record in dealing with its diverse coalition is likely to determine its political fortunes.

The relation of social class to ideology differs between the races. On all economic issues except unemployment insurance there are major differences between at least two classes of whites. Generally, the role of class is predictable, i.e. the upper classes take more "conservative" positions — positions more consistent with dominant economic interest — than the classes below them. The only notable exception arises on the question about labour union control, where the white lower class take a more militant anti-union stand than either the middle or upper classes. In short, white Bermudians exemplify economic determinism, the principle that political thought is an expression of economic interests and class position.

Among blacks, however, not one question evokes a major difference between any two classes. Moreover, the small difference between classes fluctuates from issue to issue, sometimes reversing rather than conforming to the economic determinist pattern. What are found among blacks are major male-female differences, both overall and within classes, as well as opposite class trends between the sexes. Thus the economic data confirm the finding about party support discussed in Chapter 4 — that an examination of black political culture must deal not so much with class *per se* as with the ideological differences between the sexes that are revealed through class analysis.

CHAPTER 7

THE POLITICAL ORDER

While the economic changes in Bermuda over the past two decades have been considerable, the underlying economic structure persists. There has been no significant redistribution of financial control. But in the constitutional realm there have been some radical changes. The advent of party politics in the early 1960's dealt a swift and lethal blow to the *ancien regime*. Bermuda's first formal constitution was enacted in 1968, replacing a form of government similar to that of the original American colonies with a representative system based on the modern Westminister model. Parliament, first called in 1620, was restructured from a collection of independent members to an assembly of Government and Opposition. Executive jurisdiction was transferred from essentially autonomous statutory boards appointed by the Governor to a cabinet of ministers answerable to Parliament. Chief political influence passed from the Speaker of the House to the leader of the majority party. Although much of the old terminology was retained until amendments were passed in 1972, the constitution itself established the legal structure that dramatically moved Bermuda from the seventeenth to the twentieth century.

As in the Commonwealth Caribbean, the basis of party politics and the new constitutional order was the extension of the franchise. The Progressive Labour Party (PLP) grew out of the Committee for Universal Adult Suffrage, a black group formed in 1960 to generate a mass campaign for full democratic voting rights. The franchise was then restricted to landholders, who were allowed to vote in as many parishes as they owned property. As each parish was a quadruple constituency and some of the oligarchy owned land in all nine parishes, there were persons with as many as 36 votes. Elections lasted three days, allowing the electors to travel from poll to poll at a leisurely pace.

The suffrage movement gained a compromise in time for the 1963 parliamentary election. All adults were allowed to vote, but the minimum age was raised from 21 to 25 and property holders compensated with an extra vote

in the districts where they resided. The compromise gave landholders 60 per cent of the vote, although they were outnumbered 5 to 4 by non-landholders. In only two districts, both overwhelmingly black, did the voting strength of the single voters exceed that of the double voters (*Royal Gazette*, May 4, 1963, p.1).

Yet even this small change enabled the PLP, formed only three months before the election, to sweep six of its nine candidates into the House of Assembly. That success persuaded 24 of the 30 independent members to form the United Bermuda Party (UBP) a year later and to prepare for a new political era. They agreed to drop the plus vote for property owners and to restore the vote to 21-year-olds, making the next election in 1968 the first under full and equal adult suffrage and along partisan lines. Since then no independent has been elected to the House of Assembly, and few now bother to try. A third splinter party was formed in the late 1960's but passed out of existence when it failed to gain a seat. Hence the two major parties have come to dominate and completely control the political arena.

With the rise of parties, politics has been professionalized and the public has been politicized. The UBP, more affluent and culturally more inclined toward sophisticated organization, employs a full time executive officer as well as a secretarial assistant. Each voting district has a branch level organization which holds an annual meeting, elects a slate of officers, and keeps the party in touch with constituents. Recent proposed changes include the hiring of additional paid staff, the initiation of training programmes to improve the public-speaking abilities of parliamentarians, the appointment of a public relations officer, the sponsorship of regular TV commercials in off-election years, the taking of public opinion surveys, and the possible computerization of records.

The PLP has traditionally focused attention on its central committee, the main policy-making and disciplinary body. Parish organizations exist on paper, but in fact have been dormant except during election campaigns. A youth wing flourished until the departure in 1972 of itinerant agitator and sometimes parliamentarian Roosevelt Brown. But with the gain of five seats in 1976 the

PLP has concentrated on reviving its organizational components and promoting ongoing political activities. A Party newspaper is published, a monthly television series has been started, and a professional journalist has been appointed public relations officer.

The professionalization of politics and the new emphasis on reaching and responding to the voters contribute to a broader social process: the politicization of the electorate. Change can be dated to the mid-1940's when E. F. Gordon, founder of the Bermuda Workers' Association, ran for the House of Assembly on a labour and social welfare platform (Brangman 1973: 31). Hastily passed legislation prevented Gordon from turning his union into a political party, but his candidacy represented the first major ideological confrontation in Bermuda politics. The white independents quickly responded, and by the 1948 election, were beginning to state their position on important issues instead of relying entirely on their personal reputations (Hodgson 1967: 77).

In its Constitution the PLP defines its first two objectives as follows:

A. To educate politically the people of Bermuda and to encourage their active participation in the Government of the country.

B. To provide forums for the discussion of political matters and issues affecting the country and the people (1974: 1).

The UBP has placed less explicit emphasis on politicization, having the major media organs as allies and relating to a constituency more familiar with voting. But with its recent loss of seats the party has focused considerable attention on articulating its view and responding sensitively to the public mood. In response to the PLP's media campaign for national independence the UBP prepared its own Green Paper on the subject, and then went to the people with a series of forums and television programmes.

Both parties advertise and hold public meetings during election campaigns, but have adopted door-to-door canvassing as the principal means of candidate exposure — a practice that did not begin on a general scale until the

election of 1968, the first along party lines. The accepted principle is that candidates who fail to canvass — a time consuming encounter that typically involves discussion and debate with the voter — have no chance of being elected. In marginal districts extensive canvassing goes on between elections as well. Four of the five seats gained by the PLP in 1976 are generally attributed to tightly organized canvassing from 1972 onwards, on the part of both candidates and other party workers.

But the politicization process involves more than the conscious efforts of politicians and parties to "educate" the people. It has a life of its own in the black workmen's clubs, voluntary recreational and beneficial associations that have become political nerve centers and settings for informal discussion and rapport-building exchange between politicians and working-class blacks (Manning 1973). Although the clubs are nominally neutral in partisan politics, the 1976 election saw two club presidents endorse the PLP and several other clubs place their premises at the disposal of the PLP for rallies and polling day headquarters. Mindful of the club constituency, the UBP has reacted by confidentially declaring the clubs a major

Working from polling day headquarters in the lounge of a black workmen's club, PLP volunteers check voters' list.

target for the next election. One cabinet minister who barely won his seat in a marginal district is said to be virtually "living" in his parish workmen's club. Several UBP hopefuls, white as well as black, have become frequent visitors to club bars. A workmen's club member recently observed, "I walked in here half hot (drunk) one night, saw all these big shot white boys, and fucking well thought I must have gone into the Yacht Club".

Yet while the party system and its spinoff processes have drastically changed the Bermudian political order, conservative and moderate influences remain strong. The Governor's authority has been constitutionally limited, but no Bermudian, black or white, has been appointed to the position. Bermuda remains a colonial polity; independence has been long urged by the PLP but only recently become a subject of general discussion. The Queen's Honours are still coveted prestige symbols, and knighthood is the ultimate designation of respectability.

These conservative influences are not simply elitist strategies to preserve the status quo. Rather, they are embedded in cultural forms that have a broad social base. The appeal, "This is Bermuda — let's keep it that way" is more than a UBP slogan; the refrain of a popular, native-composed folk song, it encapsulates a sentiment that is meaningful at some level to virtually all Bermudians.

Politically, then, Bermuda is at a crossroads. National independence and full Bermudianization beckon in one direction as the seemingly logical and perhaps inevitable culmination of the decolonization process that began with universal suffrage and the rise of political parties. Tradition beckons in the other, supported by deep-seated cultural attachments and the ideological conservatism fostered by an affluent but totally dependent economy. The tension of these opposing forces is the context of public opinion.

The 18-Year-Old Vote

Extensions of the franchise have invariably had racial implications in Bermuda and thus been resisted by whites. When slaves were emancipated in 1834 the minimum property qualification for voting was raised from 30 to 100 pounds (Cox 1970: 30), even though the population at that

time was fairly evenly split along racial lines. The qualification was later lowered to 60 pounds, sufficient to keep the voters' list small. In 1936, for example, only 15 per cent of whites and 5 per cent of blacks were eligible to vote (*Residence in Bermuda* 1936). Women were not enfranchised until 1944, provided, of course, that they owned property. As the number of black voters gradually equalled and then surpassed the number of white voters in the late 1940's, a white advantage was perpetuated through the ancient practice of plural voting as well as the proliferation of white property syndicates enabling large numbers of persons — 42 in one case (Hodgson 1967: 80) — to own a single estate and derive a vote from it. Finally, when the pressure for universal suffrage proved insurmountable in 1963, property owners were compensated with an extra vote and the minimum age raised from 21 to 25.

The new constitution, ratified in time for the 1968 election, created the first system of full and equal suffrage in Bermudian history. But it also gave the vote to British subjects resident in Bermuda for three years — a sizeable group that is two-thirds British and four-fifths white (Census 1970: 90). White independents too conservative for the new UBP filed a minority report objecting to the constitution's elimination of the plus vote for property owners.

The PLP, meanwhile, has consistently argued against the expatriate residence vote and in favour of making the voter registration of Bermudians compulsory and/or automatic. It has also supported a reduction of the voting age to 18 years, a change that would add to the voters' list a cohort that is about two-thirds black. The UBP has opposed all of these proposed electoral changes, although ironically it recently gave 18-year-old party members limited representation in their local branches.

Table 7-1 reveals that blacks strongly support the 18-year-old vote, three quarters agreeing and less than a fifth disagreeing. The white response is a mirror-image opposite, as slightly more than three quarters disagree and only 17 per cent agree. Strong views predominate in both races, polarizing the mean scores to a greater extent than on any other item on the questionnaire.

TABLE 7 - 1
"18 YEAR OLDS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO VOTE." (ITEM 16)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	55	20	7	10	8	1.04
White	101	11	6	6	29	49	- .99

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.11	1.21	1.00	-1.08
Upper	1.31	1.10	1.60	-1.10
Middle	.81	1.44	.76	-1.06
Lower	1.15	1.21	1.03	-1.08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	15	3	82	-1.12
UBP Blacks	100	54	7	39	.36
PLP Blacks	100	92	3	5	1.60
PLP Black Converts	100	77	15	8	1.00

Reasons given by blacks include the familiar, "If they're old enough to fight, they're old enough to vote" — a reference to the conscription of 18-year-olds into the Bermuda Regiment. Others argued that since elderly persons are allowed to vote even if they are senile, 18-year-olds should be given the same privilege even though they are not always mature.

Black support for the 18-year-old vote is highest in the lower and upper classes and considerably lower, although

still strong, in the middle class. Given the identification of the issue with the PLP, the overall class pattern is consistent with party agreement by class as shown in Table 4-11. The major fluctuation, however, occurs among black women, whose upper class is radically in favour of the 18-year-old vote but whose middle class give only moderate support to it.

The white class profile contrasts with the black in showing virtually no variation. All classes are strongly and uniformly opposed to a lower voting age.

PLP blacks take a radical stand in favour of the 18-year-old vote, 92 per cent agreeing and only 5 per cent disagreeing. This is, of course, not surprising, as the PLP has incorporated the issue into its platforms and made it a constant theme of political debate. What may be surprising is the marginal support of UBP blacks, who presumably have as much to lose by the 18-year-old vote as their white colleagues. Yet the UBP blacks are slightly closer to PLP blacks than to the whites in their own party — a striking example of how race often prevails over party allegiance and political self-interest in shaping public opinion.

Black PLP converts are strongly in favour of the 18-year-old vote, but not to the extent that it looms as an issue which attracted them to the PLP. Their position is about midway between the PLP's regular blacks and UBP blacks, an appropriate place in view of their political transition.

National Independence

Consideration of the prospect of independence for Bermuda tends to invite comparison with Commonwealth Caribbean countries, which generally moved through the stages of decolonization — universal suffrage, political party formation, representative government, and so on — two to three decades before Bermuda (cf. Manning 1973: 251-259). But the analogy is muddled by two major political qualifications, not to mention the range of economic and social differences. First, all of Britain's Antillean colonies except Barbados and the Bahamas (which had forms of government similar to Bermuda's before the new constitution) were in the latter part of the nineteenth century

downgraded from relative autonomy under the Old Representative System to total subordination as Crown Colonies (Singham 1968: 106-111). But Bermuda has always enjoyed and jealously protected an unbroken tradition of internal self-government, even while cherishing the cultural symbols of colonialism. These historical conditions give rise to the classic question put by Bermudians who oppose independence: "Independent from what? From whom? We've *been* independent for 350 years".

Second, Britain's Caribbean colonies originally approached independence through a federation that would collectively overcome their individual deficiencies of size. It was only when the West Indies Federation proved unworkable that they moved separately toward independence, the larger countries in the 1960's and the smaller countries in the 1970's. Bermuda, however, did not participate in the federal experiment and is not commonly considered part of the West Indies. Thus it has not experienced the initial stimulus that inspired independence movements in the Caribbean.

The PLP has always advocated independence as the ultimate solution to Bermuda's problems, though with varying rhetoric and with reference to varying models. The party's 1966 memo to the constitutional conference urged movement toward greater autonomy along the lines of Britain's Channel Islands, the largest of which are the same population size as Bermuda (Ryan 1973: 177). In the 1968 election campaign the PLP took a far more radical stand, likening Bermuda's exploitation under colonialism to conditions in the Caribbean and Africa. The platform gave a clear diagnosis and resolution:

> No government can be either responsible or democratic while under the rule of another country. Colonialism is a cancer which must be removed from the tissue of human affairs. Therefore, we shall return to London to examine with the British government what arrangements can be made for our independence (PLP 1968: 3).

The PLP's radical anti-colonialism was in contrast with the UBP's moderate approach to social reform, centering on racial integration and civil rights and promising continuing record prosperity under the form of

government that had always provided it. The Wooding Commission (1969: 69) observed that the campaign had the appearance of a clash between a party that urged fraternization for the colony's good and a party that denounced the colony's status. Bermuda's first election under democratically-based universal suffrage handed the PLP a humiliating defeat and eroded whatever public sentiment may have existed for the independence cause. The United Nations Committee on Decolonization took up the issue at the PLP's request, but their periodic statements of support for Bermuda's independence have been adroitly dismissed by the UBP Government as unwanted outside interference.

The PLP maintained its position on national independence in 1972, but downplayed the style of presentation. In the same year a confidential study undertaken by the Contemporary Research Centre in Toronto showed little public enthusiasm for independence. Most believed that independent status would jeopardize the economy, introducing new expenses that the taxpayers would have to bear. Sir Edward Richards, the successor of Sir Henry Tucker, and Bermuda's first and only black Premier, subsequently took a public stand echoing these sentiments and ruling out the prospect of independence (Ryan 1973: 180-181).

In the 1976 election campaign the PLP once again supported independence, but presented it as an inevitability to prepare for rather than as a struggle to be won. The platform was deliberately non-controversial:

> Bermuda is moving toward national independence. To this end a bi-partisan committee should be set up to ensure a national consensus on fundamental issues....
>
> The Progressive Labour Party remains dedicated to a revision of our constitutional framework which will prepare the way for Bermuda's independence (PLP 1976).

In the actual campaign, however, the PLP muted independence as well as other political and economic issues, concentrating instead on moral-religious concerns such as the integrity of the family and the spiritual well-being of Bermudian society.

The party gave renewed attention to independence after the election by mounting a series of television programmes and public forums to "educate" the people on the practical and patriotic benefits of independence. Other recent party-sponsored activities such as contests to design a national flag and compose a national anthem promise that independence will become a paramount concern in the near future. The *Bermuda Sun*, a non-partisan weekly newspaper, has editorially described it as the "number one issue" (July 15, 1977, p. 4).

Part of the reason for the surge of popular interest in national sovereignty stems from the UBP's changed outlook. Britain's decision in 1972 to dissolve the sterling area and thus cut Bermuda economically loose was generally interpreted by the business community as a signal that the colonial system faced an eventual if not imminent demise. Bermuda responded quickly by pegging its currency to the U.S. dollar, a move that West Indian countries delayed until several years later when their currencies had already been seriously depreciated by repeated devaluations of the British pound.

The UBP began in the mid-1970's to talk cautiously and unofficially about the prospect of independence, usually in connection with the need to develop a new political arrangement with another metropolitan country. An informal survey of a cross-section of UBP Members of Parliament in 1976 revealed heavy support for a future tie with Canada, but one that would stop short of making Bermuda a province; alternately, most envisaged a military and diplomatic arrangement that would save Bermuda the expense of defending itself and establishing embassies abroad (Manning 1977). There is, however, some UBP support for a similar agreement with the United States.

Through its appointed Governors, Britain seems to toy with both metropolitan possibilities. The incumbent, Sir Peter Ramsbotham, is a former British ambassador to Washington and an astute diplomat whose presence could facilitate a quasi-political relationship between an independent Bermuda and the United States. His immediate predecessor, Sir Edwin Leather, was a native-born Canadian and thus symbolic of a future tie with Canada.

The UBP's 1976 campaign platform hinted at the possibility of independence, but was non-committal:

> The United Bermuda Party believes that full independence requires full consideration of advantages or disadvantages that might result, including the additional costs involved. We recognize that in a changing world we must be ready to deal with events as they arise. The United Bermuda Party believes that Bermuda should keep its options open and undertakes that no decision on independence will be taken until the electors have been fully informed (UBP 1976).

The promise to "fully inform" the voters was carried out a year later with the publication of a Green Paper exploring Bermuda's constitutional options and assessing the advantages and disadvantages of independence from an essentially economic viewpoint. The report states that the British Government will neither withhold nor unilaterally urge independence, nor will it allow Bermuda to make further constitutional advances as a colony. Bermuda's choice, then, is between the status quo and sovereignty. A White Paper stating the UBP Government's position on these choices is forthcoming.

UBP cabinet members face a public meeting on national independence. From left, Ernest Vesey, John Plowman, Quintin Edness, Sir John Sharpe (then Premier), and John Swan. (Sun Pic)

TABLE 7 - 2
"BERMUDA SHOULD AIM AT GAINING NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE." (ITEM 8)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	101	20	24	22	15	20	.09
White	100	1	1	6	21	71	-1.58

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.07	.17	- .04	-1.67
Upper	.41	.20	.71	-1.65
Middle	- .02	- .22	.03	-1.88
Lower	- .01	.22	- .50	-1.42

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	2	3	95	-1.63
UBP Blacks	100	25	14	61	- .70
PLP Blacks	99	55	21	23	.49
PLP Black Converts	100	50	17	33	.25

Strong reactionary opinion has already come from a white Bermudian in the form of a pamphlet entitled "What Price In-de-pen-dance"? The author refers contemptuously to West Indian nationalism, argues that Britain is still strongly interested in keeping Bermuda, and warns that the economy will be destroyed by any movement toward independence (Smith 1977).

Table 7-2 indicates that the pamphleteer's anti-independence views are strongly shared by Bermudian

whites, although their premises, of course, may differ. Nearly three quarters of whites disagree strongly and another fifth disagree somewhat, that Bermuda should move toward national sovereignty. The white position is their strongest negative response on the entire survey.

Black opinion, on the other hand, is split and uncertain. Less than half of blacks favour independence, a third oppose it, and a fifth are uncertain. In short, whites are firmly and radically convinced that independence is wrong, while blacks are ambivalent about it.

The black ambivalence, however, is partly sorted out by a class breakdown. The lower and middle classes marginally reject independence, while the upper class moderately support it. Independence remains, as it has been in the past, basically a cause of the black bourgeoisie (Manning 1973: 115-119).

Variation between the sexes among blacks is also striking. Men and women take opposite stands in both the lower and middle classes. In the upper class both sexes support independence, but the female stand is much stronger than the male. The female response reveals great variation by class, ranging from moderate opposition in the lower class to moderate support in the upper class. It would seem, perhaps, that lower class black women are attracted to the PLP despite its independence stand, while the upper class are drawn because of it.

All classes of whites are radically opposed to independence, although the highest opposition comes from the middle class where 94 per cent disagree strongly and the remaining 6 per cent are unsure. Given the concentration of political dissension in the white middle class, discussed in Chapter 4, this suggests that the party's drift from opposition to neutrality on the independence issue may be one of the trends that supporters of the dissident whites find particularly disturbing. Notably, the two incumbents defeated in the UBP primaries took the stand that Bermuda should be prepared for independence.

Independence is favoured by only 2 per cent of UBP whites, as compared to a quarter of their black colleagues. A slight majority of PLP blacks favour independence, while approximately equal proportions disagree and profess uncertainty. These findings validate the PLP's

strategy of contending that independence should be an issue for the next general election rather than the subject of separate referendum. Were it put to a referendum in the current climate, it would undoubtedly lose; even the PLP's regular supporters are barely in favour, while other groups are decisively opposed. But in a general election the PLP could gain seats or even win the Government on the basis of other issues for which there is far more popular support.

Professional Success and Politics

Like voting, office holding in Bermuda has been restricted to landholders. When slaves were emancipated in 1834 the minimal valuation of land needed for candidacy to Parliament was raised from 200 to 400 pounds (Cox 1970: 30). The requirement was later lowered to 240 pounds, four times that needed to exercise the franchise. This ruling remained in force until the start of representative government in 1968, although even the new Constitution disqualifies persons declared bankrupt from holding a seat in Parliament.

The rule of the merchant oligarchy was further protected by the tradition of unpaid legislators. Before 1969 Members of Parliament received only a token stipend — $24 — for each weekly sitting. The salaries introduced in that year, a concession to PLP demands, were still token. Backbenchers received $2,400 per year, cabinet members twice as much, and the Premier $6,000. All salaries have since been approximately doubled, but as Bermudian wages approach North American standards, back-benchers' salaries are still at the poverty level.

The result, of course, is that politics remains restricted to those who can combine it effectively with another job — in practice, business executives responsible for their own time and self-employed professionals. The ideal has been that a person first devotes himself to a career, achieving success and security before venturing into politics to seek the personal renown that comes from unpaid service to country.

The patronage system has further reinforced the political tradition, as Members of Parliament play a critical patron role by providing jobs in their business,

extending credit to customers, securing bank loans and mortgages for their constituents, and contributing financially to local schools, churches, sports clubs, and charities. A candidate who is not in the financial position to carry out this role is generally seen as lacking an essential qualification. A PLP worker reported a talk he had with a black woman while canvassing for the party candidate, a young man seeking the seat held by the owner of an investment firm. The woman refused to pledge support for the PLP, explaining, "Suppose I need a loan or a mortgage. What's he (the PLP candidate) going to be able to do for me"?

Table 7-3 shows that blacks still hold the traditional concept of what constitutes the proper qualifications for a political candidate. More than half agree that the candidate should have already achieved business or professional success, while fewer than two-fifths disagree. White agreement stands at 85 per cent, making the difference between the races one of degree only.

Black support for the success-before-politics proposition is found in all classes, with minor variations. The weakest support comes from the lower class, suggesting, perhaps, that their reliance on patronage is balanced by a desire to see people of their own social position participate in political life. More arresting, though, are the differences between black men and women. Female support for the proposition is relatively uniform, but does rise consistently with class. Male support fluctuates more, and reaches a peak in the middle class — the group that one might expect to idealize business and professional success and thus be comparable to whites in attitude.

White class responses fluctuate less impressively, the major difference being lower support in the middle class for achievement before election to office. This again may reinforce the hypothesis about white middle class alienation from the UBP and the willingness of this class to support the "outsiders" who challenged the party's aristocratic incumbents.

Both races in the UBP agree that political candidates should have first made a successful career, although the

TABLE 7 - 3
"A PERSON SHOULD HAVE MADE A SUCCESS OF HIS BUSINESS OR PROFESSION BEFORE STANDING AS A POLITICAL CANDIDATE."(ITEM 6)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	101	32	22	8	23	16	.32
White	100	63	22	4	8	3	1.33

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.22	.27	.15	1.29
Upper	.28	.33	.20	1.40
Middle	.36	1.22	.17	1.13
Lower	.11	.11	.10	1.33

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	87	5	8	1.47
UBP Blacks	100	68	5	27	.78
PLP Blacks	100	45	10	45	.03
PLP Black Converts	100	42	0	58	- .17

feelings of blacks are only about half as intense as those of whites. PLP blacks are split on the issue, a startling finding in view of their party's persistent attacks on political elitism and patronage politics, but an indication, nonetheless, of why the PLP has generally done far better with candidates from business and professional backgrounds than with candidates from labour backgrounds. The only group to disagree with the

proposition are the PLP's black converts, but their stand is marginal.

Voting Districts

Traditionally, Bermudians sent four persons to the House of Assembly from each of the nine parishes, resulting in the highest ratio of Parliamentarians to population in the Commonwealth Antilles. The quadruple constituency system also gave rise to a distinctive electoral custom. Although each elector was entitled to four votes, he could withhold as many as three. The practice, known as "plumping", boosted a favoured candidate's mathematical chances of finishing in the top four by denying votes to any of his opponents. Before universal suffrage blacks used the plumping technique to elect token representation — usually one member from each parish. Whites also plumped, either to avoid voting for a black or to withhold support from an undesirable white.

The black drive for universal suffrage in the early 1960's was aimed also at establishing single-seat constituencies, envisaged as the most democratic (literally, one adult-one vote) electoral system as well as a sure means to increase black representation in Parliament. The counter argument was that single-seat constituencies would be so small that most districts would invariably be identified as black or white, intensifying racial division. This position eventually got the support of the blacks who were drifting toward what would become the UBP. E. T. (later Sir Edward) Richards explained:

> When a country is divided into districts so that, *ipso facto*, they will have to return white people or black people, you are playing with trouble. You are putting constitutional matters on a racial basis and creating black enclaves and white ones (Hodgson 1967: 192).

He acknowledged that the principle of single-seat constituencies was best in theory, but that the racial character of Bermudian society made such an arrangement equivalent to "playing with a political bomb which has its detonator on" (192).

The 1963 electoral reform bill thus set down yet another compromise. Each parish was divided into two

double constituencies, giving Bermuda 18 rather than 9 voting districts. This arrangement was subsequently written into the 1968 Constitution, with the minor change that populous Pembroke Parish be broken into four double constituencies.

The establishment and review of voting districts is the constitutional responsibility of the Constituency Boundaries Commission, which meets from time to time. Its terms are to draw equal size districts within each parish, taking account of natural boundaries but excluding racial considerations. The Commission is prohibited from creating districts that cross parish boundaries and from deviating from the system whereby Pembroke has four districts and all other parishes have two.

As the parishes differ considerably in population size, there are, therefore, glaring disparities between voting districts. Fewer than a thousand registered voters are found in four districts, while more than fifteen hundred are registered in eight. The largest district, Warwick West, is more than twice as large as each of the four smallest districts.

UBP running mates Clarence James, left, and Cyril Rance demonstrate the bi-racial partnership that has brought the party key victories in Bermuda's racially mixed double constituencies.

The PLP challenged the establishment of the Devonshire boundaries in 1968, denouncing the Commission itself in the election campaign (Wooding 1969: 83-84). The party has since contended that voting districts are generally gerrymandered, a charge that is difficult to sustain but that is made credible by the great differences of size. The solution, claims the PLP, is constitutional change that would establish single-seat constituencies of equal size, crossing parish boundaries if necessary.

But the issue turns on more than the belief that all persons should have votes of equal weight. The double constituencies have been skillfully used by the UBP as a means of demonstrating its bi-racial image by running racially mixed-tickets. The strategy has enabled the UBP to win both seats in districts that are two-thirds black, a political accomplishment unparalleled in the modern world. Were the double constituency system to stop the UBP would be left without an image and a slogan.

The PLP suffers from both the UBP's exploitation of bi-racialism and the inertia of irregular voting practices, including plumping. In the 1976 election 10 per cent of all persons who went to the polls cast only one vote. It is estimated that the great majority of these persons are black, since the plumper votes generally went to PLP candidates or other blacks. But the system works against the PLP by reducing its popular vote and by denying votes to a PLP running mate. The party also considers that it loses from split ticket voting, which blacks are four times as likely to do as whites (cf. Table 2-1). Were such persons given only one vote, it is reckoned they would support the PLP.

Table 7-4 shows that the races have opposite views on redistricting, although the mean difference between them is relatively small. Nearly half of blacks support equal size voting districts, while less than a third oppose the proposition. Among whites 57 per cent oppose redistricting and only 22 per cent support it. At least a fifth of both races are uncertain, indicating that the issue is not well understood. Or, as one respondent put it, "It's a good idea but I don't know how it could ever be done".

Black support for redistricting rises consistently with class. Whites are neutral in the lower class, but strongly opposed in the middle and upper classes. Accordingly,

TABLE 7 - 4
"ALL VOTING DISTRICTS SHOULD HAVE THE SAME NUMBER OF VOTERS."(ITEM 2)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	99	22	26	20	20	11	.29
White	101	9	13	22	34	23	- .49

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.27	.35	.19	- .67
Upper	.39	.19	.67	- .85
Middle	.33	.56	.28	- .94
Lower	.20	.37	- .18	0

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	22	18	60	- .55
UBP Blacks	101	41	24	36	.10
PLP Blacks	100	55	19	26	.40
PLP Black Converts	100	73	18	9	1.00

there is considerable opposition between the races in the middle and upper classes.

Among black men the major fluctuation is the decline of support for redistricting in the upper class, consistent with that group's political sympathies. Black women marginally oppose the proposition for equal size voting districts in the lower class, marginally support it in the middle class, and support it much more strongly in the upper class. The female response pattern is thus similar to that registered on the national independence item,

revealing the great ideological differences that exist among black women by class on politico-constitutional issues. On both issues upper class black women are more favourable to the PLP's position than even the PLP's declared supporters.

Redistricting is the only political item on the questionnaire on which blacks in the two parties hold a fairly common outlook, suggesting the extent to which it is perceived as a race issue. The split of black opinion along partisan lines is only half as great as the split of UBP opinion along racial lines. The strongest stand for redistricting is taken by the PLP's black converts, 73 per cent of whom agree that the voting districts should be the same size. Thus the PLP's persistent charges of gerrymandering could be one of the factors that has attracted new followers.

Party Politics

It is claimed that before the founding of the PLP and UBP there were really 36 parties in the House of Assembly. Each member had his own platform, stated his own views, and voted on his own judgements. Blacks usually challenge this claim, arguing that all seats ultimately belonged to a single party since those who occupied them represented common social and economic interests; they did business on Front Street, caucused at the Yacht Club, and derived their support from the landholding gentry.

The PLP consistently congratulates itself for introducing the party movement to Bermuda and being the *sine qua non* of black political progress. Both claims are supportable, for without the pressure marshalled by the PLP as a fledgling opposition it is doubtful that whites would have acceded to the widespread reforms that were set in motion in the 1960's. Still, the PLP's role in dividing blacks must continue to haunt it. Before the 1976 election there were 22 whites and 18 blacks in the House of Assembly. After the election and the subsequent bye-election these figures were reversed, giving blacks their first parliamentary majority in history. But as more than a third of the blacks sit with the UBP, where they are outnumbered 2 to 1 by whites, black political control has not been advanced. In this sense party politics has been an unwitting instrument of the classic colonial strategy of

divide and rule — an outcome predicted by those blacks who opposed the PLP's formation (Hodgson 1967: 225-253).

The UBP's problem has been to maintain division between blacks while bringing unity to a white population deeply split along lines of class and ethnicity. The task entailed tremendous concessions from Front Street and stoic restraint from those who had long chafed under its despotic rule. The formula worked under the firm but flexible leadership of Sir Henry Tucker and at a time when the PLP's militant racialism and doctrinaire socialism made it an intolerable threat. But as the threat diminished with the PLP's shift to the center, the coalition required more to hold it together than Front Street was willing to give or that subsequent leaders could wrest from it. Ironically, it was under Sir Edward Richards, a black, that the UBP Black Caucus emerged as a formal pressure group, just as it was under Sir John Sharpe, a white, that white dissidents organized and aligned with blacks to topple Sharpe and force new concessions on the party. The UBP has thus fulfilled the pessimistic predictions of those who opposed its original formation for reasons very similar to those advanced by the PLP's early critics: that the party system would exacerbate divisions and strains in an already fragile society.

Still, the party system is popularly accepted. Nearly two-thirds of blacks and 55 per cent of whites disagree with the proposition that Bermuda would be better off without political parties (Table 7-5). As even 17 per cent of both races are unsure, indicating considerable doubt about the benefits of party politics.

Black class differences are relatively slight, but indicate that the middle class have the most confidence in the party system. Greater differences are found between the sexes, black men being more favourable to party politics than black women. This variation is seen in all classes, but its magnitude decreases as one ascends the social scale.

The white lower and middle classes are in favour of the party system, to an extent that is comparable to blacks. Among the white upper class, however, there is marginal support for the contention that Bermudian politics would be improved without parties. It is, of course, the white upper class who have lost the most under party.

TABLE 7 - 5
"BERMUDA WOULD BE BETTER OFF WITHOUT POLITICAL PARTIES." (ITEM 24)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	101	11	9	17	27	37	- .69
White	101	15	14	17	31	24	- .33

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	- .75	- .85	- .64	- .25
Upper	- .67	- .71	- .60	.10
Middle	- .88	-1.11	- .83	- .56
Lower	- .70	- .86	- .38	- .42

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	32	10	58	- .33
UBP Blacks	100	29	17	54	- .36
PLP Blacks	101	13	16	72	- .98
PLP Black Converts	101	31	8	62	- .46

politics, at least in the sense that they no longer have a virtual monopoly on Parliament. On the other hand, one could argue that they have gained, since party politics has effaced the oligarchy without fundamentally altering the economic power structure.

PLP blacks take a strong stand for party politics, nearly three quarters being in favour of the party system and only 13 per cent agreeing that Bermuda would be better without it. Notably less enthusiasm is found in the UBP, where both races show a similar measure of marginal confidence in the party system. This supports

the notion that the UBP was formed primarily for pragmatic reasons, not as a positive ideal.

Overview

Political issues are highly controversial, splitting the public along both racial and party lines. On the 18-year-old vote, national independence, and candidate qualifications, UBP blacks stand about midway between their white colleagues and PLP blacks. Blacks come closer together on electoral reform, although only the PLP group give majority agreement to it. The two races in the UBP take an almost identical stand on the desirability of political parties, a stand quite different from that of PLP blacks. Generally, then, there are on political issues clear and considerable differences between blacks across partisan lines.

But while political issues, like economic issues, divide blacks by party more than by sex or class, there are striking differences between men and women that emerge under class comparisons. Overall, black men take a more liberal or leftist position than black women on all but one issue — candidate qualifications. But the sex difference is reversed in the upper class; upper class black women stand to the ideological left of their male counterparts on all political issues. The upper class sex gap is particularly great on the independence and redistricting issues, which both sexes support but on which the female mean score is more than three times higher than the male.

Bringing the economic and political data together, we can see that nationalistic and constitutional issues (foreign ownership, the 18-year-old vote, national independence, redistricting) have a strong appeal to upper class black women, whose leftist viewpoint is usually even stronger than that of blacks who are declared supporters of the PLP. But these same issues have either a negative or relatively low positive appeal to lower class black women, whose alignment with the PLP seems to derive more from their strong support of social welfare issues such as unemployment insurance and the wider distribution of scholarship aid. Thus the PLP would appear to attract lower and upper class black women on two different types of issues. Indeed, the lower class support the party *despite*

their objections to such fundamental PLP planks as national independence and equal size voting districts.

Black men exhibit greater ideological consistency in the sense that the lower class hold a more liberal viewpoint than the upper class on both social welfare and nationalistic-constitutional issues. This difference draws the two large male classes into opposite parties, as shown previously in Table 4-12. Ironically, though, the ideological distance between upper and lower class black males is generally less than is the case on the female side. Moreover, the male differences are of degree, whereas the female differences often entail one class being in agreement and the other in disagreement. Here, then, is another dimension of the complex relationship between sex and social thought in black political culture — a relationship that religion, our next topic, will further illuminate.

CHAPTER 8

RELIGION AND MORALITY

Like most of the Caribbean islands, Bermuda exemplifies what Cross (1950) called a "burned-over district" — an area scorched by the fervour of revivalist Protestantism. Evangelical sects, introduced since the late nineteenth century, are focal attractions and centers of influence in every sizeable community. Preachers deliver hell-fire sermons on street corners and outside bars. Weekly services take up two full pages of newspaper advertisements, and special services are given added publicity with handbills, radio announcements, and news coverage. Huge tents are set up for visiting evangelists whose accomplishments are celebrated in sectarian folklore and brought to the attention of the general public through persistent press releases. On Sunday, the air-waves are filled with religious broadcasts, those of the local churches as well as syndicated imports; further religious programming is scheduled throughout the week. Arguments such as whether Saturday or Sunday is the Christian Sabbath give rise to spirited pamphleteering and letters to the editor. Tracts are distributed on the streets and from door to door. Ministers and zealous laymen crowd the island's hospitals, urging patients to get "saved." In sum, the message and style of revivalism are encountered just about everywhere one turns in Bermuda.

Contrasted with the revivalist milieu is an older religious tradition centered in the larger denominations. The Anglican Church, not fully disestablished until the mid-1970's, is symbolized by its elegant Cathedral made of building materials imported from around the world and its historic parish churches with graveyards that silently trace Bermuda's aristocratic geneologies. Presbyterianism is small, but boasts its oldest church in the British Commonwealth and a pulpit where the famed George Whitefield spoke in the mid-18th century. Methodism came in 1799 and Catholicism about a half century later, but both denominations have built up substantial congregations.

The revivalist assemblies and the larger mainstream denominations present a radical contrast in theology as

well as outward style — a contrast heightened by the recent liberalism of mainstream Christianity and the adamant conservatism of the fundamentalist wing. But in Bermuda there is a further distinction. Mainstream Christianity is predominantly white, in terms of active, if not nominal, membership. The revivalist movements are almost entirely black.

Between them lies the African Methodist Episcopal (AME) Church, Bermuda's largest black religious organization. Following the classical Protestant model of doctrine and worship, the church is distinguished chiefly by its history as a protest movement against racial segregation. It has been a vehicle of black advancement in Bermuda, and is the only black church whose appeal to its adherents is consciously conceived in social rather than purely spiritual terms.

Like other aspects of black expression, politics is suffused with religious forms and idioms. The call and response trope that lures the black congregation into enthusiastic dialogue with the preacher has its analogue at PLP meetings where the audience respond enthusiastically to the candidate's remarks. Speakers play with the analogy, comparing collections to church offerings, likening political commitment to the conversion experience, and inviting audience to "testify" about their day-to-day problems and how the PLP provides a solution to them. The most serious messages are juxtaposed with detached humour and self-mockery, a performance device mastered by black preachers and found also in blues, calypso, and other black musical forms. The singing of hymns and recitation of prayers at PLP meetings provide a more explicit religious reference and contribute to the symbolic process whereby the relatively new experience of political involvement is given meaning in a context that is familiar and highly valued.

In the 1976 campaign, the PLP introduced a more comprehensive religious metaphor. The earlier secular dream of achieving revolutionary socialism and Black Power were replaced, or rather rephrased, with the Biblical theme of being a chosen people led by God to reform and inherit the earth. One candidate told a rally how the campaign recalled the hymn "Climbing Jacob's Ladder," a reference to the mystic ladder of Jacob's

dream linking heaven and earth and symbolizing promised redemption. As the lyrics indicate, he said, "We are going higher, higher, higher." Another appropriated the Old Testament dream archetype, recounting his "vision" of the marginal parishes falling successively into PLP hands: "I see Sandys. I see Warwick. I see Hamilton. And I see St. George's.....And the ugly head of the UBP is put down forever." As he recited the parishes, there was a gathering crescendo of excitement in the crowd. When he reached St. George's, the critical 21st seat, one supporter yelled hysterically, "Go down Moses. He's leading us to victory."

Party Leader Lois Browne invoked the religious metaphor frequently, depicting the PLP as an instrument of God's purpose. As she said at a rally following the election:

> God doesn't mean for oppression to win. So ultimately we will win. We must rededicate ourselves to the task.
>
> We have faith, strength. Even if we don't win, we're going to go on. It's inevitable. We know we're going up and the others are coming down. We will claim the victory in 1980, 1984, or whenever. It is God's work to so take us there....
>
> The party wants to build idealism and restore it to our lives and our politics. Our members are quality people. They are made in the image of God, and will serve you.

But the zeal and commitment inspired by such rhetoric is ultimately limited to those who hear it: the rally audience. To reach a larger, more undecided, and generally more middle-upper class public, the PLP developed a central issue based on religious and moral values: the need to protect and restore family life. The family was specifically mentioned eight times in the 1976 platform, furnishing the rationale for nearly every major plank. The following excerpts are representative:

> We view the steady deterioration of family life with alarm, and undertake to institute social and economic measures designed to STRENGTHEN THE FAMILY UNIT, and particularly as it is affected by unemployment.

> Every form of encouragement and support will be given to persons engaged in various forms of agricultural production...Home gardening encourages the strengthening of family units.
>
> A restructured, comprehensive social insurance programme will be instituted. Additional resources will be directed towards the strengthening of family life.
>
> Regulations will be instituted to ensure that TV and other forms of mass media are used to build and strengthen rather than destroy family life.
>
> In order to cater to the full development of family life, there must be available a proper layout of roads and houses along with adequate provisions for cultural and recreational facilities to occupy leisure hours....
>
> (PLP 1976)

Besides its prolific usage in the development of issues, the family symbol had a diffuse role in the campaign. A successful new candidate was billed as a "family doctor" and thus different from his opponent, a neurosurgeon. Candidates were encouraged to bring spouses and children to rallies and to have them on stage during their speeches. Many waxed at length about the happiness of their domestic lives. One candidate, the son of a Pentecostal minister, told an audience:

> I appreciate my wife. She's a wonderful woman. A beautiful woman. When you go behind closed doors at night, you need someone who's understanding, who can tell you, "Well, it's not so bad. Keep trying."

As the platform statements and other references make clear, the PLP's concern is with a particular kind of family — the nuclear, monogamous unit based on formal marriage. This is the family form generally idealized by black Bermudians and prescribed by the churches, but in practice achieved mainly by the middle and upper classes. It is often said that the definitive characteristic of Bermuda's black bourgeoisie is that they were born legitimately. An informant who attended the Berkeley Institute, Bermuda's most prestigious black high school, recalled that he was the only illegitimate child in his grade as well as the only one raised in a female-headed household. The black bourgeoisie righteously dissociate themselves from the lower class over the family issue, and

tend to force marriage on children who are expectant parents.

Besides appealing to the black bourgeoisie and erasing the class stigma that this social stratum previously suffered by aligning with the PLP, the family issue and other moral concerns furnish a new definition of the partisan controversy. It is no longer the PLP's economic and political views that distinguish it clearly from the UBP. These views have been muted and moderated, while the UBP has made increasing concessions to woo black support. Now the principal distinction, at least from the PLP's standpoint, is between its moral and humane values and the alleged materialistic greed of the UBP. At the final campaign rally in 1976, PLP Leader Lois Browne expounded on the "vital issue" faced by the voters:

> It's the question of family life, the quality of life, and what's going to happen to Bermuda. We have taken on this issue as a means of saving Bermuda from degradation and corruption. We have tried to impart the true social meaning and truth of life.
>
> There are big gaps between the PLP and the UBP. It's not just money. It's a question of values, dignity, love, and brotherhood.

The potential appeal of this rhetoric goes beyond the religious sensibilities and class consciousness of blacks. The Wooding Report, an assessment of the 1968 race riot, described Bermuda as an "artificial society." The observation was based on several considerations: the pervasive "holiday atmosphere" created by the year-round inundation of tourists, the overabundance of jobs, the astounding level of prosperity, the obsession with conspicuous consumption. The report went on to establish these social phenomena as a contributing factor in the breakdown of family life. Fathers take second and third jobs and mothers work outside the home, not so much to meet the high cost of living as to afford the cost of living high. The results are seen in rising youth crime rates, rising divorce rates, and the atrophy of conservative values normally sustained by a stable home life (Wooding 1969: 75-78).

While professional social analysts may question the causal relationship between Bermuda's social climate and the incidence of crime and divorce, the viewpoint

represented by the Wooding Commission has widespread acceptance in the principal institutions that shape Bermudian opinion, including the churches, schools, political parties and mass media. Predictably, each race faults the other. Whites consider blacks "irresponsible," more concerned with pleasure-seeking than the duties of home life, and more interested in acquiring expensive clothes and cars than putting their money into savings. Blacks blame whites for creating the type of economic system that encourages excessive consumerism, heavy indebtedness, and exorbitantly expensive food and housing prices. But beyond the racial polemic, most blacks and whites will admit that both charges are valid. The artificial society is a problem for which all tend to share the guilt.

The plea to rebuild the family and restore religious and moral principles is thus highly meaningful in a society which provides adequately for the satisfaction of material needs, but which has seen its spiritual values undermined by the artificial yet addictive culture of affluence.

Birth Control

Bermuda's population more than doubled in the first half of the twentieth century, a phenomenon resulting partly from the heavy influx of Portuguese and West Indian labourers but also from the reduction of infant mortality and other death rates. Concern about overpopulation was officially voiced as early as 1934, when the Board of Health considered "clinics for the dissemination of information with respect to birth control" (Roberts n.d.:2). [1] A public commission appointed in 1951 to examine population growth reinforced this position and laid the groundwork for what was to become one of the most successful birth control programmes in the world. By the mid-1960's birth rates had fallen to about 20 per thousand, a level generally considered ideal by advocates of population control. A decade later the rates fell further, to only 15 per thousand. Bermuda is unique among Antillean countries and one of the few non-industrialized

1. Bermudian interest in population control was reportedly awakened by American birth control propagandist Margaret Sanger, who visited Bermuda in the early 1930's.

societies in the world to have gained effective control over both mortality and fertility (Roberts n.d.:11).

Racially, in 1951 black women averaged 3.5 children, while white women averaged 2.3 children (*Report of Commission...*1951). Two decades later the rates had fallen to 2.55 for blacks and 1.55 for whites (Scott n.d.:8). But as the white population has been substantially increased in that period by short-term expatriates, many of them unmarried, it is blacks who have achieved the really dramatic drop in fertility.

The decline in birth rates is paralleled by overall changes in black female life styles. A social researcher reports that when black women in their late twenties or beyond are asked whether they would like another baby, they coyly decline with the stock reply, "I'm the baby" — a reference to their indulgent life style and their being pampered by husbands or boyfriends (Paul 1977). In most cases these same women work,[2] using their salaries for the home but also for travel, consumer luxuries, club activities, and other recreational pursuits that would be severely restricted by increased fertility.

The most extreme religious stand against birth control is that of the Black Muslims, now Bilalians, a group introduced to Bermuda in the 1960's and an active force since about 1970. They view contraception as a genocidal conspiracy, and react against it by strongly advocating large families. This view has an obvious political logic; had blacks maintained their former birth rates, their voting strength might now be sufficient to put a different party in power.

Some of the Christian churches as well as the PLP faintly echo the Muslim position. An AME minister recently told his congregation, "Sisters, throw away your birth control pills. Stop working, have children, and stay home with your husbands and families." The PLP takes no stand on birth control *per se*, but its strong advocacy of familism accords with the preacher's admonition. Tax reform and other economic promises are presented as a means of enabling families to support themselves without

2. Black Bermudian women now account for 43 per cent of the black labour force. By comparison, white women account for 36 per cent of the white labour force (Newman 1972: Table 24).

the mother needing to work. A new and successful candidate in 1976 told a campaign rally:

> One-fifth of a child's education occurs between the ages of four to six. Mothers should be with their children, instead of working outside. The PLP will make this possible, because it is dedicated to the restoration of the family unit.

TABLE 8 - 1
"PARENTS SHOULD BE PLEASED TO HAVE AS MANY CHILDREN AS THEY ARE BLESSED WITH, RATHER THAN SO CONCERNED ABOUT TRYING TO LIMIT THEIR FAMILIES THROUGH BIRTH CONTROL." (ITEM 7)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	101	22	15	7	35	22	- .19
White	100	3	11	8	22	56	-1.17

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	- .28	- .29	- .27	-1.13
Upper	- .64	- .95	- .20	-1.40
Middle	- .56	- .33	- .61	- .94
Lower	.02	- .05	.17	- .92

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	99	13	3	83	-1.27
UBP Blacks	100	27	3	70	- .53
PLP Blacks	100	43	5	52	- .02
PLP Black Converts	100	50	8	42	.33

Table 8-1 shows that both races reject the proposition that parents should have as many children as nature allows. For blacks, however, the rejection is marginal; nearly two-fifths of respondents support un-restricted natalism. By comparison, only 14 per cent of whites take the extreme pro-natalist stand. Thus birth control is clearly a white cause, while pro-natalism has a sizeable black following.

Black support for birth control rises with class, verifying the cliche that "the poor get children." The lower class marginally favour a pro-natalism position, while the middle and upper classes register considerable opposition to it. The pattern is similar among whites, but with much greater opposition throughout the class structure to unrestricted procreation. Upper class whites take a radical stand in favour of birth control.

Overall differences between black men and women are negligible, but sexual patterns by class and the views of the sexes within the same class reveal some striking differences. Men in all classes favour birth control, with support rising with class — an indication, perhaps, that social standing diminishes the value of paternity as a mark of manhood. Among black women, the lower class favour unrestricted procreation, while the middle and upper classes favour birth control — a difference that may reflect the strong influence of evangelical Protestantism on lower class women. Also of note is the considerable gap between the sexes in the black upper class. While upper-class men disagree strongly with the pro-natalist statement, the disagreement of upper-class women is marginal.

PLP blacks are divided, but marginally reject the statement supporting unrestricted procreation. UBP blacks reject it more forcefully, but not to the extent of their white colleagues. On the other hand, the PLP's black converts marginally favour unrestricted procreation.

Abortion

Abortion has been no less controversial in Bermuda than in North America. Both parties have avoided taking an official stand, as is customary on subjects that are considered a matter of personal moral judgment. Nonetheless, PLP members are generally known to op-

pose the legalization of abortion in Bermuda, while several white UBP members have spoken in favour of it under qualified circumstances.

As a form of population control, abortion has racial implications similar to those of the previous issue. Blacks have the great majority —about 20 to 1 — of out-of-wedlock pregnancies, presumably the kind for which abortions would be sought. Thus abortion is often construed by blacks as another white device to limit black numbers.

The counter argument is that Bermudians already acquire abortions in New York — provided, of course, that they can afford the trip and the medical expenses. Indigents are occasionally helped by a low-profile charity in Bermuda, supported largely by whites. There is, therefore, an anti-elitist rationale for legalizing abortion, premised on the view that those who wish to terminate a pregnancy should not be deterred by the lack of means to have it done abroad.

Table 8-2 indicates that 37 per cent of blacks — the largest single response group — agree strongly that abortion is morally wrong. Another 14 per cent agree somewhat, making a majority of blacks opposed to any move that would legalize abortion in Bermuda. About two-fifths of blacks disagree that abortion is morally wrong, while 8 per cent are unsure.

Whites take the opposite view. Nearly two-fifths of whites disagree that abortion is morally wrong, while only 28 per cent agree. Clearly, the issue is racially divisive.

The black class profile shows men and women moving in the same direction, but with considerable difference between them in all classes. Opposition to abortion is strongest in the lower class, and much stronger among women than among men. Opposition diminishes in the middle class, but women are still much more opposed than men. In the upper class, men are still opposed to abortion, albeit marginally; women, however, support abortion, or at least disagree with the statement that it is morally wrong.

As on the birth control issue, the class data for black women suggest that uneven distribution of conservative religious influences. The lower class, the principal con-

TABLE 8 - 2
"ABORTION IS MORALLY WRONG AND SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED IN BERMUDA." (ITEM 13)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	37	14	8	28	13	.35
White	100	14	14	7	28	37	- .59

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.35	.34	.37	- .63
Upper	- .11	.10	- .40	- .95
Middle	.30	.11	.34	- .50
Lower	.56	.45	.79	- .25

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	25	8	67	- .68
UBP Blacks	101	63	7	31	.70
PLP Blacks	100	50	6	44	.30
PLP Black Converts	100	17	8	75	- .83

stituency of evangelical Christianity, take the strongest stand that abortion is morally wrong. The upper class, probably more influenced by current ideas that the woman has a right to make her own choice, do not reject abortion on moral grounds.

All classes of whites disagree that abortion is morally wrong, the strength of disagreement rising with class. The class profile of whites thus parallels that of blacks, making differences between the races smaller in each class than between the races as a whole.

UBP blacks lead in anti-abortion sentiment, agreeing two to one that the practice is morally wrong. Their position polarizes them from their white colleagues, two-thirds of whom accept abortion. Such findings dramatize the UBP's dilemma and why it must remain neutral on an issue that whites heavily support. Oddly, PLP blacks, who are marginally opposed to abortion, hold a position that makes them closer than UBP blacks to UBP whites. As we shall see, this curious pattern recurs on religious and moral issues and points to a highly significant aspect of Bermuda's political culture.

The Family Unit

The call to strengthen the family unit summarizes and symbolizes the PLP's 1976 campaign. It was, a party official later confided, a "non-campaign waged over non-issues." Yet, the "family campaign" served the PLP's interests far better than previous campaigns waged over economic and political issues, giving the highest vote and closest brush with victory.

Table 8-3 reveals that a stronger family unit is desired by both races, but by blacks to a far greater extent than whites. Among blacks, 56 per cent agree strongly and another 22 per cent agree somewhat, that Government should act to strengthen the family, while a bare 6 per cent disagree. Among whites, 57 per cent agree, twice the percentage of those who disagree. About 15 per cent of both races are unsure, indicating, perhaps, an uncertainty as to whether Government should become involved, or can act effectively, in this area.

Black support for the proposition rises with class and is stronger in all classes among women than among men. This reinforces the notion that the nuclear, monogamous, legally constituted family is a cardinal aspect of bourgeoisie respectability, an Antillean value system embodied chiefly by the upper class and idealized by women more than men (cf. Wilson 1973). Thus the upper class gives much more support to a strengthened family unit than the lower class, while the female position is considerably stronger than the male. Male-female differences, pronounced in the lower and middle classes, are reduced in the upper class.

TABLE 8 - 3
"GOVERNMENT SHOULD TAKE POSITIVE STEPS TO STRENGTHEN FAMILY LIFE AND THE FAMILY UNIT." (ITEM 12)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	56	22	16	3	3	1.27
White	100	36	21	15	13	15	.50

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.18	1.06	1.32	.46
Upper	1.54	1.50	1.60	.35
Middle	1.12	.56	1.25	.69
Lower	1.08	.98	1.27	.33

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	101	57	17	27	.53
UBP Blacks	100	85	10	5	1.31
PLP Blacks	100	76	18	6	1.24
PLP Black Converts	100	75	17	8	1.33

On the white side the major fluctuation comes in the middle class, where support for the family is about twice as great as in the lower and upper classes. The appeal of the family to this segment of white society lays bare another dimension of their anxiety over present conditions and, hence, their alienation with the mainstream of the UBP. The closeness of the white middle class to black thought on the family issue is ironic in view of their radical opposition to black thought on such key political and economic issues as national independence, electoral

reform, foreign ownership, and unemployment insurance. Nonetheless, a continued emphasis on the family and other conservative moral issues could tap a sentiment that might draw the white middle class to the PLP, or at least neutralize their opposition.

The strongest race-party stand in favour of Government acting to strengthen the family unit — 85 per cent agreement — is taken by UBP blacks, while the weakest — 57 per cent agreement — is taken by UBP whites. As on the abortion issue, then, UBP whites are closer to PLP blacks than to the blacks in their own party. More politically significant is the extent to which an issue championed by the PLP has had its strongest appeal to blacks ideologically aligned with the UBP. This phenomenon throws light on the PLP's popular vote gain in 1976. Furthermore, it is likely that UBP black support for the PLP's position on the family comes primarily from the upper class — the stratum that left the PLP over its economic and political radicalism a decade ago. The family and related issues with moral overtones may thus be an ideological bridge that brings the black bourgeoisie back into the PLP.

Divorce

Divorce, the step that dissolves the family unit, has become increasingly prevalent in Bermuda. Between 1950 and 1970 the divorce rate rose by 67 per cent, about twice the growth rate of the population and roughly the same at that time as the American divorce rate (Newman 1972: 19-20). The rise in divorces has since accelerated, creating what many Bermudians consider an alarming trend.

Like other family problems, divorce is often traced to the economic conditions that bring Bermudian women into the labour force. A working mother summarizes a popular notion of the reason for marital breakdown in a letter to the editor:

> In order that I ease the financial pressure a little, I have to leave my six-week-old baby to go out to work to help my husband with the bills and so forth. It is no wonder that there are so many divorces among us.
>
> With all the strain a man has to carry on his shoulders... he just can't make ends meet, and before

> you know it a husband and wife are fussing because there is not enough money to go around. Next thing you know they are divorcing. This is one major fact in divorces: financial stress and strain (*Royal Gazette*, March 9, 1970, p. 4).

On closer inspection it would appear that cultural factors hold an intermediate position in the causal sequence of divorce. The better educational qualifications of women than men — particularly among blacks — enable wives to secure higher status and often better paid and steadier jobs than their husbands (Census 1970: 99-101). Their salaries, moreover, are considered their own, as black Bermudian spouses tend to keep separate bank accounts and maintain strict secrecy about their own assets. The financial independence of wives encourages psychological independence and the demand for equal privileges — including the taking of outside lovers, traditionally a male prerogative. Paul (1977: 141) reports a case, not exceptional, where a working black wife and mother carried on an extramarital affair simply to even the score after learning that her husband had a "ladyfriend." A variation of this scenario is commonplace in the black workmen's clubs, which in the past decade have become increasingly accessible to women, most of them separated or divorced (Manning 1973: 162-166).

Women's choir at the New Testament Church of God, Bermuda's largest Pentecostal assembly. The ideological conversion of black women to the PLP is the outstanding aspect of Bermuda's political ferment.

TABLE 8 - 4
"THE RISING DIVORCE RATE REFLECTS A SERIOUS MORAL DECAY IN BERMUDIAN LIFE." (ITEM 20)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	39	29	11	16	5	.81
White	100	24	28	4	29	15	.15

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.73	.56	.92	.04
Upper	.83	.48	1.33	.15
Middle	.56	.33	.61	- .13
Lower	.79	.62	1.31	.08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	57	5	38	.32
UBP Blacks	100	73	7	20	.81
PLP Blacks	100	68	11	21	.84
PLP Black Converts	100	50	25	25	.58

Table 8-4 shows that more than two-thirds of blacks and half of whites agree that Bermuda's rising divorce rates signal moral decay. Only 21 per cent of blacks disagree, compared to 44 per cent of whites. The data suggest that while both races view divorce as a serious problem, blacks have a greater moral aversion to it and a greater concern over its social consequences.

The middle class are less likely than other social strata to see divorce as a serious problem. This pattern is

found in both sexes of blacks as well as among whites, where the middle class actually disagree that the divorce rate reflects moral decay.

The concern of black women over divorce is much more acute than that of black men, a difference seen in all classes. This presumably reflects the greater religious orientations of black women, as well as the possibility that they feel the sting of divorce more than men. The difference between the sexes is more pronounced than on any other issue pertaining to the family, although women do take the more conservative position on all family issues. It is also notable that upper-class black men are morally less concerned about divorce than their lower-class counterparts, a pattern that is reversed among women.

Party allegiance makes little difference in black opinion, although a slightly greater percentage — 73 to 68 — of UBP blacks agree that divorce is a serious moral problem. The major difference is by race, as only 57 per cent of UBP whites share that view. Again, the PLP's identification with family stability would seem to have a strong appeal to UBP blacks.

The Artificial Society

The claim that religious values need to be restored to a society that has become excessively materialistic and pleasure seeking is, of course, a familiar revivalist admonition. But it has a particular relevance in Bermuda, where a strong tradition of conservative, ascetic religion is juxtaposed with the "holiday atmosphere" created by the major industry and dominant social presence. The opposition between them is total and cosmic. Religion points to an ultimate reality, while secular Bermuda, as the Wooding Report (1969: 75-78) noted, is an artificial society.

The antithesis between authenticity and pretense is morally played out in black society in the clash between the workmen's clubs and the churches. The clubs, collectively the largest black organization in Bermuda, are a social milieu focused on sport, entertainment, and sociability. Drinking, dancing, gambling, extramarital sex, Sunday sports, and other activities promoted or encouraged by the clubs are viewed by the churches as the outstanding examples of sin. The dichotomy puts the clubs

TABLE 8 - 5
"BERMUDIANS HAVE BECOME TOO MATERIALISTIC AND PLEASURE-SEEKING; RELIGIOUS VALUES NEED TO BE RESTORED." (ITEM 17)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	101	52	30	7	10	2	1.19
White	100	36	33	13	10	8	.79

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.15	1.04	1.26	.58
Upper	1.42	1.38	1.47	.60
Middle	1.00	1.11	.98	.94
Lower	1.12	.92	1.53	.08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	101	77	7	17	.93
UBP Blacks	100	90	3	7	1.31
PLP Blacks	100	83	6	11	1.26
PLP Black Converts	100	83	0	17	1.25

strictly off-limits to practicing Christians, and defines the clubs goers as the "backsliders" of Bermuda (Manning 1973: 60-85). As the clubs grow in popularity, the churches have an increasing appeal to an ever more jaded society.

Table 8-5 indicates that the desire to curb hedonistic trends is widespread in both races. More than half of blacks agree strongly and another 30 per cent agree somewhat, that religious values need to be restored.

Among whites 69 per cent agree, about half strongly and half somewhat, while 18 per cent disagree. The major racial difference lies in the greater percentage of strong agreement among blacks.

Support for the revival of religious values rises with class among black men. Black women project a different pattern, giving radical support in the lower and upper classes but considerably less, albeit still strong support, in the middle class. This pattern is rather similar to the female response on the divorce and birth control items, suggesting that black middle-class women are relatively liberal on some religious-moral issues. It may be that they are less influenced than the lower class by the rigid precepts of evangelical Christianity, and less influenced than the upper class by conservative bourgeoisie values. Middle-class black women are further noteworthy in that they are the only group who do not feel more strongly than their male class counterparts that it is necessary to stop hedonism and restore religious standards.

The most arresting feature of the white class profile is the notable differences between all classes. The call for religious reform evokes marginal support in the lower class, strong support in the middle class, and moderate support in the upper class. The strong concern of the white middle class is another indication of their alienation from current trends in Bermuda and their somewhat ironic ideological similarity to blacks.

Nine-tenths of UBP blacks agree, while only 7 per cent disagree, that it is necessary to stem the tide of hedonism and restore religious values. Regular and converted PLP blacks come next, each professing 83 per cent agreement. UBP whites are last, although more than three-quarters support the position. Note again that while all groups hold similar views, the major division is between blacks and whites in the UBP. UBP blacks are even more favourable to the religious reform of materialistic trends than are PLP blacks.

Gambling

Although Bermuda prohibits casino gambling — primarily because of the likelihood it would fall prey to foreign-based organized crime — gambling is a central

motif in Bermudian social history. Local writers typically view the island's economic, from piracy, smuggling, and "wrecking" in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to tourism and international finance in the twentieth, as a series of gambles waged by bold and far-sighted patriarchs. Their successful strategies in playing with forces controlled by the world powers are seen as the principal reason why Bermuda has never really suffered and in many periods has enjoyed phenomenal prosperity. The national motto, *Quo Fata Ferunt* — Whither the Fates Lead Us — is a statement not of resigned fatalism but of assertive confidence in the future, based on a history of productive opportunism.

Gambling in the more conventional sense is both a prevalent activity and an organizing metaphor in black Bermudian culture. The workmen's clubs regularly run bingo games, card games, and raffles. At club-sponsored sports festivals like Cup Match and County Games there is found the "stock market," a huge tent for the popular dice game of Crown and Anchor, as well as other tables for cards and crap rolling. The clubs have revived horse racing and are the principal venues for betting on local sports events contested by their teams. The ongoing influence of such activity encourages clubgoers to view their lives as a game of both skill and chance, best played by

Gamblers mill around Crown and Anchor tables at a club sports event. The PLP's conservative moral stand on gambling is supported by black women but rejected by black men.

calculating agonistic strategies to gain personal as well as social goals (Manning 1973: 87-145).

There are several agencies for British football pools in Bermuda and it is estimated by informants that seven of ten black men are, at least, occasional bettors. Off-track betting parlours were introduced in the mid-1970's; these offer patrons the opportunity to bet on British horse racing in the morning and on American dog racing at night.

The PLP opposes gambling on both economic and moral grounds. Economically it views the Betting Tax as a form of indirect and regressive taxation as well as money that comes ultimately from black pockets, as it is blacks who gamble. Morally it supports the position of the black churches, which view gambling as seriously sinful. In 1974 the PLP combined with politically active black churches to defeat a motion sponsored by the Government minister for Youth and Sport to establish a national lottery to finance sports facilities.

The UBP is generally viewed as tolerant of gambling, both as a tax base and as a recreational pastime. A recent move to tighten regulations on public betting was qualified to exempt the traditional "stock market" operation at sports festivals. On a different front several prominent UBP members are among Bermuda's avid high stakes gamblers. One of them, an appointee to the Legislative Council, has a gambling syndicate which recently won $27,000 from a single patron during a private, all-night Crown and Anchor party. The syndicate's attempt to collect the debt, which it had loaned to the bettor a thousand dollars at a time, resulted in a notorious court case.

Table 8-6 shows blacks evenly split on the gambling issue, a position symbolic of their experience with the contrasting influences of club and church. By comparison, half of whites support greater restrictions on gambling while two-fifths oppose them. This is the only religious issue on which whites take a more conservative stand than blacks, most likely a reflection of the simple fact that gambling in the conventional sense is not prevalent in white Bermudian culture.

Class differences among blacks stem primarily from the contrasting views of men and women. Men, in all

TABLE 8 - 6
"GOVERNMENT SHOULD RESTRICT AND DISCOURAGE GAMBLING (BETTING PARLORS, POOLS, LOTTERIES, ETC.)." (ITEM 22)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	29	14	10	24	23	.02
White	101	28	22	13	31	7	.33

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	- .10	- .41	.23	.33
Upper	- .28	- .43	- .07	.60
Middle	.12	- .78	.32	.19
Lower	- .15	- .36	.27	.08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	58	7	35	.52
UBP Blacks	100	44	7	49	- .10
PLP Blacks	100	44	6	50	.11
PLP Black Converts	100	54	15	31	.54

classes, clearly oppose greater Government control over a favourite pastime. Women favour such control in the lower and middle classes, but marginally reject it in the upper class. The female pattern is broadly similar to that registered on the abortion issue, the other item calling for prohibitive action from Government. The negative response from upper-class black women on these issues may reflect a sentiment that Government should not legislate morality.

All white social classes support greater restrictions on gambling, but the level of support rises with class. This finding confirms the speculation that those who participate in gambling are the least likely to favour Government control. What public betting is done by whites occurs in the lower and middle classes, the clientele of white recreational clubs which sponsor horse racing, weekly bingo games, and raffles.

Nearly three-fifths of UBP whites agree that Government should restrict and discourage gambling, as compared to an identical segment — 44 per cent — of both UBP blacks and PLP blacks. The PLP blacks register a positive mean score, however, owing to their relatively high percentage of strong agreement — a phenomenon that places them, once again, ideologically closer than UBP blacks to UBP whites. PLP black converts, meanwhile, take a clear anti-gambling stand, suggesting that the PLP's policy may have attracted them. The implication of these findings is that the UBP's tolerance of gambling would seem to provide not only a support-winning issue for the PLP, but also a source of opposition from its own white and black female followers — an opposition that the sentiment of black men alone is insufficient to counter.

Overview

Unlike economic and political issues, religious issues do not divide blacks by party. Only one of the six issues — the statement suggesting that parents have as many children as nature allows — evoked a major difference between blacks along party lines. By comparison, there were major differences between UBP blacks and whites on this same issue as well as on three other religious issues — abortion, gambling, and strengthening the family unit. On all religious issues the differences between the races in the UBP were considerably greater than the party differences between blacks. If nothing else, religious issues overcome black partisan disunity.

What is particularly striking and ironic is that on most religious issues the opinion of UBP blacks is such that their white colleagues are actually closer to the PLP's blacks. The statements on abortion, divorce, the threat of materialism, and the need to strengthen family life, see

UBP blacks take a more conservative stand than the blacks in the PLP — despite the PLP being identified with the conservative position on these issues. This suggests that the PLP's religious-oriented election campaign in 1976 must have had a tremendous appeal to UBP blacks, despite their disagreement with the PLP's economic and political planks.

But while religion heals the party rift between blacks, it accentuates other divisions in black society. Economic and political issues evoke on major differences between the black upper and lower classes as a whole, or between upper- and lower-class black men. Yet the birth control, abortion, and family issues do evoke such differences. The significance of this pattern becomes more apparent when one looks at whites, whose major class differences stem from economic rather than religious ideology. Thus while white class consciousness is predicated on socioeconomic interests, black class consciousness seems to be predicated more on religious and moral values. Note, however, that this comparison pertains only to ideological differences between classes, not to their objective stratification.

Religion also widens the sexual dichotomy among blacks. A total of six major male-female differences in the upper and/or lower classes are elicited by birth control, abortion, divorce, gambling and the need to restore religious values — as many major sexual differences as are evoked by all of the economic and political issues combined. Furthermore, the religious differences are more consistent than the economic and political differences and thus potentially more significant. Women, as a group, always take the more conservative position on religious issues — the position most closely identified with the moral respectability that distinguishes the black bourgeoisie.

The PLP's recent emphasis on religious and moral concerns has thus functioned to articulate black class consciousness, to project an image of bourgeois respectability, and to appeal to black women in general and upper-class black women in particular. A continuation of this emphasis seems likely to gain additional followers from the ranks of UBP blacks, whose views on religious and moral issues are fully compatible with those of PLP supporters. But does this strategy run the risk of

alienating the PLP's lower-class supporters, especially men? Perhaps such a trend is suggested in Table 4-15, which shows a slight loss of black male support for the PLP in contrast to the heavier increase of black female support. The PLP's current campaign in the black churches not only associates it with religious and bourgeoisie standards but also with a predominantly female social milieu. Conversely, the UBP's tactic of canvassing the workmen's clubs exposes it to the antithesis of these standards as well as to a principally male domain. These opposing strategies could result in an exchange of supporters along lines of sex, class, and value orientation.

CHAPTER 9

RACE

Summarizing its assessment of the underlying causes of Bermuda's 1968 race riots, the Wooding Commission discussed the race factor as a paramount consideration and irreducible premise of Bermudian thought:

> ...Practically everything is viewed in (racial) profile in Bermuda because it is seen by everyone in each racial group from a subjective racial angle. The relations between the police and the civilian public, the enforcement of laws which are or tend to be a source of grievance, the banning of publications, the ideology of Black Power, the cult of the Black Muslim, the reliance for the colony's revenue upon import duties and non-imposition of direct taxation, the anti-discrimination enactments and their application or non-application in letter or spirit, the slow and mostly one-way (black into white) progress towards integration in the schools, the availability without discrimination in practice of sporting and other recreational facilities, the social conditions, the expensive recruitment of skills from abroad, the immigration policy and its effect upon job opportunities, trade union demands and employers' resistance to them, the confrontation between the political parties, the struggle for leadership within the parties themselves, the basic attitudes of people to people — whatever may be said or left unsaid when such subjects are discussed, none of them ever fails to provide, deep down, variations (more or less subtle) on the one theme (1969: 86-87).

The present data amply confirm these sweeping generalizations. As a correlate of ideology, that is, sociopolitical thought, race overrides all other variables. But how do Bermudians think of race itself? What are their sentiments on problems that are explicitly as well as implicitly racial?

The cultural meaning of race in Bermuda is ambiguous, having been shaped by two variant social traditions. The first is an institutional tradition, developed under rigid segregation similar to that practiced in the American South. Schools, churches, clubs, restaurants,

theatres, neighbourhoods, place of work and business — all were formally segregated until the early 1960's and most have remained essentially constituted along racial lines. The institutional tradition has made the races separate and self-contained groups, each with its own cultural style and outlook.

The second tradition that has shaped the meaning of race derives from the experience of informal interaction. Historically (including the slavery period) black Bermudians worked as seafarers, artisans, and domestics, positions which afforded a physical and personal closeness to whites that was unknown in the plantation societies of the Caribbean (Parsons 1925). The transactional context of race relations was the patronage system, which endeared blacks to whites emotionally as well as economically and which instilled in whites an abiding, albeit paternalistic, sense of social responsibility. The circumstances of living in a miniscule, isolated, and densely populated island furthered the attachment of each race to the other, as did the mating liaisons that created kinship ties across racial lines. The Bermudian proverb, "Skin is black or white, but blood is red," recognizes that racial segregation and the disparities sustained by it are only one aspect of the social order. Beside them, and to some extent above them, is the realm of personal interaction between the races, governed customarily by a spirit of amity and mutual affection. Social relations have, therefore, masked and tranquilized social organization, furnishing a dimension of the racial experience that is equally as real and meaningful as structural segregation.

The difference between the political parties can be viewed with reference to these two variant traditions. Almost all candidates, members, and supporters of the PLP have been black, a handful of socially marginal whites being the only exceptions. The party dismisses its mono-racial composition as inevitable in a society based on racial segregation, occasionally chiding whites for their aversion to joining black-led movements. But neither has it seriously elicited white membership or even white voting support, primarily because of the prevalent view that separatism is psychologically necessary at the current stage of black development. White recruitment is still seen by many in the PLP as tantamount to seeking

white approval, and thus a feared impediment to black self-confidence (Hodgson 1974: 150-151).

For the first decade of its existence the PLP linked its separatism with overt racial militancy, presenting a posture that many blacks as well as whites viewed as a threat to the harmony of race relations. The instigation of racial violence and tension in the late 1960's and early 1970's was often indirectly linked with the PLP. The Wooding Report (1969: 11-12) cited the party's provocative rhetoric in the 1968 campaign as one of the factors that precipitated the rioting of black youths. A widely publicized charge of racism against Lord Martonmere, Bermuda's popular Governor from 1964 to 1972, alienated both whites and moderate blacks. A strong verbal attack in Parliament on Governor Richard Sharples was headline news on March 10, 1973 *(Royal Gazette, p.1)*; that evening, Sharples was assassinated by a black Bermudian.

Exactly opposite has been the UBP's approach to race. The party draws its principal symbols from the spirit of interracial rapport found in the margins and interstices of the social structure, proclaiming that spirit as the basis of a new social order and the only system that can guarantee Bermuda's continued political stability and economic prosperity. The party's central theme is the "partnership," represented by a handshake in black and white and the nomination of racially mixed tickets in about three-fifths of Bermuda's double constituencies. The party actively recruits influential blacks as parliamentary candidates and administrative officials. White members cautiously refrain from statements that could be construed as racist, attacking the political opposition on exclusively ideological grounds.

Committed to desegregation — a goal sought by black activists from the late 1950's onwards — the UBP was unassailable for a long time on racial issues. The PLP and its one-time allies, the black street gangs and para-military units that flourished ephemerally in the early 1970's, were left with no rhetorical weapon except the charge that the UBP was still a white party that had fooled the public by taking in a few Uncle Toms. But as the appeal of formal integration gradually waned and the PLP muted its militant racialism, the UBP's bi-racial image came

under more cynical scrutiny. The UBP Black Caucus, formed in 1974, claimed that the party's acronym could be interpreted to mean "used black people." It demanded a far greater role for blacks in the party, as well as substantial programmes aimed at meeting black interests in the fields of education, employment, and business.

The PLP's religious stance has enabled it to exploit the UBP's racial dissension. In the 1976 campaign, the PLP frequently attacked the "partnership," not as a moral ideal but as the artifical and hypocritical pretense of one. Alternately, the party indicated that its promised moral rebuilding of society would include a "real" or "true" partnership of the races. This view was sanctioned when a black Pentecostal minister told a campaign rally on election eve:

> We've been hearing a lot lately about some kind of partnership. We see blacks and whites shaking hands on television. I'm not against it. God knows I'm not. But I like to see the real thing.

The institutional and personal relationship between the races, and the dramatic changes that have taken place on the racial front, underlie the issues that we shall now examine.

Bermudianization

Bermudianization, ostensibly a nationalist issue, exemplifies the inextricability of race from Bermudian social reality. Nearly three-tenths of Bermuda's total population and a full third of its work force are foreign born. Of these, 85 per cent are white — a group that is about two-fifths British and otherwise Portuguese, American, and Canadian. An astounding 57 per cent of Bermuda's white population are foreign born, as compared to only 7 per cent of the black population. Consequently, although blacks are 76 per cent of the native-born population, they are only 59 per cent of the resident population (Census 1970; Newman 1972: 7-8).

Consistent with the social logic of colonialism, foreigners have predominated in positions of authority and prestige. As recently as the late 1960's, Englishmen constituted two-thirds of the police force (including 19 of the 24 officers above the rank of sergeant and 27 of the 43

sergeants), and expatriates, mostly British, accounted for 54 per cent of the teaching staff (Wooding 1969: 43-44, 124). In 1970, 17 per cent of civil servants were expatriates, a figure that does not include the estimated large number of foreigners who have achieved status, the Bermudian equivalent of citizenship (*Royal Gazette*, March 10, 1970, p.2). Most of the Bermuda's churches, including the larger and more influential assemblies, have long had predominately foreign clergies.

The expatriate presence increased dramatically in the 1960's, foreigners having a numerical growth rate of 66 per cent and rising from 21 to 28 per cent of the island's population (Newman 1972: Table 18). This trend has been partially curtailed in the 1970's, through tightening up work permit and residence certificate requirements, new restrictions on home ownership by foreigners, and the introduction of a quota system which limits status grants to one-tenth of one per cent of the native-born population — 38 persons per year. Yet as the teaching profession and other job areas traditionally dominated by foreigners become increasingly Bermudianized, the demand for skills not readily available in Bermuda moves to relatively new sectors of the economy. International corporate business has spawned and proliferated positions in accounting, executive secretarial work, bookkeeping, and similar specialties for which Bermudians, and particularly black Bermudians, have not been trained. Government's short-run dilemma is whether to stop economic growth — an option that seems absurd in comparison to other nations — or to continue the influx of skilled personnel from white metropolitan countries — a course fraught with political liabilities.

Meanwhile, black pressure for Bermudianization increases. In 1977 the AME Church, Bermuda's largest and most influential black religious assembly, petitioned Government to implement full Bermudianization of the work force in five years, adding that it referred exclusively to native-born Bermudians (*Bermuda Sun* May 13, 1977, p.1). Ironically, about three-quarters of the Church's ministers in Bermuda are black Americans, and the petition itself was endorsed by the black American bishop "responsible" for Bermuda — items that comment

TABLE 9 - 1
"THE PROCESS OF BERMUDIANIZATION NEEDS TO BE SPEEDED UP, PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD TO GETTING BERMUDIANS INTO TOP JOBS." (ITEM 21)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	74	19	2	5	0	1.62
White	100	25	32	3	26	14	.28

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.65	1.54	1.77	.21
Upper	1.67	1.52	1.87	- .30
Middle	1.82	1.67	1.85	.75
Lower	1.55	1.53	1.60	.33

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	55	2	43	.17
UBP Blacks	100	88	2	10	1.37
PLP Blacks	100	94	2	4	1.75
PLP Black Converts	100	92	8	0	1.77

forcefully on Bermudianization as a racist rather than nationalist process.

Turning to the survey, three-quarters of blacks agree strongly, and another fifth agree somewhat, that Bermudianization of the labour force needs to be speeded up (Table 9-1). Only 5 per cent disagree, none strongly, resulting in the highest mean score recorded by either race on the entire questionnaire.

Radical support for Bermudianization is found in all black classes, although the middle and upper strata — those in closest job competition with expatriates — respond more strongly than the lower stratum. Black women favor Bermudianization to a greater extent than black men, a discrepancy that increases with class. These sexual differences, however, reflect intensity of agreement rather than agreement itself. Among upper-class black women, for example, 87 per cent agree strongly and another 13 per cent agree somewhat, while none is uncertain or in disagreement. Upper-class black men are also unanimously agreed, but more evenly divided between those who agree strongly (52 per cent) and those who agree somewhat (48 per cent). Similar proportions divide the sexes in the black middle class. Again it should be pointed out that the black women have had longer experience than black men at being in job competition with expatriates.

Among whites there is greater class variation. The lower and middle classes support a speeding up of Bermudianization, while the upper class oppose it. The relatively strong position of the middle class suggests their rising expectations and their sense of frustration at seeing top-level positions held by expatriates — an attitude that gives them much in common with blacks, especially middle class blacks.

UBP whites marginally support Bermudianization, 55 per cent professing agreement and 43 per cent disagreement. This position separates them appreciably from their black colleagues, 88 per cent of whom favour the Bermudianization proposal. The division of opinion along racial rather than party lines fits with the UBP Black Caucus' demand for a moratorium on status — a position taken by the PLP since the 1960's

Amalgamation

Until 1965, Bermudian schools were allowed to maintain racial segregation, an option that nearly all of them took. Encouragement to integrate in the latter 1960's produced only one apparent result: a trickle of bright black students into some of the prestigious secondary schools that were formerly all white. Committed to fuller integration, Government began in 1971 what it called

"Amalgamation." De facto white and black schools were combined into single units, resulting over the next five years in a 25 per cent reduction in the number of primary schools. At the same time the island was divided into three school zones, and each child required to attend a primary school in his own zone.

Predictably, the programme has been controversial. For whites, who are only about a quarter of the school age population, the process involved being moved from schools that were entirely white to schools that were three-quarters black. About a third of white children affected by amalgamation dropped out of public schools, moving into two white private schools as well as two Government schools that opted to go private (Scott 1975). The consequence has been a tendency toward the resegregation of education along private-public lines, a situation not unlike the former distinction between "vested" (white) and "non-vested" (black) schools.

Black reaction to amalgamation has been mixed. Although the programme has given blacks access to schools with relatively high educational standards, the ideal of integration is now out of vogue. Blacks also resent the loss of schools as well as other institutions that contributed historically to the racial struggle (cf. Manning 1973: 38). Those who take this view, however, are appeased by the fact that the largest and most renowned black schools — notably Berkeley Institute and Sandys Secondary — remain, literally, 99 per cent black (Scott 1975).

Nearly two-thirds of blacks reject the claim that amalgamation has done more harm than good, as opposed to only a fifth who agree with it (Table 9-2). Among whites, the outstanding response — 43 per cent — is uncertainty, the highest level of uncertainty recorded by either race on the entire survey. Otherwise, a third of whites agree that amalgamation has been primarily harmful, while a quarter disagree.

Black opinion varies little by class, although there is a consistent pattern of increasing support for amalgamation as one moves socially upward. Looking closer, however, we see dramatic sexual

TABLE 9 - 2
"THE AMALGAMATION OF SCHOOLS HAS DONE MORE HARM THAN GOOD." (ITEM 15)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	9	12	14	35	30	- .65
White	100	7	25	43	18	7	.07

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	- .68	- .69	- .68	.10
Upper	- .77	- .60	-1.00	.10
Middle	- .70	- .67	- .71	.25
Lower	- .64	- .72	- .48	- .08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	35	40	25	.13
UBP Blacks	99	17	10	72	- .86
PLP Blacks	100	20	17	63	- .66
PLP Black Converts	101	31	31	39	- .15

variation. Black male support for amalgamation actually decreases with class, albeit slightly. It is black female support that rises with class, and to an extent that is enough to offset the reverse trend among men. Consequently, the greatest sexual difference lies in the upper class, a finding that is now relatively commonplace.

Class differences are more pronounced among whites. In the lower class, where only 25 per cent are uncertain, there is marginal acceptance of amalgamation. Notably, lower-class children of

Portuguese descent attended black schools before the recent drive for integration, and had gone to black schools as a matter of course until the 1930's when Government pressured them to do otherwise (Hodgson 1967: 27). Middle-and upper-class whites, however, support the proposition that amalgamation has done more harm than good. This reaction was foreseen in the 1964 Houghton Report, which predicted a white backlash to school integration, not on the grounds of racism but over resentment at having relatively less access to Bermuda's top quality schools (Scott 1975).

UBP whites, like whites generally, are highly uncertain about the effects of amalgamation. Still, 35 per cent agree that the programme has done more harm than good, as compared to 25 per cent who disagree. Their black colleagues, on the other hand, are strong supporters of amalgamation; nearly three-quarters reject the negative proposition, while only 17 per cent agree with it. PLP blacks also support amalgamation, but not as intensely as their UBP counterparts. These findings, reinforced by the UBP Black Caucus' concern over mono-racial schools and criticism of whites for removing their children from Government schools, dramatize the UBP's dilemma. To maintain the favour of its black followers, the UBP must continue a programme that only a quarter of its white followers unreservedly support.

The Partnership

Entitled *The Partnership that Works*, the UBP's 1976 campaign platform explained its slogan and principal theme as follows:

> The cornerstone on which the United Bermuda Party was founded remains unchanged. Unchallenged, and more relevant today than ever before, is the fundamental belief that only a genuine relationship and partnership between our two races, living and working together in mutual respect, can preserve the spiritual and economic well-being of all Bermudians. It is this spirit of working together which has enabled us — better than almost any other country — to meet and overcome the difficult challenges of recent years.

> Our partnership is the politics of trust: a sincere belief that politics is people working together to guarantee useful and rewarding lives for ourselves and our children. To support this partnership is to support mutual respect and racial harmony .... (UBP 1976).

As a UBP slogan, the partnership has faced varied criticisms. The PLP attacks it as a hypocritical marriage of convenience designed to protect the economic status quo. Black cynics discuss it by quoting the Bermudian proverb, "A partnership is a leaking ship" — a reference to the many business deals that have sunk when one partner embezzled another. UBP supporters concede that the slogan was overused in 1976 and that it acquired a negative connotation in UBP circles by becoming especially associated with the relationship between Premier Sharpe and his running mate, Quinton Edness — a power center that was widely resented and that undoubtedly damaged Edness in his short-lived bid for the Premiership after Sharpe's resignation in 1977.

But the notion of partnership also has a more general meaning supported by the informal tradition of race relations and the spirit of friendliness and warmth that it symbolizes. Most Bermudians of both races cherish this

Waiting for supporters on polling day, Premier Jack Sharpe, right, and running mate Quinton Edness show concern over the trend that substantially reduced their winning margins.

TABLE 9 - 3
"THE CONCEPT OF BI-RACIAL PARTNERSHIP IS VERY IMPORTANT AND SHOULD BE HEAVILY STRESSED BY GOVERNMENT." (ITEM 18)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	34	35	20	9	2	.89
White	100	25	28	10	23	14	.28

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.86	.91	.80	.15
Upper	1.03	1.19	.80	.65
Middle	.61	.56	.63	0
Lower	.92	.87	1.04	- .50

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	55	7	38	.28
UBP Blacks	100	74	17	9	1.02
PLP Blacks	100	70	19	11	.90
PLP Black Converts	99	58	33	8	.92

ideal and hold the hope that social progress will better fulfill it. To quote the oft-spoken phrase, bi-racial Bermuda is potentially a "showcase for the world." The disagreement — between the races and the parties — stems from how to realize this potential.

Table 9-3 shows that blacks are considerably more favourable than whites to a formal emphasis by Government on the partnership ideal. More than two-thirds of blacks support the proposal, as compared to 53

per cent of whites. Only 11 per cent of blacks but 37 per cent of whites are in opposition. A fifth of blacks and a tenth of whites are unsure, a possible reflection of the double meaning in the term partnership.

Black support for the emphasis of bi-racial partnership is strong in the lower and upper classes but only moderate in the middle class — a pattern replicated in varying degrees by both sexes. But there is also the pattern of sexual inversion seen on the previous two racial items as well as on economic, political, and religious items. Black male support for the partnership is higher in the upper than the lower class, while black female support follows an opposite pattern.

The white class profile reveals broader differences. The lower class oppose the emphasis of bi-racial partnership, the only sample group on the survey to take a negative position. The middle class are neutral, and the upper class are nearly as supportive as blacks. The narrowing of the racial gap in the upper class on this general issue contrasts with the widening of that gap on more specific issues such as Bermudianization.

While UBP blacks are, as expected, more favourable to the partnership ideal than their PLP counterparts, the difference is slight. A far greater difference is found between the races in the UBP. The nearly two-fifths of UBP whites who disagree with the proposal to emphasize the partnership indicates again how the party's attempt to appeal to blacks draws mixed reactions from its majority supporters.

Race Relations

While desegregation has removed the formal inequality of blacks, it has also brought new tensions into the informal relationship of the races. With access to the same facilities and resources, blacks and whites are now structural competitors. Unlike traditional relationships based on patron-client ties, modern relationships in institutional settings have no established model. Personalities are left to experiment with an encounter for which there are as yet no cultural rules.

The mildest complaint is that integration has had no substantial carryover into the lives or attitudes of those

brought together in work settings, schools, or public facilities. As one black who worked in a racially mixed office put it, "We both come down the same elevator at five o'clock. He (a white co-worker) goes right, and I go left, and we don't see each other again until nine o'clock the next morning" (Manning 1973: 37).

A more serious complaint is that race relations have not improved in recent years, but deteriorated. The amity and mannered politesse that formerly characterized the black-white encounter have given way to contempt and hostility. Reporting his views to the Race Relations Advisory Council — a permanent committee established after the 1968 riots — a senior civil servant recently stated that prejudice and antagonism are growing in Bermuda, not diminishing. As evidence he cited the prevalence of slur terms, the sullen attitudes of blacks to whites, the spreading white backlash, and, most dramatically, the murders of several whites by black gunmen. Vignettes such as the following, he suggested, are increasingly typical:

> He (a white motorist) stops at a crosswalk to let a black girl cross. She looks at him insolently and proceeds to cross at a snail's pace. Angrily he honks his horn and in return gets: "Fuck off, you white bastard". He mutters to himself: "More chance of you being a bastard than me, you black bitch".
>
> He (the same motorist) arrives at work and a job that was once competed for only by white Bermudians. His experiences during the day confirm his conviction that black means lazy and incompetent. He sums it up over morning coffee with three white companions with the observation that it takes three black people to do the work that used to be done by a white person.

While few would totally deny the existence of attitudes illustrated by such scenes, the social changes produced by integration are at least equally significant. Unlike the United States, Bermuda had no court pronouncements to outlaw segregation. The first breakthrough came in 1959 when an anonymous black group picketed the theatres as a protest against segregated seating arrangements. The theatres capitulated within weeks, setting an example soon followed by hotels, restaurants, and other public facilities anxious to avoid the bad publicity of a

confrontation. Even the Church of England eventually stopped its practice of pew renting, which had effectively reserved the front half of the church for whites.

When the UBP was formed in 1964, it co-opted the integration thrust by opening the civil service to blacks and by passing legislation to end segregation in schools and other institutions under Government control. It also used its influence to remove formal racial barriers in clubs and other private facilities, a course that realized its most dramatic success when the aristocratic Royal Bermuda Yacht Club admitted a few black members towards the end of the decade. Thus in the short span of ten years Bermuda moved from total institutional segregation to the integration, albeit nominal, of both public and private domains.

Table 9-4 shows that both races are clearly convinced that Bermuda has achieved significant race-relations progress in the past decade. A full 81 per cent of blacks and 91 per cent of whites support the statement, making it one of the few items that is strongly favoured by both races. The black response is roughly commensurate with their support of amalgamation and the partnership ideal, issues which logically bear on the climate of race relations. Whites, on the other hand, oppose amalgamation and support the partnership only marginally, despite their radical conviction that race relations have improved.

The black lower class agree strongly, and the middle class moderately, that race relations have improved. In each class the sexes hold a similar view. In the upper class, however, male agreement rises to its highest level while female agreement falls to its lower level. As in the previous three racial issues, the sexual patterns by class are opposite.

Also opposite are the class patterns of the two races. Whereas blacks in the middle and upper classes are less convinced than in the lower class that race relations have substantially improved, white agreement with that contention rises appreciably with class. As it is primarily the middle and upper classes of both races who have been brought together by integration, these data indicate that the situation has impressed them quite differently. Greater exposure to whites has made blacks more cynical

TABLE 9 - 4
"BERMUDA HAS MADE GREAT PROGRESS IN THE FIELD OF RACE RELATIONS IN THE PAST DECADE." (ITEM 3)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	99	25	56	4	9	5	.87
White	100	40	51	3	6	0	1.26

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.89	.99	.77	1.31
Upper	.89	1.10	.60	1.50
Middle	.64	.67	.63	1.38
Lower	1.02	1.00	1.07	.92

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	95	3	2	1.38
UBP Blacks	99	93	3	3	1.36
PLP Blacks	99	71	5	23	.50
PLP Black Converts	100	69	8	23	.62

about the progress of race relations, whereas greater exposure to blacks has made whites more optimistic.

Race relations is the only racial issue to unify the races in the UBP and to divide blacks along party lines. There is nearly unanimous agreement in both races of UBP supporters that race relations have substantially improved during the past decade. By comparison, only 71 per cent of PLP blacks share that view, while 23 per cent reject it. It would seem that confidence in the betterment

of race relations is one of the factors that keeps blacks in the UBP. Those blacks who have left the UBP, the PLP's black converts, are similar to other PLP blacks in their level of reservation about whether there has been progress in race relations.

Integration

Whatever their views on anti-segregation statutes, Bermudians hold strongly that integration should be voluntary rather than forced — a rather obvious logic, perhaps, in a society where race has been the fundamental social barrier. Table 9-5 shows that 87 per cent of blacks and 89 per cent of whites support integration as a voluntary process. Only 8 per cent of blacks and a mere 2 per cent of whites are in disagreement.

Black support for voluntary integration is strongest in the lower class, the group least affected by it in their daily lives. Slight reservations but still strong support for the voluntary principle are found in the black middle and upper classes. Again, sexual patterns by class are opposite. Black male support for voluntary rather than forced integration is strongest in the upper class, where 95 per cent agree with the item. Black female support, conversely, is weakest in the upper class, where only two-thirds agree and one-third disagree.

As on Bermudianization, amalgamation, and race relations, the white class profile is partly an inversion of the black. White support for voluntary rather than forced integration rises considerably from the lower to the middle and upper classes, just as black support falls from the lower to the middle and upper classes. The difference of opinion between the races is greater in all classes than it is between the races as a whole.

With reference to the previous item about the improvement of race relations, it is notable that those who feel most strongly that outstanding progress has been achieved — upper — and lower — class black men, lower-class black women, and middle — and upper-class whites — also take the strongest position that racial integration should be voluntary rather than forced. Conversely, those who have greater doubts about the betterment of race relations — upper-class black women, middle-class black

TABLE 9 - 5
"RACIAL INTEGRATION SHOULD BE VOLUNTARY RATHER THAN FORCED." (ITEM 10)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	62	25	5	4	4	1.37
White	99	75	14	8	1	1	1.60

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.35	1.46	1.24	1.50
Upper	1.23	1.70	.60	1.60
Middle	1.16	.67	1.27	1.69
Lower	1.51	1.49	1.53	1.08

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	95	3	2	1.73
UBP Blacks	100	86	9	5	1.48
PLP Blacks	100	85	3	12	1.23
PLP Black Converts	100	92	0	8	1.67

men, and lower-class whites — are more inclined to hold that integration may have to be forced. A single but numerically sizeable exception to this rule are middle-class black women, who score relatively low on believing that race relations have advanced but who are strongly convinced that integration should not be forced.

UBP whites take the strongest position in support of voluntary integration, 95 per cent agreeing with the proposition. Blacks come about ten percentage points behind, holding almost identical positions regardless of their party preference. Hence despite the high agreement

percentages in both races, the issue is divisive primarily along racial rather than party lines.

Overview

Like religion, race generates issues that unify blacks across party lines. On all issues but one — the question of whether race relations have substantially improved in the past decade — UBP and PLP blacks are closer in opinion than are the races in the UBP. Ironically, on two issues — amalgamation and the partnership concept — the position of PLP blacks is such that they are closer than UBP blacks to UBP whites. The attraction of UBP blacks to that party is explainable only with reference to their strong belief that Bermuda has achieved significant progress in race relations — a belief that clearly separates them from PLP blacks but makes them almost identical to UBP whites.

Unlike religion, however, race does not divide blacks as a group by class. But it does make major differences between upper-and lower-class black women, a pattern resulting from the militancy and cynicism of upper-class women on racial issues. More striking, however, is the class inversion between the sexes. As men move up the social scale they become more sedate and more optimistic. As women move up the social scale, they assume opposite attitudes. The result is sizeable differences between the sexes in the black upper class.

Relating this contrast to the issues, we see first of all that upper-class black women are relatively unconvinced that progress has been made on the racial front. Their solution is not to stress the partnership ideal, but rather to pursue Bermudianization more aggressively, to continue school amalgamation, and even to consider forced integration in other areas. Upper-class black men, conversely, believe strongly that race relations have improved and place high value on the partnership concept as a national ideal. They favour Bermudianization (although not as radically as women), have doubts about the effectiveness of school amalgamation, and are nearly unanimously convinced that racial integration should be voluntary rather than forced.

In sum, economics, and politics are the issues that divide blacks across party lines, while religion and race

are the issues that unite them. Religion also brings out black class consciousness as well as major sexual differences in all black classes. Race does not articulate black class consciousness, but elicits a sexual inversion by class that parallels the pattern of party agreement (cf. Table 4-12) and thereby suggests its political significance. Were the PLP to exploit race as successfully as it has recently exploited religion, it would have a source of symbols and issues with immense potential to draw blacks. The association of religious style with racial culture in the format of campaign meetings is a step in this direction, as is the assertion that conservative moral values are essentially consistent with black cultural tradition and essentially opposed to the materialistic orientation of whites.

The white class profile is outstanding in that it is the ideological reverse of the black. The opinion of the races moves in opposite directions by class on all but the partnership issue. This pattern supports other data in indicating that Bermuda is not, as liberal optimists once believed, becoming a racially integrated class society. Class comparisons exaggerate rather than diminish ideological differences between the races as a whole. One can predict that race will remain a fundamental social barrier and thus a potential political weapon.

CHAPTER 10

LAW AND DISCIPLINE

In all societies there is a need to reaffirm common values and accepted mores by punishing those who transgress them. In Bermuda the problem of discipline is rendered more difficult and delicate by two peculiar conditions. First, the self-containment and compactness of an island environment make it especially critical to maintain social equilibrium. Second, the overlap of kinship, network, residence, and other bases of social relations results in a highly diffuse bond between those in authority and those under their jurisdiction.

The traditional predominance of expatriates, primarily white English but also black West Indian, in the teaching profession, the police force, and the judiciary, has functioned on one level to by-pass the ambivalence of exercising discipline in a personalized society. But on another level it has heightened tensions stemming from race and nationality. With the substantial removal of white children from Government schools after amalgamation, the public school enrollment became overwhelmingly black. Likewise, the overall population under age 30, who accounted for nearly nine-tenths of all persons accused of crime in the first half of the 1970's, is two-thirds black. The familiar scenarios, then, are the black child being corrected and punished in school and the young black adult being arrested by police and perhaps convicted and sentenced in court — in all cases by foreigners who are more often white than black. The Wooding Report (1969) discussed the implications of these conditions, citing them as both underlying cause and immediate precipitating factor in the 1968 riot.

By North American standards, discipline is still severe. Corporal punishment in the schools has been curtailed, but head teachers have retained the prerogative of using it. Court fines for minor traffic violations (speeding over the 20 m.p.h. limit is the most common) often run as high as $150, and are supplemented by a two or three month suspension. Stiff fines and jail sentences are imposed for such misdemeanors as smoking marijuana.

(Visitors caught with marijuana are fined as much as $2,000, deported, and prevented from returning.) There are three prisons on the island as well as reform schools and other correctional centres.

The PLP's views on law and order issues are hardly more liberal than those that prevail in the councils of Government. The party recently criticized the police for not making mass arrests for marijuana smoking at an outdoor entertainment extravaganza coincident with Cup Match, Bermuda's major festival. The UBP, conversely, defended the police, not on the principle that marijuana smoking is permissible but on the expedient ground that mass arrests could have touched off a riot.

Yet while there is little genuine liberalism on disciplinary issues, conservative sentiment is widespread and militant. Callers to a recent radio forum were almost unanimously in favour of going back to greater corporal punishment in the schools and restoring the flogging and paddling of criminals — forms of punishment whose Bermudian ancestry includes not only the whipping of recalcitrant slaves but also the use of the famous "ducking stool," a wooden seat to which petty offenders, usually women, were strapped and then submerged repeatedly in the ocean water. The following comments reveal a flavour, if not a statistically accurate picture, of public opinion:

> I think if people realize the punishment is going to be something that is going to hurt their hide, they are going to think twice before they commit it.....
>
> He that spared the rod, hated his son....
>
> The first offence for vandalism, crimes of violence, etc., — flogging should be brought in.....
>
> If those criminals cause pain they should receive pain. I also think that the birch should be brought back into the school, and the parents should use it more. You'll find that you would not need it as much as some people would think because it will always be in the back of their mind. In the old days, we had respect for our elders, and if you did not respect them there was the cane across your back or something; and if you went to school and you got the cane you did not go home and tell your father and mother about it because they would add to it. Since the parents and also the courts have been lenient on the use of the cane

on people, there are more problems not only in Bermuda but all over the world.....

In any society, if it is not run with an iron hand — in other words, fear — it'll just get progressively worse...

If some of these youngsters were given the birch — not the cat o' nine tails, just the birch — and anybody could go and look, that would be a great deterrent....

It doesn't seem like the crime rate has decreased since they stopped flogging and I think in cases where physical or mental pain is inflicted on these people they might not be so apt to go and do these things again or it would tend to deter others.....

Flogging is the only thing that is going to cure this horrible business with children. It does not matter if they are big or small, black or white, they are all the same. I feel it is very important that corporal punishment has to come back (to the schools)...

I am 100 per cent for it (whipping of criminals). When it is abolished, crimes increase 100 per cent. If brought back, without any doubt, crimes would decrease at least 50 per cent. I am not brutal — as a matter of fact I am very soft-hearted– but I don't see why they should get away with it.....

I was attacked by a man who was trying to take my hand bag. If people are going to hurt you, they should be hurt. (*Bermuda Sun*, December 24, 1976, p.6).

Law Enforcement

Table 10-1 reveals that comments of the type above are consistent with the tenor of public opinion. Almost three quarters of blacks and nearly nine-tenths of whites agree that the police and judicial system should impose harsher treatment on lawbreakers; less than a fifth of blacks and only 10 per cent of whites disagree. The stronger stand of whites may reflect not only the racial implications of the judicial process but also its economic implications. Crimes of violence against tourists have risen to the extent that many consider them a serious threat to Bermuda's reputation as a vacation resort. In the 1976 election campaign a white UBP candidate called for tougher law

TABLE 10 - 1
"THE POLICE AND COURTS NEED TO TAKE STRONGER MEASURES IN DEALING WITH LAWBREAKERS." (ITEM 5)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	36	38	8	15	3	.90
White	100	61	26	3	6	4	1.35

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	.87	.86	.88	1.35
Upper	.94	.95	.93	1.15
Middle	.74	1.00	.71	1.63
Lower	.90	.81	1.10	1.33

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	87	2	11	1.28
UBP Blacks	100	83	5	12	1.17
PLP Blacks	101	68	9	23	.74
PLP Black Converts	101	85	8	8	1.23

and order by warning his audience that "A crime against a tourist is a crime against Bermuda."

Black support for stricter law enforcement is strong in the lower and upper classes but moderate in the middle class — a reflection of the liberalism of women in this group. In the lower class, however, black women take a more conservative stand than their male counterparts.

White support for harsher penalities is highest in the middle class, followed by the lower class and then the upper class. All classes of whites, however, give greater support to increased law and order than any class of blacks.

The issue splits blacks along party lines to a much greater extent than it splits the races in the UBP. This suggests two points: first, that a strong law and order stand by the UBP would bolster or at least maintain its standing among blacks; second, that the PLP's recent campaign against capital punishment may be — quite apart from the ensuing riot — a political liability. Notably, the PLP's black converts are far closer in opinion to UBP supporters than PLP supporters.

School Discipline

The contention that school discipline has broken down and should be restored is radically supported by both races — the only item on the questionnaire besides voluntary integration to enjoy that distinction. Table 10-2 shows that nearly two-thirds of blacks agree strongly, while another fourth agree somewhat, that the school problem is critical and in need of forceful action. On the white side 56 per cent agree strongly, while 32 per cent agree somewhat. The difference between the races is smaller than for any other item on the survey.

The chief differentiating factor among blacks is sex, as women in all classes take an even more radical stand than their male counterparts in favour of greater discipline — a reflection, undoubtedly, of the closer involvement of women in the schools. The largest difference between the sexes is in the upper class, where women register a mean score of 1.87 — the result of almost unanimous strong agreement. Notably, upper class black women — many of whom are teachers — also gave the strongest support to school amalgamation (cf. Table 9-2).

On the white side, contrastingly, there seems to be a correlation between the conviction that school discipline has seriously broken down and the view that amalgamation has been harmful. The middle class voice the highest agreement with both propositions, and whites generally have mixed views about amalgamation. The suggestion is that whites tend to view racial mixing as a

TABLE 10 - 2
"THE BREAKDOWN OF DISCIPLINE IN THE SCHOOLS HAS BECOME A CRITICAL PROBLEM AND NEEDS TO BE DEALT WITH MORE FORCEFULLY THAN AT PRESENT." (ITEM 1)

A. RACE

Race	Percent						Mean Score
	Total	Agree Strongly	Agree Somewhat	Not Sure	Disagree Somewhat	Disagree Strongly	
Black	100	64	26	7	3	0	1.49
White	100	56	32	11	0	1	1.40

B. CLASS, RACE, AND SEX

Class	Mean Score			
	Black			White
	Both Sexes	Male	Female	Both Sexes
All Classes	1.51	1.42	1.62	1.33
Upper	1.64	1.48	1.87	1.20
Middle	1.46	1.22	1.51	1.50
Lower	1.50	1.43	1.63	1.33

C. PARTY AND RACE

Party and Race	Percent				Mean Score
	Total	Agree	Not Sure	Disagree	
UBP Whites	100	88	12	0	1.45
UBP Blacks	100	88	10	2	1.50
PLP Blacks	100	92	5	3	1.50
PLP Black Converts	100	100	0	0	1.69

source of disciplinary problems, while blacks, who are equally convinced that disciplinary problems exist and must be remedied, do not attribute these problems to racial integration.

While class and sex differences are relatively small, they are greater than either racial differences in the UBP or partisan differences between blacks — a unique response pattern and one that reflects the bi-racial and bi-

partisan accord that the disciplinary issue evokes. UBP whites and blacks voice the same agreement level — 88 per cent — while blacks in both parties register an identical mean score — 1.50. Notably, there is unanimous agreement among PLP black converts that school discipline has broken down and must be forcefully remedied.

Overview

Law and discipline issues provide a common ground, and a very conservative one, on which all Bermudians stand. There are no major differences on these issues along lines of race, party, sex, or class — a pattern found nowhere else on the survey. Hence whatever their other disagreements, Bermudians stand united on the conviction that firm social control is necessary.

Middle class whites, whose disaffection with current trends has been manifest throughout the survey, take a particularly strong stand in favour of greater discipline in both the schools and the judiciary. This group thus epitomizes Bermudian thought on the issues which most unify the diverse and otherwise disagreeing components of society. Interestingly, middle class whites also epitomize the most common feature of Bermuda's political transition: increasing alienation from the UBP and growing uncertainty in the choice between the parties (cf. Table 3-7). That conservative, middle class whites exemplify ideological aspects of a society that is three-fifths black is thus another outstanding attribute of Bermuda's unique political culture, as well as a critical commentary on the significance and potential impact of their current role as a dissident element in the UBP.

CHAPTER 11

CONCLUSION: REPUTATION AND RESPECTABILITY

This study has considered two phases of Bermuda's political transition. The first, examined historically, has been the process marked by the rise of political consciousness among blacks, the drive for universal suffrage, political party formation, the constitutional establishment of representative government under the Westminster model, and the evolution of ideological positions and social alignments within the context of partisan combat. The second, examined through survey research, has been the electorate's shift of voting allegiances and party agreement, developed with reference to a social profile of public opinion on the major issues and problems that have preoccuppied political discussion in the past decade.

The data show clearly that the voting change of the mid-1970's, the immediate cause of the PLP's improved prospects, resulted primarily from a socially broad shift rather than the impact of new voters. Among blacks who voted in both 1972 and 1976, UBP support declined from 19 to 13 percent, PLP support increased from 76 to 80 percent, and split ticket voting increased from 5 to 7 percent (Table 2-5). This impressive shift is seen in all but one age group (Table 2-10), and in both sexes (Table 2-11). New black voters — the group reputed to be responsible for the PLP's popular vote gain — gave the PLP the same level of support as those blacks who voted in 1972, although the new voters did give somewhat less support to the UBP and more to split tickets (Table 2-6). While blacks who reached the voting age after 1972 did, as speculated, give higher than average support to the PLP (Table 2-6), they account for only about a third of the PLP's popular vote gain among blacks in 1976. The remainder of that gain comes from the politicization of those who previously failed to register and/or vote, and from the conversion of those who previously voted for the UBP or split tickets (Table 2-7).

The evidence for a political transition among blacks is reinforced by the results of the residential survey, which

measured party agreement. Between 1972 and 1976 black UBP agreement declined from 34 to 29 percent, while PLP agreement rose from 49 to 52 percent and uncertainty from 18 to 19 percent (Table 3-7) — figures that closely parallel the voting shift. Unlike the voting shift, however, the party agreement shift is seen only in women, where it occurs in every cohort and amounts to a sizeable overall gain of seven percentage points for the PLP. A black male agreement shift to the PLP is seen in the 21-29 cohort, but is offset by a counter shift to the UBP among those in the 30-39 cohort and those over 50 (Table 3-8). Hence while both sexes of blacks increased their vote for the PLP, only women are now more in agreement with the PLP than in the previous campaign.

The political transition is also seen among whites, who previously gave unanimous support to the UBP. Among whites who voted in both 1972 and 1976, UBP support declined from 100 to 98 percent, the transfer going to split tickets (Table 2-8). But among whites who voted in 1976 but not in 1972, UBP support is lower — 91 percent; the remaining voters are evenly divided between PLP and split ticket supporters (Table 2-9).

As on the black side, party agreement data reinforce the white shift in voting patterns. Between 1972 and 1976 white UBP agreement fell from 92 to 85 percent, while PLP agreement rose from 1 to 4 percent and uncertainty rose from 7 to 11 percent (Table 3-7). Unlike the black party agreement shift which occurs only among women, the white shift occurs in both sexes as well as in most age groups (Table 3-9).

In both races the transition is more of a shift away from the UBP than toward the PLP. The UBP's loss of voting support is thus divided between the PLP and split tickets (Table 2-4), while its loss of agreement is divided between the PLP and uncertainty (Table 3-7). Such data throw light on the rise of cross voting and its result, the election of split representation. Before 1976 Bermuda's twenty double seat constituencies were exclusively in the hands of a single party; now three of them — all formerly held by the UBP — are divided between the parties.

A fascinating picture emerges when social class is considered, a variable derived from educational and oc-

cupational data elicited on the residential survey. Among whites the decline in UBP agreement is concentrated in the middle class, where less than seven-tenths of respondents now prefer the UBP as compared to nine-tenths of the lower and upper classes. The drift from UBP agreement to uncertainty in the white middle class began at least as early at 1972, and exemplifies a more general trend of white erosion from the UBP (Tables 4-11, 4-16).

Among blacks, class controls emphasize the arresting differences between the sexes as well as rather striking differences within each sex. Three-fifths of lower class black men express agreement with the PLP, the choice of only a third of their middle and upper class counterparts. In the lower and upper classes, the two largest male groups, there has been a loss of PLP agreement and a corresponding rise of UBP agreement and uncertainty (Table 4-15).

Substantially dissimilar is the political profile of black women. More than half of the lower and middle classes and nearly nine-tenths of the upper class express agreement with the PLP. All classes of black women have



Premier David Gibbons, right, accepts congratulations from his resigned predecessor Sir John Sharpe, after the caucus meeting which chose Gibbons over C.V. "Jim" Woolridge, left (Sun Pic)

shifted from the UBP to the PLP, resulting in a decline of UBP agreement from 33 to 23 percent and an increase of PLP agreement from 53 to 60 percent (Table 4-15).

Described as "the most striking feature of Negro social organization" (Keil 1966: 18), the opposition between the sexes has been extensively discussed in a variety of studies pertaining to black domestic behaviour, life style, and cultural character. The present study shows that black sex differences have a crucially important political dimension as well. This "politics of sex" clearly warrants further research, which can build upon the quantitative parameters presented here.

In Caribbean literature perhaps the most insightful anthropological model of black sex differences has been furnished by Wilson (1973). He discerns two contrasting value systems associated with opposite sexes. The male value system, known as "reputation," is socially egalitarian and centered in the fraternal peer group. It emphasizes indigenous ideals of behaviour and demeanor: competitive and performance abilities, verbal fluency, sexual prowess and virility, swagger and "prettiness" (flashy clothes, ostentatious jewellery, chic grooming, etc). The female value system, known as "respectability", is centered in family and household and premised on social class consciousness. It emphasizes standards of conduct and appearance inherited from external, metropolitan influences: the ideal of monogamous, formal marriage, bourgeois sexual morality, strict childrearing practices, conformity to law and established social norms, and the virtues of sobriety, discretion, responsibility, and self-improvement.

The association of these contrasting value systems with opposite sexes refers to a general proclivity rather than an absolute distinction. Women, while normally expected to project respectability, recognize reputation and may at times practice some of its behaviours. Men, though highly involved in reputation, acknowledge respectability as an overall ideal and partially tend to internalize it with age, marriage, and social advancement.

For Wilson the source and rationale of respectability is the church, and in particular its standards of family and sexual morality. "The mores advocated by the church, including especially monogamous marriage, are the

ultimate referent for respectability. From this follows the emphasis on the nuclear family household as the ideal, not so much from the angle of composition as from the point of view that such a family is the indivisible unit of the society" (Wilson 1973: 100). Thus the church constituency consists mainly of women and their children, while the peer groups that sustain reputation (exemplified in Bermuda by the workmen's clubs) are essentially a male domain.

From this perspective the PLP's emphasis on religion, and particularly its appropriation of the family as a platform plank and campaign symbol, looms important in relation to the large and growing political/ideological differences among blacks by sex and class. Let us examine the extent to which religion, viewed in the context of the reputation-respectability model, illuminates key findings of the surveys.

Religious issues account for the major ideological dissonance between black men and women. Of the six religious items on the residential survey, three (gambling, divorce, and family life) evoke statistically significant[1] differences between the sexes — a proportion far greater than that produced by any other topic. The gambling and divorce issues yield the largest mean point spreads between black men and women on the entire survey. On all religious items women take the more conservative moral position.

Religion also elicits contrasting sex results among black men and women with reference to class differences. All three items which evoke statistically significant differences between upper and lower class black men are religious (birth control, family life, religious values). Black women, however, reveal statistically significant upper-lower class differences on ten items, only two of which are religious (abortion and family life). It is primarily politics and secondarily race which evoke the greatest class differences among females.

A plausible reason for this contrast lies in the bourgeois orientation of religion-respectability values. As women generally accept and project these values

1. For a discussion of statistical significance, see Appendix C. Unless otherwise noted, references to statistical significance in this chapter do not distinguish between .9 and .8 levels.

regardless of socioeconomic position, they are drawn together by class on religious issues. But as men in all socioeconomic strata are culturally inclined toward the egalitarian attitudes of reputation, religious issues have the opposite effect of emphasizing and enlarging class differences.

Consistent with the reputation-respectability perspective, the political use of religion by the PLP is meaningful to blacks in ways that vary appreciably by sex and class. Lower class women evidence the most comprehensive and unqualified allegiance to conservative religious standards. They are strongly in favour of strengthening the family unit and restoring religious values, and are anti-birth control, anti-abortion, anti-divorce, and anti-gambling. On political, economic, and racial matters, however, their views often run counter to those of the PLP. They oppose national independence and electoral redistricting, take the position that Bermuda is drifting too far toward socialism and that Government is financing services that individuals should provide for themselves, and are strongly convinced that Bermuda has achieved outstanding progress in race relations and should now emphasize bi-racial partnership. Given their disagreement with some of the major points and programmes that the PLP has stressed over the past decade, their sizable and growing agreement with the party seems likely to derive in large measure from their attraction to it on religious and moral grounds. From the PLP's standpoint religion has thus played a crucial role in delivering the support of lower class black women.

Among upper class black women, by comparison, conservative religious standards have a more qualified appeal. They favour birth control, and do not think that Government should legislate against abortion and gambling. They do, however, radically support the religious issues explicitly championed by the PLP: the need to strengthen family life and to restore religious values. In addition, they are highly concerned over the moral implications of rising divorce rates.

On political, economic, and racial questions upper class black women invariably uphold the positions of the PLP. Indeed, their support for national independence, redistricting, and Bermudianization is even stronger than

that of PLP blacks as a whole. They are relatively conservative on the desirability of unemployment insurance and the awarding of scholarships on the basis of monetary need, but still profess moderate agreement with these proposals. Given this ideological profile, the radical support of upper class women for the key religious issues of the family and moral values would seem to heighten their attraction to the PLP — an observation that certainly fits this group's astonishing rise of PLP agreement from 60 to 86 percent.

Black men, though less strongly attracted than black women to religious positions, nonetheless evidence a similar pattern of class support. Thus while upper class black men are more permissive than their lower class counterparts on birth control and abortion, they are also much more in favour of strengthening the family unit and restoring moral values to a society deemed excessively materialistic. This confirms the bourgeois respectability inherent in the PLP's major religious themes, showing that they are relatively more attractive to the upper than the lower class in both sexes of blacks.

But whereas black women profess party agreement by class in a way that is consistent with their religious responses, the class pattern of party agreement among black men is exactly opposite to their religious responses. Lower class men are twice as heavily in agreement with the PLP as their upper class counterparts. If not religion, then what are the key issues influencing the partisan leanings of black men?

We turn to political, economic, and racial issues, which elicit consistent, albeit relatively small and statistically insignificant, differences between upper and lower class black men. On all these issues the upper class take a position that is more conservative and more compatible with dominant interests. Economically, upper class men differ from their lower class counterparts in favouring greater control over the labour union, being less concerned about foreign ownership, and less in favour of unemployment insurance, tax reform, and scholarships for poor but deserving students. Politically, upper class men are less supportive than lower class men of the 18-year-old vote, national independence. and redistricting, and more in favour of professional or business success

being regarded as a prior qualification for political life. Racially, upper class men differ from lower class men in being slightly less supportive of Bermudianization and more strongly convinced that race relations have substantially improved and that the black-white partnership ideal should now be stressed. In short, while the ideological differences between upper and lower class men are not great, they are wholly consistent with the fundamental finding that there is majority PLP agreement in the lower class and majority UBP agreement in the upper class.

One can therefore conclude that economics, politics, and race, but not religion, are the major ideological influences on black male party agreement. This deduction fits with their lesser exposure to the church than their female counterparts, and their much greater exposure to the secular politicization process carried on in the workmen's clubs and other centres of the reputation value system. The data do not imply, however, that the PLP's religious emphasis alienated black men. With the exception of gambling (an entertainment that the PLP disapproves but that black men in all social classes approve), there is strong male agreement with the PLP's stand on key religious and moral issues. What is suggested by the data is simply that religion is not a support-winning issue among black men, as it is among women. The more probable reason for the PLP's loss of ideological agreement among black men would be the party's relative inattention to the political, economic, and racial issues that influence male partisan orientations.

Drawing these observations together, we begin to see the crucial and complex significance of religion in black political culture. More than all other issues, religious issues serve a vital double function:
1) they diminish and transcend partisan differences among blacks;
2) they intensify and polarize racial differences within the UBP[2]. Religion is thus a potential basis of what is at once the PLP's most cherished dream and the UBP's most feared threat: black political solidarity.

2. All six religious items evoke statistically significant (at the .9 level) differences between UBP whites and UBP blacks, a record unmatched by any other group of issues.

Yet while religion overrides the most obvious political cleavage among blacks — the division between those who favour opposite parties — it accentuates internal cultural divisions that have far reaching political implications. As noted, religious issues elicit the greatest differences between the sexes. They are also the only issues that elicit statistically significant class differences among men — differences which are great enough that they remain significant when blacks of both sexes are viewed as a single group. Religion therefore exposes what has traditionally been the PLP's major weakness: class dissension. Unlike the 1960's when labour gained effective control of the party, professional and business groups now dominate the hierarchy through their preponderance on the central committee and the parliamentary caucus. Labour controls the trade union, the party's principal affiliate and the power base for a growing co-op and credit union movement. Labour interests are also represented on the leftist Pembroke Branch, the party's oldest and most autonomous parish organization and virtually a dissident group in its own right.

The growing hope of victory has held the PLP together, as both sides now realize that they need each other's vote getting appeal. But class tension is at best thinly veiled, and at times nakedly visible. A continuing emphasis on the religion-respectability value system maintains rather than eases this tension.

Further implications stem from the finding that the political, economic, and racial views of black middle and upper class men are more closely attuned to the credo of the UBP than the PLP. In view of the acceleration of Bermudianization, one can confidently predict that the major occupational shift of the coming years will be the movement of black men into technical, administrative, and managerial positions now held by white male expatriates. Black women will also advance, of course, but to a lesser extent; their movement into white collar positions, chiefly clerical and some of the professions, began in the early 1960's and by 1970 had already resulted in nearly half of the working black women holding white collar jobs, as compared to less than a fifth of working black men (Census 1970: 177-8). In sum, upward occupational mobility, a process that strengthens the PLP

among black women and the UBP among black men, is likely to produce net gains for the UBP as long as men have the greater rate of mobility.

The findings ultimately suggest, then, that the political transition may be oscillatory rather than unilineal. The factors that strengthened the PLP in the middle 1970's may later generate trends that favour the UBP, or the positions that the UBP currently represents. From an economic viewpoint this tendency is easily explained as the triumph of dominant material interests. But it also has a cultural explanation predicated on the symbolic role of religion in the dialectic between respectability and reputation. The PLP's use of religion appeals to the bourgeois ethos, attracts black women, and diminishes the fear that keeps the UBP cohesive. But religion fails to offset the secular appeal of the UBP to black men, and accentuates the class differences that are the PLP's major source of dissension. The PLP is tempted to respond, as it did in late 1977, by again courting those perceived, albeit mistakenly, as the embodiment of lower class and left wing concerns: the back of town youth gangs. The unplanned result is a riot that not only revives the PLP's spectre as an intolerable threat to conservative interests, but also enhances the brokerage value and therefore the political clout of UBP blacks, the privotal group in the partisan confrontation.

The implications of this scenario for voting trends are problematic, as the scenario is predicated solely on the data about party agreement and political thought. The post-election survey indicated that black males have increased their vote for the PLP, supporting it to a slightly greater extent than their female counterparts. As suggested earlier, this discrepancy is illuminated by the agonistic conception of politics, an influence of reputation. Reputation fosters the sporting view of politics, encouraging men to view voting as an act of competition rather than an expression of conviction. By contrast, respectability emits the religious metaphor of conversion, accounting for the greater consistency among women between party agreement and voting.

In a broader sense, however, it does seem likely that the ideological sentiments of upwardly mobile black men will eventually colour their political participation. Either

they will compete for their goals from within the UBP, as the Black Caucus have done, or they will support the PLP but exert a conservative influence on its economic, racial, and constitutional policies. Despite the fear (or the promise) issued by assassinations and riots, it is unlikely that the political transition itself will undercut the inner structure of Bermudian society.

APPENDIXES

THE POST-ELECTION SURVEY

The post-election survey was conducted on June 12, 1976, twenty-five days after the General Election which saw four marginal parliamentary seats and six percentage points of the popular vote shift from the UBP to the PLP. A Saturday was chosen, as it is the major shopping day in Hamilton and therefore the best occasion to find a rough cross-section of the population walking about. Each of four pollsters was assigned to a major commercial block, while a fifth (the author) covered all four blocks to keep in touch with other pollsters as well as to interview.

The approach was for the pollsters — three black and two white — to stop persons of their own race, using the following introduction:

> Good morning/afternoon. I'm working on a research project about voter attitudes, and I'm wondering if you could help me by answering a few questions.
>
> You haven't been interviewed already today, have you? (If yes, terminate interview.)
>
> First, are you a registered voter and did you vote in the recent general election? (If answer to either question is no, terminate interview.)

When necessary, respondents were assured that all answers were anonymous and confidential, and that the survey was neither conducted nor supported by a political party. The following questions were then asked:

1. Are you currently a member of either political party?
   a. . . . . non-aligned
   b. . . . . UBP member
   c. . . . . PLP member
2. (If applicable) When did you join that party?
   a. . . . . within the last six months
   b. . . . . since the 1972 election
   c. . . . . since the 1968 election
   d. . . . . before the 1968 election

3. In 1968 there were three parties. Did you vote then for the UBP, the PLP, or the BDP, or did you split your vote?

   a. . . . . UBP
   b. . . . . PLP
   c. . . . . BDP
   d. . . . . split
   e. . . . . qualified to vote, but either not registered or did not vote
   f. . . . . not qualified to vote

4. Going back to 1972, did you vote then for the UBP, or the PLP, or did you split your vote?

   a. . . . . UBP
   b. . . . . PLP
   c. . . . . split
   d. . . . . qualified to vote, but either not registered or did not vote
   e. . . . . not qualified to vote

5. Coming up to this year, did you vote for the UBP, or the PLP, or did you split your vote?

   a. . . . . UBP
   b. . . . . PLP
   c. . . . . split

6. In the next election who do you intend to vote for?

   a. . . . . UBP
   b. . . . . PLP
   c. . . . . depends on candidates
   d. . . . . undecided

7. Which party would you like to see form the government after the next election?

   a. . . . . UBP
   b. . . . . PLP
   c. . . . . undecided

8. Would you also tell me your age and the voting district you reside in?
   Age . . . . . .
   Voting District . . . . . .

9. Finally, are you a native born Bermudian, a status Bermudian, or a residence voter?

   a. . . . . native born Bermudian
   b. . . . . status Bermudian
   c. . . . . residence voter

   Thank you very much. I appreciate your help.

10. (Pollster: indicate sex of respondent).

    . . . . . M
    . . . . . F

Exactly 300 interviews were begun, and 293 satisfactorily completed — a sample equal to 1.1 per cent of the registered electorate and 1.5 per cent of those who actually voted in 1976. Respondents came from all twenty voting districts, with a concentration from the parishes of Pembroke (35 per cent), Warwick (16 per cent), Devonshire (14 per cent), and Paget (10 per cent) — the areas surrounding Hamilton. Of the 293 respondents, 205 or 70 per cent were black and 88 or 30 per cent were white.

A major concern was to check the probable accuracy of the survey by comparing its voting data for 1976 with the actual popular vote. Two basic calculations were necessary. First, the white respondents had to be expanded from 30 to 41 per cent of the total, their estimated proportion of the actual (as opposed to eligible) electorate, while the black respondents in the 21-29 cohort had to be reduced by a third, to compensate for an estimated high percentage of failure to vote in this cohort. Second, voters had to be translated into votes, a procedure involving the following operations: a) in the case of regular party voters, two votes were given to the appropriate party; b) in the case of those who cast only one vote or "plumped", one vote was given to the appropriate party; c) in the case of split ticket voters, one vote was given to each party. The results show 53.7 per cent of the survey respondents' votes going to the UBP and 46.3 per cent going to the PLP — a tally that falls within two percentage points of the 1976 actual popular vote. This suggests that the survey polled a representative segment of the electorate, and that it is, therefore, an accurate reflection of what it seeks to measure.

The table below shows the comparison of the adjusted survey results to the 1976 popular vote.

TABLE A
COMPARISON OF ADJUSTED SURVEY RESULTS AND 1976 POPULAR VOTE

	PERCENT	
	UBP	PLP
Adjusted Survey	53.7	46.3
1976 Popular Vote	55.5	44.4

THE RESIDENTIAL SURVEY

The residential survey was conducted over a two-week period in August 1976. Three marginal parishes were selected: Hamilton, Warwick, and St. George. Hamilton and Warwick are the parishes where the PLP gained its four new seats in the 1976 General Election, while St. George, traditionally regarded as the most conservative of Bermuda's predominately black parishes, is now regarded as an area where the PLP can and must make substantial inroads if it is to acquire a parliamentary majority.

The major sampling objective was to draw a population whose socioeconomic characteristics would be representative of the parishes as a whole. We divided postal districts into three strata on the basis of housing density and racial composition. High density districts where 80 per cent or more of the residents were black, were considered lower stratum. Middle density districts where 40 to 79 per cent of the residents were black, were considered middle stratum. Low density districts where 39 per cent or fewer of the residents were black, were considered upper stratum. Districts that did not meet the same criteria on density and race were eliminated from consideration, leaving 16 districts in the lower stratum, 12 in the middle stratum, and 6 in the upper stratum. On a random basis we then selected five lower stratum districts, four middle stratum districts, and two upper stratum districts, about one-third of each group.

Working from a map, interviewers began by numbering all households in the selected postal districts. They then visited every third household, beginning with the first, and sought to interview all registered voters. When eligible respondents were not home on the first visit, they made at least one call-back.

The questionnaire presented to respondents read as follows.

> You are asked to complete the following survey, as you have been randomly selected to participate in a public opinion study aimed at developing an understanding of how Bermudians feel about some basic issues and concerns.

Your responses are entirely anonymous and confidential. Your name is not taken or used, and the interviewer will not see your completed questionnaire unless you choose to show it. When the questionnaire is finished, it will be put in a sealed envelope which will not be opened until the survey is ready for processing.

Below are a series of statements. Please read each statement carefully and then indicate whether you: a) agree strongly; b) agree somewhat; c) are not sure; d) disagree somewhat; or e) disagree strongly.

a) To agree strongly means that you fully support the statement.

b) To agree somewhat means that you tend to support the statement but have reservations.

c) To be not sure means that you have no real opinion or are unfamiliar with the issue.

d) To disagree somewhat means that you tend to be opposed to the statement, but not completely.

e) To disagree strongly means that you are fully and firmly opposed to the statement.

1. The breakdown of discipline in the schools has become a critical problem and needs to be dealt with more forcefully than at present.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

2. All voting districts should have the same number of voters.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

3. Bermuda has made great progress in the field of race relations in the past decade.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure

d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

4. Government is spending too much money on services and benefits that individuals should provide for themselves.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

5. The police and courts need to take stronger measures in dealing with lawbreakers.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

6. A person should have made a success of his business or profession before standing as a political candidate.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

7. Parents should be pleased to have as many children as they are blessed with, rather than so concerned about trying to limit their families through birth control.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

8. Bermuda should aim at gaining national independence.

   a. . . . . agree strongly
   b. . . . . agree somewhat
   c. . . . . not sure
   d. . . . . disagree somewhat
   e. . . . . disagree strongly

9. Government should exercise more control over the labour union, especially with regard to preventing strikes.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

10. Racial integration should be voluntary rather than forced.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

11. Bermuda's tax structure should be changed in order to put the greatest burden on those who are most able to pay.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

12. Government should take positive steps to strengthen family life and the family unit.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

13. Abortion is morally wrong and should not be allowed in Bermuda.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

14. The amount of foreign ownership in Bermuda is a threat to the economic and social well-being of the island.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

15. The Amalgamation of schools has done more harm than good.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

16. 18 year olds should be allowed to vote.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

17. Bermudians have become too materialistic and pleasure-seeking; religious values need to be restored.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

18. The concept of bi-racial partnership is very important and should be heavily stressed by Government.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

19. Bermuda should have some form of unemployment insurance to provide benefits for those who are out of work.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

20. The rising divorce rates reflect a serious moral decay in Bermudian life.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

21. The process of Bermudianization needs to be speeded up, particularly with regard to getting Bermudians into top jobs.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

22. Government should restrict and discourage gambling (betting parlours, pools, lotteries, etc.).

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

23. Scholarships and bursaries for study abroad should be given to those students who have the greatest financial need, rather than to those who get the highest grades.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

24. Bermuda would be better off without political parties.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

25. Bermuda is drifting too far in the direction of socialism.

a. . . . . agree strongly
b. . . . . agree somewhat
c. . . . . not sure
d. . . . . disagree somewhat
e. . . . . disagree strongly

26. Which of Bermuda's political parties are you presently more in agreement with?

a. . . . . UBP
b. . . . . PLP
c. . . . . not sure

27. Which of Bermuda's political parties were you more in agreement with four years ago?

a. . . . . UBP
b. . . . . PLP
c. . . . . not sure

28. Are you a native-born Bermudian.

a. . . . . yes
b. . . . . no

29. Please check the bracket in which your own age falls.

a. 21-29
b. 30-39
c. 40-49
d. 50-59
e. . . . . 60 and over

30. Please note your sex.

a. . . . . male
b. . . . . female

31. What is the highest level of education that you have completed?

    a. ..... elementary school or incomplete secondary school
    b. ..... complete secondary school, with certificate
    c. ..... one or more GCE exams passed (O or A level)
    d. ..... post secondary academic or professional training, but not university degree
    e. ..... university degree

32. Please state your occupation.

    .....

33. Do you own your own home in Bermuda?

    a. ..... yes
    b. ..... no

    Thank you very much for your assistance.

While a few persons, chiefly the elderly, wanted the interviewer to read the questions and record their answers (an option offered to all respondents) the great majority preferred to complete the questionnaire themselves. The interviewer always remained present, however, to respond to any difficulties. The interviewer concluded by sealing the folded questionnaire in an envelope and recording the respondent's postal district and race on the outside.

Questionnaires were administered to 301 respondents, of whom 229 or 76 per cent were black and 72 or 24 per cent were white. Of course, not all respondents completed all items. Averages of the number of respondents in various categories are given in Chapter 5.

STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Reference to statistical significance has been omitted from text and tables for two reasons: first, to make the data as readable as possible for the non-professional; second, to obviate abuses that have crept into the use of statistical significance in the social sciences.[1] Too often statistical significance — the measure of probability that a finding observed in a sample exists in the population universe from which that sample is drawn — is confused with social significance — the importance and value of the finding. But what is highly significant statistically may be totally irrelevant socially — and, of course, vice versa. Numbers should not become a substitute for thought.

More reliable than tests of statistical significance are tests of replication — whether a finding from one survey is substantiated by findings from a separate and independent survey. It is for this reason that emphasis is placed on the many parallels between voting data recorded on the post-election survey and party agreement data recorded on the residential survey. Each complements and reinforces the other, lending added credibility to some important findings.

Bearing in mind such precautions, we can turn to Table C, a measurement of statistical significance between the mean scores of selected control groups. The designation "x" indicates significance at the .9 level; that is, there are nine chances in ten that the finding of the survey sample exists in Bermudian society. The designation "•" indicates significance at the .8 level; that is, there are eight chances in ten that what is found in the survey is also to be found in Bermudian society.

As seen, racial differences are statistically significant on nearly all of the questionnaire items. Comparisons based on party, class, and sex are less likely to be statistically significant. Bear in mind, though, that significance is also a function of the number of cases; where the number is relatively small, a difference; even

1. My discussion of these abuses leans heavily on the critique of Lenski (1963: 367-370).

TABLE C
STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE

Item	RACE	RACE—PARTY		RACE-CLASS		BLACKS: CLASS AND SEX			
	Black vs White	UBP White vs UBP Black	UBP Black vs PLP Black	Black Upper vs Black Lower	White Upper vs White Lower	Black Male Upper vs Black Male Lower	Black Female Upper vs Black Female Lower	Black Male Lower vs Black Female Lower	Black Male Upper vs Black Female Upper
1							●		X
2	X	X	●		X		X	X	
3	X		X		X		●		●
4	X	●	●		X		●	X	
5	X		X						
6	X	X	X						
7	X	X	X	X		X			●
8	X	X	X	●			X	X	
9	X	X	X						
10	X	X	●	●			X		X
11	X	X	X		●				

12	X	X		X		X	●		
13	X	X	●	X			X		
14	X	X	X		●				
15	X	X							
16	X	X	X				X		X
17	X	X		●		●		X	
18	X	X			X				
19	X	X	●						
20	X	X						X	X
21	X	X	X				●		X
22	●	X						X	
23	X	X	X		●			●	
24	X		X					●	
25					X				

Key: X = significant at .9 level
Key: ● = significant at .8 level

though great, may not be statistically significant. In view of this mathematical limitation, the frequency of statistically significant differences based on class and sex comparisons among blacks is striking.

To use Table C, read down the "Item" column for the number of the statement for which information is sought. Then read across the page for data on the controlled comparisons listed on the top of each column.

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